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ON THESE WE MUST BUILD

CHARLES E. BATTEN
Crozer Theological Seminary

EDUCATION may be defined as the means any society uses to pass on to its children and youth the values which it seeks to preserve. It is a method of social control through which the younger members of the group, by one means or another, are introduced to the values of the culture, led to their acceptance, and taught how to inculcate them into their daily living. Thus, if one is really to know and understand the educational philosophy of any people, he must first become acquainted with the dominant and basic ideals and ideas of that culture. Any student of comparative education will agree that in order to study the educational system of any country it is necessary to understand the underlying philosophy of the people.

Political and military leaders have been well aware of this fact. That is one reason that as soon as one order is overthrown and another instituted there is immediate attention given to the schools. For example, just at present there is much educational activity in three parts of the world—Japan, Germany, and China. In each of these countries recently there has been a complete overthrow of the former government and a new system has been introduced: in these cases, communism and democracy. Old textbooks must be destroyed and new ones written; other teachers must be secured; systems of study and discipline must be revised—all in terms of the new philosophy.

So is it with our American system of education. There were certain fundamentals on which our country was founded. Chief among these are first the doctrine of natural rights, which states that every man is endowed with certain inalienable rights. These come not from the state. Rather, these rights come to men by God, their creator. By the very make-up of the universe men have these rights by nature. It is the function of the state to guarantee them. Thus it is that all men are entitled to the privileges of citizenship.

Closely associated with natural rights has been the doctrine of natural reason. As far as education is concerned, the doctrine has stated that if men

develop their reason and are informed they will be able to make correct decisions in governing themselves. Therefore it is important that all men have command of certain fundamental processes. They must all be able to write and read, for it is necessary to be able to communicate and understand ideas if one is to govern himself. Thus it is out of the basic philosophy of government that comes the idea of universal elementary education. Men to govern themselves in a democracy must be able to read and to communicate their ideas freely.

The philosophy of democracy lends itself to great self-criticism and adaptability. Just so has American education, particularly on the secondary level, been characterized. Its two most pronounced features have been and are its universality and its adaptability. So, out of the philosophy of democracy has come our educational system. The distinctives it possesses are those distinctives of the culture in which it has developed and which it has helped mold. If there is confusion, uncertainty, and conflict of ideas in the educational world today, it is largely because such conditions are also present in the democratic society of which we are a part.

What has been said of education in general also applies to Christian education. The same principles hold, for Christian education is the means the Christian society or the church uses to pass on to its youth the values which it feels are necessary for the preservation and the ongoing of the Christian community. Here, too, there has been much confusion in recent years. This has come about for a number of reasons. The first and paramount reason has been the lack of a basic philosophy of Christian education having as its undergirding a clear-cut conception of its purpose. Certainly, there have been developed objectives and goals, but to too many people these have been so many words. For the most part these have not been carried out because of a lack of understanding of them by those who were teaching in the program and by those administering it.

Behind this has been the fact that there has been much disagreement as to what is basic in Christianity, what are the values that must be perpetuated. There has been a confusion of ideas on this foundational level. Blanche Carrier gives a description of this condition with which all of us are familiar:

> About 1910, liberalism began to bring conflicts into many churches. The term "liberalism" may be used to describe any position in political science, religion or the arts which has moved away from the classical or orthodox tenets into a freer interpretation. Churches were indirectly influenced by several aspects of the liberal movement of these years, particularly by the passion for democracy that accompanied World War I. However, they were particularly affected by higher criticism of the Bible, which, when applied to religion, gave rise to a negative sort of intellectualism; many young people, professional men and ministers found it highly important to disclaim belief in miracles or to explain how the events might have occurred or the

record might have been made without breaking the laws of nature which we now know.

When ministers, and later college students, began to study and accept these liberal positions, people in the churches became intensely disturbed because their system of beliefs and that of their young people were threatened. They sharpened and clarified their position and fought with righteous indignation those who spread the heretical doctrines. The conflicts and hostilities that resulted split many churches and made pastoral resignations a common event. Some ministers became zealots for the cause of orthodoxy or for liberalism; others felt the need to avoid controversy and to stress spiritual truths common to all Christians. What happened to the majority of church members was that they also avoided the conflict and came to content themselves with vague notions as to what they believed. The modern church was so weakened by such tolerance that today few people can give a clear statement as to what they believe; they feel that it matters very little what they do believe. Too few convictions are proving as destructive as too narrow a field of conviction.[1]

Consequently, because of very little clear-cut agreement of what constitutes the Christian life in terms of belief and conduct there has been confusion in formulating a philosophy of Christian education which could gain widespread acceptance by the Christian community to use in guiding the educational program of the church.

On the one hand have been the traditionalists. They have insisted that only by an acceptance of a thoroughgoing orthodoxy with a completely infallible Bible as its basis could be developed a satisfactory means of education. This has been a process of indoctrination: having children learn creeds, Bible verses, and accept with no critical examination the traditional and conventional theological doctrines of the church.

Such a program is heavily weighted with content. To be able to repeat the words is one of the chief aims. Many times this process has little effectiveness in the lives of the learners. They might just as well be parrots. For the traditionalist has paid too little attention to method, to the findings of modern psychological studies in learning, and to the means whereby such a world view as he holds can be translated into a living reality in the experiences of the pupil.

On the other extreme has been the progressivist or the functionalist. He has been greatly influenced by Dewey's pragmatism and instrumentalism in the field of education in general. The representatives of this school put the major emphasis on method. The content or subject matter of the Christian tradition is of small importance in the curriculum. Usually the progressivist has been outspoken against theology or theological interpretations. Belief is of small matter in comparison to conduct. Correct attitudes carrying over in and influencing behavior have been his main concern. He has put little emphasis upon commitment to Jesus Christ.

[1] Blanche Carrier, *Free to Grow*, New York, Harper, ©1951, p. 54. Quoted by permission.

Rather, he has been primarily interested in a way of life. Some, on the extreme, have stated that theology is so much verbiage. No one, including the theologian himself, knows what he is talking about, and even if he does, it makes little difference.

The progressivist, for instance, will start with the outcome of behavior which he wishes to effect. His approach is a functional one. When people are behaving in a certain manner, they are religious. He will say, for example, that a person is religious when he is participating in an activity which leads him to develop respect for human personality, a sense of social responsibility, an appreciation of the universe, or some similar value.

Many educators, pastors, and parents have recognized that somewhere something is lacking in each of these approaches. In the first, there has been a certain divorce of ethics from the program. Little attention has been paid to desired outcomes of behavior. There has been small emphasis on the way children learned but much on what they were taught.

In the latter, it was recognized that learning was more pleasurable, but there was little content of the Christian heritage and quite a departure from what the average member of the Christian community thought should be included as part of the values of the tradition. The story of the two children comparing their experiences has as much truth in it as it has humor. Two boys were chatting. One mentioned Moses and Daniel. "Who are they?" asked the other. The first responded with the story of Moses receiving the law on Sinai and then told in detail about Daniel in the den of lions. "They are good stories," replied the first chap; "Where did you hear them?" "In Sunday school," said the second, "Don't you ever go?" "Sure," answered the other, "but I never heard those stories. I get religious education."

In such circles there has been much talk about the inability to teach real religion. All are familiar with the phrase, "Religion is not taught; it is caught." This may be very well, but from a frank appraisal of the current situation one suspects that the methods used and the situations set up have been such that religious attitudes have not been caught with anything like epidemic proportions.

The progressivist has been the liberal, and the strengths and weaknesses of his educational theory and practice have been the strong and weak points of his general position. This liberal educator has been greatly influenced by the progressive educational theories stemming from Dewey's pragmatism and instrumentalism. He has taken these ideas and used them in the field of Christian education. A good critique of this point of view in general education has been made by Theodore Brameld. What he says about progressivism in the whole field of education can be applied equally to this position in Christian education.

Its liabilities as well as its assets are also to be assessed in the same spirit of frank inquiry and sharp criticism that it has itself so freely applied to other positions. Accordingly, if we judge it in necessarily oversimplified terms, we may say that, in general, progressivism is strong in scientific method; weak in concern for the concrete and comprehensive outcomes of this method. Strong in teaching us how to think; weak in teaching us what to think for. Strong in characterizing as well as encouraging active intelligence; weak in estimating and counteracting the forces and restrictions that block its effective operation. Strong in encouraging individual self-expression and individual action; weak in integrating these successfully, powerfully, with group self-expression and group action. Strong in tolerance toward varying beliefs; weak in conviction or commitment to needed positive beliefs. Strong in the process of ongoing dynamic experience; weak in agreeing upon the products of such experience. Strong in believing that the present is important and real; weak in believing that the future is equally important and real. Strong in delineating the complexities and pluralities of experience; weak in fusing these into comprehensive, appealing, purposeful designs. In short, progressivism is strong in all the ways liberalism is strong; weak in the ways liberalism is weak.[2]

The discussion at this point resolves itself around the knotty problem which is claiming the attention of many educators today: How can one teach content, which in itself is authoritarian, by a democratic and dynamic method? The answer to this problem of the relationship of content and method, of belief and behavior, is one of the necessary foundation stones which must be discovered and on which we must build a philosophy of Christian education.

One of the most pressing problems facing Christian educators today is how the content of the Christian faith may be taught in a manner consistent with the best methods of dynamic teaching and learning. There is a Christian tradition, a body of accepted data which is part of the heritage of our faith. By its very nature it is authoritative for Christians. The extent and volume of the data vary widely within different religious groups. It runs the gamut all the way from a highly organized and almost completely closed system on the one hand to a minimum of accepted beliefs on the other. At one extreme the tradition consists of the Bible, the creeds, the pronouncement of councils, synods, ecclesiastical courts, and houses of bishops. On the other, there may be nothing more than the authority of an inner leading.

But let us make no mistake about it. Both extremes, as well as all the degrees of belief between them, are authoritative and must be so for the particular adherents of the respective groups. These values are the ones which each communion wishes to have perpetuated.

Here immediately, then, one runs into a problem: how can authoritative content be taught in a progressive dynamic method? Modern educa-

[2] Theodore Brameld, *Patterns of Educational Philosophy*, Yonkers, World Book, ©1950, p. 99. Quoted by permission.

tional theory is sound psychologically and philosophically. Its teaching methods make for the greatest ease, efficiency, and pleasure in learning. Its effects are far more lasting than are those of an authoritative and autocratic pedagogy. But modern methods in Christian education at this point suffer from two weaknesses—both of which are flaws in the pragmatic methods they follow. Method has become an end in itself, and thus the ultimate goals and values are lost sight of. The content has not been representative of the vital elements in the tradition.

In the field of education in general the strengths and the weaknesses in the progressive point of view have been studied and analyzed with the view of working out a philosophy which would at the same time seek to preserve the strengths and offset the weaknesses. This process has also been taking place in the field of Christian education. Few leaders wish to return to a content-centred program with a disregard for the religious needs and experiences of the growing person. For such a course leads to verbalisms and the repetition of words and phrases which have little reality in the lives of the learners. Too long have our children learned Bible verses and religious ideas which they can repeat but about which they have no real understanding or knowledge. We know psychologically that there is no necessary relationship between the ability to memorize content and the ability to use this same material in the changing or directing of one's religious development.

Nor does one wish to overcome the weaknesses by a process of indoctrination in which the thought of the child is controlled. This is the method of the authoritarian, whether he be the fundamentalist in religion or the communist in politics.

The problem, however, still is a persistent one. Randolph Crump Miller has suggested what appears to the writer as a good basis toward finding a solution. He writes:

> The clue to Christian education is the rediscovery of a relevant theology which will bridge the gap between content and method, providing the background and perspective of Christian truth by which the best methods and content will be used as tools to bring the learners into the right relationship with the living God who is revealed to us in Jesus Christ, using the guidance of parents and the fellowship of life in the Church as the environment in which Christian nurture will take place.[3]

This is sound, for the foundation of Christian education on which all else must be built is the leading of growing persons into the discovery of the truth of Christianity and the making of this truth a reality in their living. Jesus said, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you

[3] Randolph Crump Miller, *The Clue to Christian Education*, New York, Scribner, 1950, p. 15. The entire first chapter is the best discussion of this question the writer has seen, and he is deeply indebted to Dr. Miller. This quotation and the one following are made by permission of the publisher.

free." When the emphasis has been on the truth, the methods have been inadequate for imparting it. When, however, the emphasis has been on the method, there has been a lack of understanding and commitment.

What a person basically believes guides his conduct and behavior. His thought is stimulated and his actions motivated by his fundamental philosophy of life. There is a direct relationship between belief and action. Actions may not be consistent with professed and vocalized ideals. This may be caused by the very complexity of personality, by mixed motives or by a complete lack of understanding of what a person thinks he believes. But taking these into consideration, it will be discovered that a person will act according to his basic ideas even though he may not be conscious of what these are.

This has great implications in the field of Christian education.

> It explodes both the traditional view and the progressive one, for the traditional view insists that beliefs be accepted within the framework of a certain vocabulary regardless of their relevance, while the progressive view ultimately is reduced to the solving of a problem within the frame of reference of that problem and without regard to the wider cosmic or metaphysical point of view. If theology comes into the foreground of Christian teaching, there is great danger that beliefs will be held which are not part of one's basic personality pattern, whereas if theology is disregarded there is no sense of ultimate purpose.[4]

This does not mean that the content of the curriculum will be theology for the very danger pointed out above. It does mean, however, that a relevant and dynamic theology will be one of the main foundation stones on which to build a curriculum. Those who plan the learning experience will have a definite and well-thought-out system of theology as a substratum on which a course of study can be developed. The purpose of Christian education can then be stated as leading growing persons into a vital relationship with God and his fellow men within the framework of Christian truth about all of life. These will include a Christian interpretation of the universe, a Christian view of God, an understanding of how God works in the processes of history and in the experiences of men today, a knowledge of the Christian community or the church as a fellowship of believers. What is of equal importance and a basic element is to have the learner make his own the experiences which underlie these theological expressions. At this point people of widely divergent points of view can agree. There is little disagreement about the fundamental religious experiences that men have. The difficulty arises when we seek to explain them. The point here, then, is not to inject theology into the curriculum but for those who are organizing, directing, guiding, and teaching in the program to have certain theological suppositions in mind.

[4] Miller, *Ibid.*, p. 7.

The modern educator in his approach to Christian education must present to all age levels Jesus Christ in such a manner that children, youth, and adults will put their faith in God through him, and live with the help of God a life of creative power in fellowship with other Christians. This can be achieved in only one way as men have relationships of meaning with God. The principle of rôle psychology is well known. People tend to play different rôles in different situations. However, if the rôles are too much at variance one with the other, there is a breakdown in personality. In popular parlance we use the phrase, "He is flying to pieces." The function of Christian education is to have a person bring as many of these rôles as possible together around a common centre so that he reacts with dependability and reliability in every situation.

It is well recognized in religious education that a child feels his security and stability in life not through ideas he has about his parents but by the personal relations he has with them. So is it with a man's integration in life. He finds it not in his ideas about God but in his living relationships with him. The important emphasis is in the relationship.

Here, then, is one of the foundations on which we must build a philosophy of Christian education: a recognition that the purpose of Christian education is the discovery and imparting of Christian truth, that a relevant theology must be held by teachers and administrators which will incorporate the basic truth of the Christian heritage, as an actual frame of reference within which the course of study will be constructed.

In seeking foundations for a philosophy of Christian education we must give far more attention in the future to an area which has been neglected in the past. That is the whole field of group behavior. At present much more emphasis is being put on the various groups within our society. Especially is this so in the field of social action, for much of the welfare of groups within our society depends upon legislative action. In recent years there has grown up much pressure-group activity, especially in the field of political activity, which has made our people conscious of the particular segmented groups to which they belong in the larger society. The attitudes and activities of groups play a prominent part in the determination of our contemporary culture.

This does not mean that the individual is not important, for at a time of group-centredness and depersonalization all the more attention must be paid to him. From the days of Jeremiah down through Jesus to our own day, the prophetic religious leader has placed great emphasis upon the individual, his duties, privileges, and responsibilities. Protestantism, for the most part, has also been greatly interested in him. This interest has been paramount in liberal progressive educational theory and practice. In fact, so much stress has been placed upon psychological processes and the de-

velopment of the individual that the other side has been neglected. We need to be turning our attention to the sociological processes and to give more attention to the influences of the social group upon the individual. For the most part, when we have considered the group, we have done so in terms of the manner in which the individual has contributed to and changed it. But any system of education today which is not considering the group and what it does and can do in and of itself and what it does and can do to the individual member simply is not realistic. There is one fundamental point that must not be overlooked: The group is far more than the sum total of the individual members of which it is composed. As such it has a certain identity of its own which manifests itself in particular attitudes and behavior patterns. It has great potentialities for strengthening and supporting the Christian ideals of its members and just as great potentialities for weakening them. We have placed much emphasis upon building an individual morality but have not given the place to a social conscience that we should. As one looks at the results, he can have something of a sense of accomplishment, for, by and large, people as individuals do have certain standards of high action. There is a fair amount of discipline, and one discovers by and large that individuals will react reasonably, intelligently, and rationally on an individual level. However, this is not so generally true of the group, for with its own identity it tends to be much more impulsive, less reasonable, and more unrational. Over and over again men act as members of group in a manner in which they would never act as individuals. Thus it is as educators one must seek to change the group in such a manner that the behavior of all members will somewhat approximate the conduct of them if they were acting as individuals. It may never be done completely, but the fact that must not be forgotten is that group attitudes and behavior are no more inevitable or unchanging than those of individuals. Groups can be changed; they can be taught how to grow creatively and develop toward an idea. The group concerns us here, then, for two reasons: the effect on the individual, and the potentialities for creative dynamic thinking and action on the part of the group itself.

What, then, are the characteristics of these groups that so greatly influence the learners with which we must deal? There are three which must claim the attention of the educator: loyalties, conflicts, and standards.

First is the matter of group allegiances or loyalties. Men are bound together in terms of their race, their color, their class position in our so-called classless society, their economic status, their vocations, their religions, their regional or national groups. To one or more of these they show great devotion. It is easily recognized that the one that seems to claim the greatest devotion is the national group. Patriotism has ever been

one of the greatest factors in conditioning the behavior of the individual to conform with that of the group. People will make almost unbelievable sacrifices in order to show their loyalty to a national group and will mete out to their fellows who do not the severest of punishment. In many places capital punishment has been abolished, but death is almost still universally the penality for treason. Religion too has called for great loyalties. Because of the intensity of the emotions involved perhaps there is no more dramatic crisis than when the demands of one's religion and one's nation are in conflict. Race and color are particularly in the fore in our own day.

These group loyalties, of course, many times call forth the best a man has to offer. On the other hand, many of these allegiances result in immature and irrational responses of the worst order. There is an almost complete lack of logical justification for many of them. They express themselves in such things as stereotypes, that is, one sees a person or a few people of another group acting in a certain manner. Immediately he believes that all people act in that pattern. Some of the more familiar ones voiced by typical "wags" (white American gentiles) are: All Jews are abnormally aggressive. All Catholics are superstitious and have no religion. Negroes are inferiors and hate whites. In religious groups, we have all heard: "Fundamentalists have no ethics." "Liberals don't believe anything." And so one could go on down the list.

Another characteristic is the amount of emphasis put on respect for authority and prestige within the group. The writer has just seen notice of a suit in the civil courts of this Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The news account read:

> Ex-Lodge Chief Sues for her Job
>
> The former Great Wenonah of the Degree of Pocahontas, an auxiliary of the Improved Order of Red Men, filed suit yesterday to get her job back. She charged she was brought into "disgrace and disrepute" when the Red Men's Great Council of the United States removed her as Great Wenonah in March 1950. Furthermore it wrecked her chances of becoming Great Pocahontas, highest degree in the Great Council of Pennsylvania, she said. She had already been Great Minnehaha.[5]

Closely associated with an over-emphasis on group status is wishful thinking concerning the importance of the group, which is many times greatly divorced from the reality of the situation. How true this is in terms of the ideas of cosmic importance with which many members of religious bodies hold their sects. One is not surprised to find members of such groups easy victims of propaganda, especially of items that tend to flatter the group or of threats which will supposedly weaken it.

Closely associated with intragroup loyalties are extragroup conflicts.

[5] Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin*, September 8, 1951, p. 2, col. 3.

Anything which will weaken the group may result in feelings of animosity toward others. At the basis of much group antagonism is the economic factor. This is true in the capital-labor groups and in majority and minority races. These conflicts have wide variation running all the way from large-scale killings in war on the international and national level to the feelings, attitudes, and gestures of contempt in primary relations in daily living.

A third characteristic of groups is the standards they set and maintain. There is a stubbornness about group behavior which tends to view as normative for all people the standards it creates and enforces for its own members. It is at this point that conflict results for the religious educator. He has been interested in standards taught in the church, little realizing that the forms of conduct forced on his pupil by other social groups are probably far more normative and effective in the life of that pupil.

All in all, many of the facts of group behavior are far from pleasant to consider. The injustices and cruelties of the group because of its self-interest must concern the educator both because of their effect alike on the member and nonmember. Much of the action of the group is irrational, which means far more attention must be given in Christian education to the emotions and feelings, seeking to temper them with reason and direct them toward approved goals.

As has been shown, then, there is the real difference in behavior of groups and individuals. Often the latter may wish to act in a manner which is both rational and moral, but he belongs to a group which will behave in an entirely different manner. The emotion of the group carries him along with it and usually is not of as high an order as is his. Since this is true, any philosophy of Christian education, if it is to be realistic today, must take into consideration the basis of group behavior.

As stated above, such a philosophy must be built on the idea that group behavior is no more inevitable or unchanging than is the conduct of individuals. Groups can be changed even as can their respective members. They are not always dominated by mob behavior. Through processes that have been developed and which are at present emerging as a result of much social experiment, there are techniques coming to the fore by which it is known that basic attitudes, beliefs, and actions of groups as groups can be changed. There is much emphasis at present in the whole field of group dynamics. It is generally recognized as far as religion is concerned that the group never achieves the degree of insight or is capable of the depth of commitment as is the individual; so the primary concern is still the individual. However, the Christian educator must consider the group and the possibilities of the changes and dynamic possibilities of which it is capable.

This presents a challenge to the Christian educator from two avenues

of approach—the approach to groups from outside the church, and the approach to those from within. Still he must have in mind the purpose of Christian education: to help growing persons discover, impart, and make Christian truth a living reality. This means that he must use the techniques of group education in those groups of which his people are members which are inimical to the development of Christian character. Ever must situations and experiences be arranged in such a way that the Christian influence will be an effective factor in such group action. Thus the influence of groups which tend to retard Christian growth may be lessened.

The other approach is within the church. Here the educator must work so that a genuinely creative fellowship of Christians results. The fact that groups within the church as groups can be changed makes it imperative that the leaders in religion put forth every effort in guiding this change in terms of development and growth toward the basic Christian educational purpose. It is through the fellowship and inspiration of full participating membership in a democratic and Christian group that the individual has an excellent opportunity of ridding himself of the tensions that occur between group and individual ethics. In fact, the strength that comes to an individual from a like-minded fellowship characterized by high idealism is one of the most satisfying experiences in terms of helping him integrate himself in terms of a Christian philosophy. Group allegiances and loyalties of the right sort are among the most powerful determiners of high thinking and action on an idealistic level. And, once again, while the commitment of the group as a whole can never reach either the height, depth, or intensity of an individual commitment, the mind-set of the group is one of the most effective aids in assisting the individual in a continuous deepening commitment.

While the Christian educator must be interested in the attitudes and behavior of all groups, there are two that are of special concern to him. One has been mentioned above, the group within the church. The second is the family. Too long has the family as a family unit been neglected by the church. An adequate philosophy of Christian education must have as an additional foundation stone a concern for the family.

As stated previously, most emphasis in educational activity has been upon the individual. True during the last hundred years, ever since the publication of Horace Bushnell's *Christian Nurture,* educators have recognized the importance of the family group in the development of Christian character. Bushnell's thesis that the most effective method of evangelism is a Christian home with its concern and nurture of the child in terms of religious development rather than a sudden conversion experience has much to commend it and has had through the century much support. But little has been done for the family as a family in terms of a program of

Christian education. Knowing what we do about the influence of the home, we have still persisted in saying that the group on which the major educational emphasis should be placed is the children. I believe this to be erroneous. "We must get the children. They are our future," one hears repeatedly. I agree. The question is, however: What is the most effective way of helping children develop as Christians? I have no hesitation in replying, "Through the home."

It is for this reason that more emphasis must be placed upon the young adult group, those who are parents of children from infancy to adolescence. If we in the church have the parents interested and in attendance, there is a much greater possibility of having their children interested and in attendance. If the parents are present at services within the church, the children will almost certainly be there. The reverse, however, is not true. It is the exceptional Protestant nonchurch family that will change its plan for an outing or visit so that children may be in attendance at a service of the church whether at church school, worship, or youth group. Usually the family loyalty is more intensive than the church loyalty to the child. This is quite natural.

The family is the basic unit in the culture of which we are a part. Few will disagree that of all social institutions it has the major influence on the development of the child. Here, more than any other place, the child has his personality molded and determined as far as environment is concerned, for here are satisfied or thwarted those basic elemental emotional drives of security, affection, and status. The relationship is one of interaction between all members in the home, and, as is true of all groups, the family as a unit has a character of its own which is more than the sum of the individuals of which it is composed. When the standards of the family are different from those of the church, the child will take his stand with those in his home. The Roman church has been aware of this to a much greater degree than have Protestants. The program of Christian education must have the active interest and support of the parents in the home if effective work is to be done in the church. Even today, many teachers in the church school seem far more concerned about the religious instruction their pupils receive in the church than they do about the Christian influence and teaching in the home. In those plans where progress is being made in Christian education parents are actively involved. In fact, in some schools, notably those established and run under the direction of Ernest Ligon, which have been quite successful, the attendance of the children is conditional upon the parents attending conferences and guiding the religious development of their children during the week in the home. Ligon has ample evidence through his years of working in this

area that parents are interested in the religious nurture of their children and will coöperate with the church in the educational venture.

Here again, however, the problem discussed earlier in this paper comes to the fore. Parents are confused. In the field of Christian education they know neither what to expect from the church nor what they want for their children. As long as there is uncertainty on this level, no adequate program can be developed. Parents must have, even before their children, a basic understanding of the purpose and values of Christianity. They are desperately in need of a theology.

Wesner Fallow, who is one of the leaders in the field of Christian family education, says:

> Parents need to be drawn into a program of religious growth guided by a church which employs a Christian theology sufficiently well-structured to remedy the flaccid religious concepts characteristic of adults whose religious training has been the scant diet of indecisive liberalism, careful to avoid any mention of the word "theology." Religious education that is Christian needs to be taken to homes—not only for the sake of the children but for the sake of the parents. The parents of today have little understanding that man's dependence on God is axiomatic to Christian thought. They believe that the sciences have freed man; they need to understand that freedom lies in God. They need a theology which holds that man is endowed with a realm of freedom peculiar to human intellect and experience. They need to experience a developing maturity which introduces them to the paradox that man is both bound and free—and that the kind of freedom he has is dependent upon what he chooses to be bound to. Until modern parents come to know and believe with their whole being that man's freedom can only lie in God's boundless grace, they will miss the truth and will accordingly tend to retard or negate whatever discovery of truth their children may be able to make under the guidance of the Christian educational program which the churches must soon be conducting—if the children of this generation are to escape the penalties of past failures in religious teaching.[6]

The program must reach the family as a whole, must be adapted to the various types of families found within the specific church, and must begin with family experience. It will be the church and the family working together in a program of shared responsibility. Harry Munro has said:

> ". . . church and family serve and support each other, not chiefly from duty or even from choice, but because they have so much in common in their functions and destinies. It is not a question of the church calling upon the family to help put over the church's program. Nor is it a question of the family calling in the church to make up for its failures or to take over a difficult part of its task. Rather it is a relationship of complete mutuality. The family finds its richest self-realization in the larger community of Christian families. The church finds its noblest fruitage in the love and community of family life. Together they seek to develop each person to his

[6] Wesner Fallow, *The Modern Parent and the Teaching Church,* New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. 63, 64. Quoted by permission.

fullest spiritual capacities and to extend that love and community to encompass all mankind as children of one Father.[7]

Never must the educator lose sight of the fact that he is dealing with people who are constantly changing, for education should be a matter of continuous growth. There is no final end at which one ultimately arrives. The underlying goal must always be to aid growing persons discover more facts and deeper insights into their mutual relationships with each other and God through Jesus Christ and to incorporate this truth into their daily living so that the "word" becomes flesh in their own lives. Both the teacher and the pupil must be constant learners and both must go on growing. In a small discussion the writer once heard Elliott Dunlop Smith, provost of the Carnegie Institute of Technology, use a biological analogy which is appropriate to real Christian education. Some people have a structure of faith similar to the structure of the king crab. This particular species has a horseshoe-shaped anterior shell which is joined to a smaller posterior shell, with the legs and vital organs attached to the underside of the shell. There is room for little growth, for the living flesh is constricted by the hard shell. Contrast this to the vertebrates. Here there is a basic skeletal structure on which are muscle and skin, and because of its very nature it can grow, develop, and expand. It does so successfully, however, only because of a strong skeletal support. Thus in Christian education. There is a basic underlying structure of Christian truth by which the individual may grow, develop, and expand. This skeletal framework is basic and must be strong. It must be capable of supporting the growth of new truth in the process of development. The process of growth is most important, but so is the structure on which the growth takes place.

In this process of Christian education there are at least three important emphases that must claim much attention in developing an adequate philosophy today: a relevant theology that will bridge the gap between method and content, a real understanding of and concern for group behavior as well as individual, and an increased emphasis on the family as a family unit. On these we must build.

[7] Harry C. Munro, "A Family-Centered Curriculum," *Religious Education*, May-June, 1944, p. 163, quoted from the bulletin of the International Council of Religious Education, *Christian Education Today*.

THE REPEAL OF THE TEST AND CORPORATION ACTS

PREPARATION AND ACHIEVEMENT

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In 1812 England faced a series of crises so pressing that its leaders were more willing to consider the claims of the Protestant dissenters than in the preceding twenty-five years. Bonaparte was invading Russia; the United States passed from protests to war; within the country riots and uprisings menaced the whole social order. What made the situation worse, the country possessed neither competent nor inspiring leadership. Early in the year "a second-rate lawyer" with "the head of a country parson and the tongue of an Old Bailey lawyer," Spencer Perceval, headed the government.[1] His assassination paved the way for men whose only virtue consisted in being less bad. In the words of Lord Acton,[2]

> Lord Liverpool governed England in the greatest crisis of the war, and for twelve troubled years of peace, chosen not by the nation, but by the owners of the land. The English gentry were well content with an order of things by which for a century and a quarter they had enjoyed so much prosperity and power. Desiring no change they wished for no ideas. They sympathised with the complacent respectability of Lord Liverpool's character, and knew how to value the safe sterility of his mind. He distanced statesmen like Grenville, Wellesley, and Canning, not in spite of his inferiority but by reason of it. His mediocrity was his merit. The secret of his policy was that he had none . . . he wished his government to include men who were in favour of the Catholic claims and men who were opposed to them. His career exemplifies, not the accidental combination but the natural affinity, between the love of conservatism and the fear of ideas.

The position of the dissenters thus seemed well-nigh hopeless. This contrasted sharply with the eve of the French Revolution when the courts had proven kind, and Parliament had conceded some minor relief and debated their larger objectives without rancor. Perhaps reform had not been just around the corner, but dissenters had enjoyed a moderately charitable response when they petitioned for relief. The Revolution demolished that situation. Parliament rejected the dissenters' pleas by lopsided divisions. The courts, lately generous, interpreted the penal laws so strictly that more decisions went against dissenters between 1790 and 1812 than in the preceding century. The cabinet considered further legislative restrictions. Even when dissenters suffered no added penalties, they

[1] Sidney Smith, *The Letters of Peter Plymley* (London, 1929), p. 7.
[2] *The History of Freedom and other Essays* (London, 1909), p. xii.

had to submit to expensive court actions and accept passively the most virulent abuse. This situation was almost at its worst in 1811 and 1812 when a number of suits attempted to narrow the meaning of the Toleration Act.[3]

With the present dark and the future hopeless dissenters saw no profit in passivity and agitated so freely as to win concessions. Undoubtedly the government was frightened, and in its bewilderment was willing to try anything—even reform. Reform, still a bogy, had lost some of its terrors, and expediency justified it. Moreover, able voices were raised in its support. Perceval then, early in 1812, shortly after his government had sought to limit the Toleration Act, prepared a bill to benefit dissenters. Before its introduction Perceval was assassinated; meanwhile some Whigs had raised the issue in the Lords.[4]

On March 24 Lord Holland reminded the House that the government had considered additional relief for dissenters, and inquired if one of its members would soon introduce such a measure; otherwise a private lord might assume that responsibility. Grey also asked whether the government intended to give relief if the King's Bench upheld the restrictive construction of the Toleration Act. On April 8 Stanhope declared that although opinions differed concerning the admission of dissenters to civil office, toleration was generally approved. He therefore had prepared a relief bill, but would await the result of the discussion of Catholic claims before introducing it. Catholic emancipation was then brought up and defeated.

The death of Perceval only delayed concession; the cabinet had already admitted its necessity. Stanhope had merely kept the issue alive. On June 2 he recalled that Perceval had held out promises of relief, and that he himself had already announced his intention of bringing in a bill.[5] He then moved the first reading of a bill which sought to relieve some members of the Church of England and others "from the operation of certain unjust penalties and disabilities." When Liverpool objected to "unjust," Stanhope waived it; the second reading took place on July 3.

During the interim the same question agitated the Commons where Samuel Whitbread recalled that prior to Perceval's death considerable reference had been made to a relief act. He promised a motion in behalf

[3] "The Legal Position of the English Protestant Dissenters, 1767-1812," 25 *Virginia Law Review* (1939), 671-697. The situation was even worse than that described by a pamphleteer in 1789: "May we not congratulate our country on its wonderful uniformity of religion, when not even a bug can be destroyed within the purlieus of the royal household but by the hallowed fingers of a communicant; nor a post letter conveyed to any part of the kingdom by horses belonging to a Protestant Dissenter?"—*The Right of Protestant Dissenters to a Compleat Toleration asserted,* by a Layman, p. 41.

[4] 22 *Parl. Debates,* 149-151, 234-235.

[5] 23 *Parl. Deb.,* 318-319, 887-892.

of the dissenters within a short time.[6] Relief for Catholics likewise inspired lengthy discussion in both Houses.[7] When, on its second reading, Stanhope's bill was thrown out, 31 to 10, Holland inquired if *anything* would be done to relieve dissenters. The prime minister's assurance of a remedial measure within a few days did not forestall Holland, Stanhope, and Norfolk from protesting that the toleration hitherto granted dissenters amounted "to nothing more than a partial and conditional exemption from penalties and persecutions; whereas the bill now rejected, by recognizing the right of private judgment in matters of conscience, would have placed religious liberty on its only true and legitimate basis."[8]

Shortly after, Castlereagh brought in a bill "to repeal certain acts and amend other acts, relating to religious worship and assemblies, and persons preaching or teaching therein," because "in consequence of certain decisions at the quarter sessions, doubts had arisen as to the question of qualification."[9] The bill sought to place "dissenters in the situation in which they practically stood previous to such decisions." It entirely repealed the Five Mile Act, and so modified the Conventicle Act that religious meetings where the number of worshipers, exclusive of the family, did not exceed twenty were exempt from any restriction. Moreover, a licensed dissenting preacher did not have to officiate at a specific congregation. Although one member complained that the bill did not go far enough, general satisfaction was registered. The bill quickly passed through the Commons, but the government, while expressing the most tolerant sentiments in a condescending way, did not hesitate to advise dissenters to behave decently and not forget their debt to the party which had been more than kind.

In the Lords the debate ran a little more sharply. Liverpool praised the bill as combining ample toleration with security. Stanhope objected to the stress on expediency rather than on the right of toleration. Holland felt the bill, though in some way deficient, to be a gain. Sidmouth favored it in principle but opposed the modification of the Conventicle Act and the lack of supervision of licenses to dissenting preachers. Various amendments were offered in committee, but for the most part the bill retained its original character. As it finally passed, local preachers were refused its benefits.

During 1813 Protestant dissenters were often before the public. In April they petitioned the Commons that under the new East India Com-

[6] *Ibid.*, 551. During April, 1812, petitions signed by thousands of dissenters were presented to the Commons, insisting on freedom of conscience and regretting the existence of laws inimical to their rights—22 *Parl. Deb.*, 418-420, 705-706, 727-728.

[7] 23 *Parl. Deb.*, 633-711, 814-871.

[8] J. E. T. Rogers, *A Complete Collection of the Protests of Lords* (Oxford, 1875), *sub* July 4, 1812.

[9] 23 *Parl. Deb.*, 994-995, 1105-1110, 1191-1193, 1250.

pany charter they be permitted to send missionaries to India.[10] Shortly after, a bill for the better regulation of ecclesiastical courts went through without much debate.[11] This struck a stout blow for relief since these courts often functioned in an arbitrary and expensive fashion. They took cognizance of personal immorality, heresy, neglect of church observances, tithes, and intestacy. Notwithstanding a tendency to restrict their power, and even though the letter of their power exceeded its actuality, these courts could still excommunicate a person. Excommunicated, he could not be a witness or juryman; he could not bring an action or recover property; he had no right to a Christian burial. After forty days contumacy he might be arrested on the writ, *de excommunicato capiendo,* issued by the chancery, and imprisoned until reconciled with the church. To avoid this, only a long, expensive process was effective. Admittedly this machinery operated infrequently, but to a dissenter one application was tyranny. Henceforth, the power of excommunication for contempt and nonpayment of fees was reserved for expressly defined cases; no civil disability, except a maximum of six months' imprisonment, could attach to excommunication.

Simultaneously Parliament was debating a bill to relieve persons denying the doctrine of the Trinity, by extending to them the Toleration Act of 1689.[12] According to an act of 1698, persons who denied the existence of any member of the Trinity were disabled from holding any office, civil, ecclesiastical, or military, on conviction; if a second time convicted, they were disabled to sue or prosecute in any action or information, to be guardian of any child, and were liable to a three-year imprisonment. The only object of the proposed bill being to repeal this act, it quickly passed both Houses, even the bishops not making much fuss about it.

Not only statutes but also litigation affected dissenters at this time. In 1813 the King's Bench interpreted the Corporation Act to their advantage.[13] In a polling for two borough aldermen, after ninety-nine votes had been cast for Smith, ninety-one for Sparling, and eleven for Bridge, it was disclosed that Sparling had not satisfied the sacramental test; thereupon Bridge informed the electors of his opponent's ineligibility. A fresh nomination did not take place, but the burgesses continued to vote, and at the end Smith had 133, Sparling 123, and Bridge 22. The mayor, considering Sparling ineligible, returned Smith and Bridge. The court, however, held that inasmuch as no notice of Sparling's ineligibility was given until after ninety-one persons had voted for him, the mayor could not disregard those votes. The rule was made absolute.

[10] 25 *Parl. Deb.,* 764-765, 1084-1085, 1090-1093.
[11] 23 *Parl. Deb.,* 806-808; 25 *Parl. Deb.,* 761-762; 26 *Parl. Deb.,* 311-312, 705-708, 1003-1005.
[12] 25 *Parl. Deb.,* 1147-1148; 26 *Parl. Deb.,* 1222.
[13] *The King against Bridge,* 1 M. & S., 76 (K.B., 1813).

A quite different legal problem came before the chancery in 1814.[14] In 1749 several Protestant dissenters had purchased ground on which they erected a chapel. The land had been conveyed to the original purchasers, their heirs, successors, and assigns, forever, upon trust for erecting the meetinghouse and keeping it up. The defendant, heir of an original trustee, arguing that this conveyance was to the trustees and heirs of their bodies, had claimed the chapel and land as his private property and had variously interfered with divine worship. Although he defended his claim at considerable length Lord Eldon was unimpressed. In answer to the charge that the minister of the chapel had preached improper doctrines, Eldon declared his incapacity to know what were the proper doctrines in the view of the congregation, and that the court would "support these establishments according to their institution, if the doctrine preached is tolerated by law." Moreover, he insisted, the legal estate was vested in a body of *trustees* of whom there would be a succession, and not in a body of *men* and their heirs male.

Two years later, the perennial but not overly important question of disturbing a dissenting congregation again arose, and a person, who had upset a meeting permitted and authorized by the Toleration Act of 1813, was fined £40.[15]

A case superficially resembling *Davis v. Jenkins,* but of more fundamental significance, occurred in 1817 under the title of *Attorney-General v. Pearson.*[16] In 1701 a meetinghouse for Trinitarian Protestant dissenters had been erected in Wolverhampton; from time to time grants and bequests had been made for the purposes of maintaining it and supporting a minister. The defendants, a majority of the trustees, were charged with not being properly authorized to become trustees because they belonged to the Unitarian sect and had excluded a minister who complained that, because he was a Trinitarian, the defendants had deprived him of his proper revenues. It was also charged that the defendants, though legally incompetent, planned to elect a new minister. The defendants replied that they did not know of the founders' intention to promote the belief in the Trinity, that the excluded minister had been elected in 1813 as a Unitarian and had preached that doctrine for about three years. Recently he had preached doctrines objectionable to the whole congregation so that large numbers had withdrawn. Finally, they wished to abide by no sectarian tenets.

In behalf of an injunction to restrain the defendants from further proceedings it was urged that Trinitarianism must have been the doctrinal

[14] *Davis v. Jenkins,* 3 Ves. & B., 151 (Chancery, 1814).
[15] *The King against Wadley,* 4 M. & S., 508 (K.B., 1816).
[16] 3 Mer., 353 (Ch., 1817).

intent of the founders because in 1701 Unitarianism was still illegal, being expressly excepted from the Toleration Act. Therefore no charity could have been endowed in its favor. Moreover, publicly impugning the doctrine of the Trinity was still indictable at common law because Christianity was parcel of the law of England. The recent statute had only placed Unitarians in the same class with other dissenters and had in no wise modified the common law.

The defendants rejoined that the object of the original trust was "the worship and service of Almighty God," with no specifications as to form or doctrine. Since no form of worship or mode of faith was prescribed, how could the court impose either? The defendants had the complete power to remove the minister; they had elected him only for three years. Even if Unitarianism was not legally tolerated in 1701, its exclusion could not be taken for granted, and for that matter the chancery had no jurisdiction over the legality of its doctrines. If a trust had been misapplied, how was it consistent with the silence of one trustee, the plaintiff, during the past thirty years? It had not been shown that the doctrines preached at this chapel were contrary to law. The plea that the common law did not permit the preaching of doctrines contrary to Christianity was not enough, for, by the same argument, the preaching of any doctrine which impugned those of the Establishment, no matter how unimportant, was an offense indictable at common law, a view that made the Toleration Act of 1689 a nullity and the late act a mockery and an insult. Indeed rather let it be stated that the law will only restrain and punish all open attacks on religion.

In answer Sir Samuel Romilly maintained that the court did have to settle the point of doctrine. The plaintiff, who had remained silent concerning the misapplication of the trust, did not exercise his trusteeship during the thirty years, and only recently had the question on which he differed come directly before the court. When the congregation changed its persuasion, it ceased to be *the* congregation which the plaintiff was supposed to have deserted. He remained steadfast in the faith; the congregation had changed. The chapel was originally founded for the worship of God according to the Trinitarian doctrine; the majority of the trustees were guilty of abandoning the trust. The court, furthermore, could no more sustain a trust for promoting Unitarianism than for preaching Judaism. Even if denial of the Trinity would not support a criminal prosecution, it might still be considered a common law offense. Finally, was it good policy and in conformity with the intent of the founders to appoint a minister for only three years? Such a limited term made him subservient to arbitrary dictates, whereas the Church Establishment had

always sought to make the minister independent of his hearers, "to give him a freehold interest in his sacred office."

When Eldon, in passing judgment, came to the legality of Unitarianism, he maintained that in the Lords at least the 1813 statute was not intended to alter the common law as it stood in matters of religion. As a judge in equity he did not intend to go into the doctrine of the common law or the intent of the legislature; yet if impugning the Trinity was indictable at common law, he ought not to execute a trust the object of which was illegal. On the other hand, where it could not be discovered what species of worship was intended, the court could only inquire into what had been the usage of the congregation; if the usage could be supported, the court must administer the trust. Where a congregation disagreed among themselves, the original institution must alone be looked to. Since Unitarianism could not have been the intent of the founders, the court should execute the trust accordingly. By the same token, the court would never permit a trustee to be discharged for endeavoring to preserve the original end of the institution. Finally, Eldon believed that the original intent was to choose the minister for life.[17]

In 1818 the King's Bench also set back the dissenting cause. *Lewis v. Hammond* concerned a dissenter who though he lived in one parish worshiped at a chapel in another, two parishes away, and who was compelled to pay toll on his journey to and fro.[18] The Turnpike Act exempted persons from toll "in going to and returning from their proper parochial church, chapel, or other place of worship on Sundays." The court held that "parochial" covered the whole clause, and that a dissenter "was not within the exemption in going to and returning from his proper place of religious worship, situated out of the parish in which he resided." The toll was imposed generally; the exemption extended only to Anglicans going to their "proper" church. In fact the exemption would not extend to them if they attended another parish church, because such would not be their "proper" worshiping place. The dissenter, therefore, failed to recover the damages lost by the imposition of the toll.

Another squabble came up in 1820 over the trusteeship of a dissenting chapel which had been built in 1796 under one trust deed and rebuilt in

[17] The judgment was repeated in 1835—7 Sim., 290 (Ch.). The issue involved in this case appeared in the famous series dealing with Lady Hewley's charities: *Shore v. Wilson,* 9 Cl. & Fin., 355 (H.L., 1839, 1842); *The Attorney-General v. Shore,* 11 Sim., 592 (Ch., 1843); *The Attorney-General v. Wilson,* 16 Sim., 210 (Ch., 1848). I hope soon to deal with their implications. Another point suggested by the decision in *Attorney-General v. Pearson* is that which was to come much more clearly to the fore in the Scottish Disruption and the Tractarian movement, namely, the issue of state interference in ecclesiastical matters.

[18] 2 B. & Ald., 206 (K.B., 1818). A few years later, a statute enacted that no toll should be taken from a person on his way to and from religious worship tolerated by law. Nevertheless, in 1870, the issue again came into the courts; this time the dissenter got judgment—*Smith v. Barnett,* L.R., 6 Q.B.D., 34.

1803 on another spot under another trust deed.[19] Some members of the congregation had obtained an injunction to prevent the trustees from shutting the chapel or excluding any of the congregation. In his ruling Lord Eldon declared that, considering the number of Dissenters, it was greatly to their credit that their affairs were not more frequently the subject of suits, especially since he had never known any good to result from them.[20] As often happened in such cases, the dispute was grounded on matters of doctrine. Eldon of course believed that the chapel must remain devoted to the doctrines originally agreed on, but, instead of deciding this particular case, he strongly urged the parties to settle their own affairs because "the infirmities of the law on this subject" enabled him to do very little.

After 1820 the fear of Jacobinism died away; reform was becoming respectable, and internal rumblings unsettled the Establishment. Consequently, dissenting suits disappeared from the courts, and the dissenters themselves turned to the legislature for the relief that the courts presumably could not concede. One case, in 1822, touching the statement that Jesus Christ was an impostor and a murderer in principle, did attract attention, but it scarcely belongs with what has gone before.[21] The publication was declared a libel at common law, and the court emphasized the fact that the statute of 1813 only removed the penalties imposed upon persons denying the Trinity and extended to them the benefits conferred upon all other Protestant dissenters by the Toleration Act which made nonconformity no longer a crime. Again it was recalled that Christianity was part of the law of England.

For ten years after 1813 Protestant dissenters received far less attention from Parliament than Catholics. In 1823, however, when the Marriage Act (1752) came up for amendment, Catholic and Protestant dissenters' marriages figured extensively in the debate. A Lords bill sought to extend to Catholics and dissenters the facilities long granted to Quakers and Jews, by conceding that dissenters, having gone through the legal forms and paid the fees due the Establishment, should be allowed to marry in their

[19] *Foley v. Wontner,* 2 Jac. & W., 245 (Ch., 1820).

[20] Occasionally the court settled disputes within dissenting congregations: *Hyslop v. Nairne and Others,* 21 Fac. Coll., 846 (Court of Session, 1825); *Leslie v. Birnie,* 2 Russ., 114 (Ch., 1826); *Revett v. Brown,* 5 Bing., 7 (C.P., 1828). In the first the court held that a religious congregation was like a literary institution where no member was farther liable than he pleased. In 1818 a case touching the Jews had some relation to dissenting history. The lord chancellor held that English law recognized no rule which denied Jews a benefit under any charity. Although reference was made to Hardwicke's judgment in *De Costa v. De Paz,* Amb., 228 (Ch., 1754), the court held that that case had only decided that a bequest for the propagation of the Jewish religion was void, not that Jews could not be the objects of a charity. Where admission to institutions required subscription to certain articles, a person declining to subscribe was disqualified, not by his principles but by his omission of the ceremony—*In the Matter of the Masters, Governors, and Trustees of the Bedford Charity,* 2 Swans., 487 (Ch., 1818).

[21] *The King against Waddington,* 1 B. & C., 26 (K.B., 1822).

own churches and have their marriages duly registered.[22] Eldon opposed the bill as not regulating a marrige between a Catholic and a Protestant, as letting down the bars to every variety of dissenter, and as coming too late in the session to receive adequate consideration. Liverpool complained that the bill neither regulated a marriage between a conformist and a dissenter, nor properly defined where dissenting marriages might take place; they might be contracted in every alehouse. The archbishop of Canterbury opposed it because it altered the liturgy, Redesdale because it allowed the conformists to violate the Marriage Act. Scarcely a voice favored the bill. Calthorpe, with reservations, felt that it might benefit the church. Ellenborough registered his pain at seeing "the right rev. bench always indisposed to give relief to tender consciences. What was required of the legislature by this bill was but little; what the legislature at present required of the Dissenters was a very grievous obligation." The bill lost.

In the same session the Commons discussed at length the free expression of religious opinions.[23] While not specifically connected with the dissenters, the debate pointed to the breakdown of the hegemony of the Establishment and stressed greater religious toleration. The Commons had now reached the point where, whether they liked it or not (and many did not), Paine's *Age of Reason* could be defended as a serious piece of biblical criticism. Although the applause went to the defender of the faith that was delivered unto the saints, to defend rationalism in Parliament was no longer actionable.

In 1824 the marriage issue arose in regard to the Unitarians. On April 2 the Lords passed by a majority of four the second reading of a bill to exempt Unitarians from the necessity of being married by a ceremony to which in conscience they could not assent.[24] Thereupon several members, while protesting their support of toleration, insisted that such a concession threatened the peculiar integrity of the church. On the other side, many, even some bishops, defended the validity of the Unitarian position. A month later, however, the House was less favorably disposed. Dependence upon the old arguments prompted Lord Holland to recall how a famous lawyer, on being asked the reason for his intense contemplation of the sea, had expressed his wonder that the vast element should produce the contemptible sprat. The bill was a sprat, and Holland wondered how it could have raised such a commotion. Although Liverpool supported the bill as merely restoring the Unitarians to their position before the Marriage Act, it subsequently lost.

Toward the end of this session Joseph Hume presented a petition

[22] 9 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 965-973.
[23] *Ibid.*, 1365-1400.
[24] 11 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 75-95, 434-446.

from some dissenters for the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts.[25] In debate various supporters emphasized that the acts were disgraceful, that repeal would in no way harm the Establishment, and that repeal in Ireland had not damaged the church there. Nothing tangible was accomplished, however, by these arguments.

The next year the Commons debated a Unitarian marriage bill.[26] On the second reading, although some speakers denounced the sect as un-Christian and dangerous to church and state alike, the bulk of opinion was on the whole either friendly or neutral. Stalwarts emphasized the church's devotion to toleration and the essential respectability of the Unitarians. The most effective opponent, Peel, took an attitude by no means uncompromising. A member who put both "Mahometans" and Jews down as better Christians failed in his attempt to postpone the bill's commitment for six months.

In the Lords Lansdowne alluded to the rejection of the preceding bill and pointed out that this one, while having the same object, differed in some respects.[27] After insisting on the high character of the marriage ceremony and condemning a hypocritical conformity, he explained that the present bill, unlike its predecessor, permitted the Unitarian ministers to perform the ceremony in their own congregations. Opponents argued that the Unitarians were not Christian, that they were not injured, and that before this bill could be passed, another must be enacted to give Unitarians a legal status, since the act of 1813 had only restored them to their common law status which still made it a crime to deny the divinity of Christ. On the other side, the archbishop of Canterbury gave support and Liverpool thought that Unitarians ought to enjoy the same privileges as Quakers and Jews. To the argument that this sect ought not to be favored above other dissenters, it was replied that no other sect had suffered such hardships. Despite this powerful support, however, the House divided against the second reading, 56 to 52.

Out of this debate came a suggestion which was called to the attention of the Commons by a petition. It had been stated that before Unitarians could benefit by a marriage act they must first be exempted from the penalties still attaching to them by the common law for their denial of Christ's divinity. In presenting the petition, Mr. W. Smith reminded the House of Mansfield's judgment that "unconformity, simply and as such, was no offense at common law."[28] The act of 1813 exempted Unitarians

[25] *Ibid.*, 1089-1090.
[26] 12 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 1236-1245; 13 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 353.
[27] 13 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 1025-1031.
[28] *Ibid.*, 1015-1018, 1250-1252. William Smith later became chairman of the United Committee of Protestant Dissenters appointed to protect their civil rights. Mansfield had uttered this dictum in 1767 in the famous case of *Harrison v. Evans* which terminated the practice of penalizing dissenters for their incapacity to fill corporation offices—"Lord Mansfield and English Dissenters," 2 *Missouri Law Review* (1937), 46-62.

"from all penalties to which they were previously liable for non-subscription to certain doctrinal articles and oaths." The petitioners sought to make only the denial of Christianity as such and blasphemy, offenses at common law, and to prevent the common law from allowing a judge to take from a man half his fortune and years of his liberty for dissenting from the Church of England. Although one member cautioned the House against "the prevailing spirit of innovation," the petition was read and printed.

Two weeks later, Lansdowne in presenting the same petition to the Lords expressed astonishment that such persons were excluded from citizenship.[29] While holding no opinions dangerous to the state, they were still liable to heavy penalties. Holland applauded the present attempt and declared that the position of all dissenters called for inquiry: they existed only by sufferance and their charitable and educational institutions "stood on a sandy foundation, and might be swept away by a process at law." He concluded that the statement, that Christianity was part of the law of England and that to deny the Trinity was to deny Christianity, lacked any specific meaning. The petition was ordered to lie upon the table.

In 1826 the dissenters supported the Tories in a "no-popery" election, hoping to be rewarded with the repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts.[30] Unfortunately for such hopes, many Tories opposed this with unqualified hostility, hostility shot through with fear. Others, who did not expressly oppose dissenters, realized that with repeal it would be harder to withstand Catholic emancipation which they certainly did not want. On the other hand, with Whig stock rising, Tories desired to lose no electoral support. Consequently, they took some hesitating steps in1827, but these were halted when the "pert joker" who made "pretty Latin verses," George Canning, became prime minister.[31] The dissenters thereupon organized themselves into an effective political phalanx and turned to the Whigs who had traditionally, if unrewardingly, favored them and now desired to make political capital. The ancient policy of playing off dissenters against Catholics in order to defeat both would not work again. The agency through which dissenters set to work was a United Committee, representing the various sects. In March this committee held three organizational and policy meetings in anticipation of a concerted campaign in and out of Parliament.[32]

During the same month the debate of the Indemnity Bill provided an opportunity for a sharp denunciation of the Corporation and Test

[29] 13 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 1480-1483.

[30] E. Halevy, *A History of the English People, 1815-1830* (New York, n.d.), pp. 261-264.

[31] *The Letters of Peter Plymley*, p. 7.

[32] The activities of the committee can be traced in *The Test Act Reporter, or Report of Proceedings in the later application to Parliament for the Repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts* (London, 1829).

Acts.[33] Speakers also contrasted the comparative neglect of dissenters with the persistent urging of Catholic claims; the situation ought to be reversed, for the dissenters' claims were founded on religious freedom, devotion, sobriety, and patriotism. To this Lord John Russell replied that Catholics were much worse off than dissenters, especially since the Indemnity Act did not extend to them.[34] He expressed willingness, however, to move the repeal of the acts at the proper time. Another member deplored the lack of dissenters' sympathy with Catholic claims and observed that dissenting relief had not been aggressively pushed because it had not been steadily sought. A dissenting member rushed in to say that the dissenters wished the Catholics every success. After further debate Russell reiterated his readiness to move repeal, if the dissenters thought it proper; otherwise he would keep quiet. Thereupon early in April, the United Committee, meeting in conjunction with sympathetic Parliamentarians, resolved that at the proper time Russell should introduce a repeal motion.

Some weeks later he informed Parliament of his intention to do this on June 7, since he had examined dissenting claims and found them justified.[35] On that day, however, Russell only presented several United Committee petitions for repeal and discussed its desirability. The motion had been postponed because the committee hoped that the weight of its propaganda would persuade the new ministry to act. If this hope bore no fruit, repeal would be moved next session. Many dissenters wished to press the issue immediately, but the committee had agreed upon postponement. Russell emphasized that petitions had been signed by Anglicans and Catholics as well as dissenters. Other spokesmen then reminded the House that grievances were not theoretical when a dissenter could not be a member of Oxford University or serve as a magistrate in corporations.

Not long after, the Dissenters' Marriages Bill passed the Commons. Some members opposed it as making marriage merely a civil contract while others regretted that it did not apply to all Protestant dissenters.[36] These latter, however, supported the bill as a step in the right direction. It also went through the committee in the Lords by a small majority, but Parliament adjourned before final action occurred.

Meanwhile the United Committee had, through its secretary, Robert

[33] 17 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 12-19.

[34] Of all defenders of Catholic claims none, as might be expected, equalled Sidney Smith in pertinence. In a speech before the clergy of the East Riding archdeaconry in 1825 he pleaded for the eligibility of Catholics to all civil offices, with the usual qualifications. The laws against them were impolitic, unjust, and unnecessary. If injustice must be done, persecute the Ranters not the Catholics, a few thousands not six millions: "Galvanise a frog, don't galvanise a tiger." Just as furniture went down bit by bit from the London house to the cottage and then the dunghill, so arguments were still heard in the country, which no longer passed in London—*Catholic Claims* (Carlisle, 1825).

[35] 17 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 743-744, 1145-1149.

[36] *Ibid.*, 1343-1345, 1407-1424, 1426-1427.

Winter, drawn up a statement of the case of the Protestant dissenters, which was sent to every member of Parliament and to the editors of every metropolitan and provincial newspaper and many periodicals, and distributed freely as a pamphlet. The committee also circulated widely a sermon preached in 1790 by Samuel Pearce of Birmingham to much the same purpose. The statement described the peaceful state of the kingdom as a proper time to request the grant of those rights from which dissenters had so long and so unwarrantedly been excluded; it emphasized the factitious origin of the penal laws and traced their wavering history; it denounced the indemnity acts as at once an admission of failure and an imperfect concession. Neither Ireland, Scotland, nor America had suffered from the lack of tests which were a poor barrier if men really intended damage. Dissenters did not threaten the state or the church, and the grant of freedom would make them better citizens.

Scarcely was this plea before the public than *The Necessity of the Corporation and Test Acts* attempted a refutation. In denying the existence of persecution the author maintained that while the penal acts opposed dissenters' principles, the indemnity acts recognized that their usual conduct did not threaten the state. Repeal was not a right but a concession, and all Englishmen were under the law. If dissenters wished political equality, repeal was unnecessary; they could already enter Parliament. On the other hand, holders of offices of trust worked in the dark and should be proper men. Disaffection was flourishing in the land, and to concede to it was like appeasing a conflagration by tamely surrendering to the flames. To point to America was blasphemous. "God forbid that we should ever experience anything like *such* liberty, such licentiousness I should say, as is permitted in . . . that boasted land of religious liberty [where] we shall find, in one street, the blasphemer boldly declaiming against all religion; and in the next, some delirious fanatic doing all that human folly can do to make religion ridiculous." Unitarians ought especially to be watched, for those who spoke loudest about religious liberty actually cared least about religion.

Much in the same vein was *A Letter to the King.* Although admittedly his pages contained nothing not to be "found in the Bacons, Hookers, Cookes, Hales, and Clarendons of former times," the author must defend "the principles which constitute the essential polity of the nation . . . the indefeasible union of divine with human law." Since church and state were one, repeal meant not only separation but also sanctioning the false opinion that the people, not God, were the source of legitimate power. That the tests were not wholly adequate did not justify repeal. "Do we leave our doors open at midnight, because the robber may break in at the window?" Even an infidel who had professed Christianity was pref-

erable to one who had not; he would at least try to live up to his profession. A mere oath not to injure the church was at once worthless and a weakening of the moral fibre of dissent which after all did believe the Establishment wrong. Relaxation of the test must bring on revolution and undo the Reformation by amalgamating England and the papacy. Those Anglicans who supported repeal as a way of retaining "their stalls and their tithes" would soon find that in losing their souls to safeguard their property they had sacrificed everything.

A third literary opponent, Stephen Cassan, took up his pen only to aid the church, "crucified between Dissenters and Papists," and lying wounded in the highway whilst priests and Levites passed by. Dissenters, he said, cried conscience but sought revenues. If repeal were conceded, no one knew what torrent would pour down on England. To believe the church secure in her own strength was insanity; concession only inflamed cupidity. The acts imposed no penalty; they protected the constitution, rewarded the upholders of church and state, and preserved unity. Dissent was "spiritual republicanism," and once the bars were down England could anticipate revolutionary orgies, the more since repeal reflected the "pestiferous machinations of the patrons of the God-rejecting London University." Dissenters totally misinterpreted the Reformation when they compared their schism to the Anglican breach with Rome. Although Rome was corrupt as to practice, she was true as to constitution. Anglicanism was true in both, and Dissent in neither. England had only two churches, Anglican and Roman; the sects were schismatics who had divided the Establishment for nothing or next to nothing. To admit them to full religious liberty meant democracy and chaos.[37]

Such tissues of intolerance and unreality appeared from time to time in the press, pulpit, and Parliament before repeal was finally achieved, but they only spurred the United Committee to greater effort. Scarcely had Parliament assembled in 1828 than on February 4 the Commons received a repeal petition.[38] Its presentation was accompanied by the explanation that the committee's decision against uniting at that time with

[37] The dissenters' statement appeared in two forms, one approximately half as long as the other, both bearing the title, *Corporation and Test Acts* (London, 1827). The full titles of the three other pieces are: *The Necessity of the Corporation and Test Acts maintained in a Brief Review of the "Statement of the Case of the Protestant Dissenters"* (London, 1828); *A Letter to the King against the Repeal of the Test Act. By a Tory of the old school* (London, 1828); *Considerations against the Repeal of the Corporation and Test Acts; and on the danger of concession to Dissenters or Papists. Together with a reprint of those acts, by the former of which it will be seen that the alleged grievance of dissenters is ideal, and by the latter that its enactments affect papists only and not dissenters. To which are appended some Remarks on the Reformation, and on the Restoration of the Church and Monarchy after the overthrow of both by dissenters,* by the Reverend Stephen Hyde Cassan (London, 1828). Cassan, the inconsequential ecclesiastical biographer, died insane; the hysteria of his tract was perhaps a prognostication of that fate.

[38] 18 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 96-97, 124-125, 305-307, 449. During 1827 over 1,000 petitions were presented to the Commons, and early in 1828 over 700 more were added; they came mainly from municipalities.

the Catholics proceeded not from hostility but from political expediency alone.[39] Other petitions for repeal signed by Catholics, Anglicans, and dissenters alike soon poured in. One came from the London Common Council of which the majority were Anglicans, with only three or four hostile votes out of 260; forty years before, a similar motion got almost no support. When someone charged the Corporation of London with inconsistency in seeking relief for dissenters and at the same time persecuting Jews, the persecution was credited to the Court of Aldermen which had been begged by the Common Council to repeal the bylaw under which the persecution took place. In presenting the petitions speakers again denounced the Indemnity Act as insulting and inadequate.

Petitions gave way to something more substantial on February 26 when Lord John Russell, after the pattern of Fox in 1790, moved that the House resolve itself into a committee of the whole to consider repeal.[40] In a lengthy and comprehensive speech, bolstered by a vast array of facts dug up by the United Committee, he reviewed the history of the acts and the changing opinions through the years. He dismissed the indemnity acts as indefensible: if the dissenters were dangerous, they should have been totally excluded; if not, they should have been freely admitted. He denied that dissenters' grievances were merely theoretical or that their admission to office threatened the church or property. The seconder applauded the character of the dissenters and emphasized the practical and ideal value of repeal. Other supporters deplored the holding of liberties by an annual lease, the profanation of religion, and the essential futility of the penal laws.

On the other side, men stressed the church's need of protection and argued that if the grievances had been as great as stated, thirty-seven years would not have elapsed with scarcely a complaint of hardship. To this a Scottish member replied that the fear caused by the French Revolution had made dissenters realize the futility of trying for relief. Another member cited the numerous petitions as evidence that dissenters felt their burdens; as a member of the Establishment he believed that the church could be better protected than by a sacramental test. Huskisson opposed the acts but regarded repeal as inappropriately timed; he echoed the common phrase that the grievances were insignificant, and he attempted

[39] This issue had been precipitated by a paragraph in the *New Times* on January 31, alleging that the British Catholic Association had joined forces with the committee. Secretary Robert Winter immediately refuted the statement, and a few days later the committee resolved that "acting upon their own best judgment, and on the recommendation of some of their Parliamentary friends, [they] have not thought it expedient to endeavour to unite with the Catholics in matters politic, but that they disavow the inference that their acting separately and independently proceeds from any hostility to the claims of that numerous and respectable body of petitioners." Lord John Russell and Mr. John Smith were requested to state the purport of this action. The latter did so in presenting the petition on February 4—*Test Act Reporter*, 445; 18 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 96-97.

[40] 18 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 676-784.

to confuse the issue by adverting to Catholic claims. Several members then pointed out his inconsistency and confusion, "not at all like those clear statements which he was accustomed to give with reference to commercial matters." Peel, after contrasting the difficulties of the government with the good fortune of the opposition in being responsible only to conscience, defended the acts in an often-interrupted speech; they did not inflict any real hardship because in ten years, 1817-1826, only six petitions for repeal were presented to the House. He noted also that three Presbyterians were members of the cabinet and that a dissenter was Lord Mayor of London. This information was turned back upon him, appropriately, as proving the ridiculous character of the acts and indicating the profanation of a sacred ordinance.

The final speech in the dissenters' behalf came from Brougham who reminded his listeners that they sat as representatives of the people. He considered the phrase, 'the wisdom of our ancestors,' "one of the most fruitful sources of mischief to the country," because as Francis Bacon had pointed out, it proceeded upon the assumption "that the world was older and wiser when it was younger." He denounced the profanation of religion and declared that even if dissenters had no practical grievance—which assumption he denied—the stigma, the mark of the chain, was enough. Before a dissenter could become Lord Mayor he had to repress his repugnance and take the sacrament. Did not this constitute a practical grievance?

Palmerston then wound up the debate by supporting the acts. Although a friend to civil and religious liberty, he believed that they might well be continued, dormant in times of order, invoked in times of treason. Moreover, Catholic grievances were more pressing than dissenters' whose hardships were "theoretical, or at least extremely trivial."

The opponents of repeal were on the whole none too happy in their arguments. None in Parliament opposed repeal on principle; no one questioned the dissenters' loyalty to the crown or accused them of seeking to uproot the church; no one defended the revolting farce, whereby those who wished to qualify for office took communion solely for that purpose, as an adequate test of loyalty or faith. The Indemnity Act drew the teeth from the charge that the dissenters were a menace: if they were, they should be excluded; if not, their talents should be utilized to the full. To argue that the Corporation and Test Acts safeguarded the church was absurd, all sail and no anchor. The church stood on its own doctrine and on its own members, many of whom favored repeal. Did not the Scottish Establishment survive without a test? Was the church in Ireland "built of stronger materials or founded on a steadier rock," to survive without protection?

In the abstract realm the opponents were totally unrealistic. They argued for retention, indifferent to the political and social circumstances of 1828. They insisted that the acts impaired no rights. They promised to support repeal at the proper time. They made clear on occasion that church and state were but euphemisms for property. Full often they couched their arguments in phrases that warrant Palmerston's summary of dissenters' grievances—theoretical, or at least extremely trivial. Any fulfillment of their prophecies with respect to the decline of the church must be judged primarily in terms of internal factors, not in terms of dissenters' gains.

When the House went into committee, the motion having passed 237-193, neither friends nor foes added much to what had been said, although the suggestion that the acts be suspended rather than repealed gained some support.[41] Peel sought to postpone debate on the ground that not all who had voted for the motion would approve unqualified repeal, which only impelled several members to explain that their votes did mean complete approval. The debate then became thoroughly acrimonious, accusations as to motives and conduct flying freely back and forth. On the second reading of the repeal bill, two members spoke briefly in opposition, one insisting that repeal would bring on Catholic emancipation, the other, that it would "damnify" it. Meanwhile, in the Lords, on the first consideration of repeal, three members briefly criticized the acts whilst another defended them. A little later, Lord Holland presented a repeal petition and reiterated his own devotion to Locke's ideals of liberty.[42]

In the further debate in the Commons one member sought to require all candidates for office solemnly and sincerely to declare not to use any of their powers to subvert "the principles of the Church of England, Scotland, or Ireland, as by law established.[43] The seconder explained his opposition to Russell's motion on the ground that no substitute had been offered for the test it proposed to abolish. Russell, while applauding the sentiments of both, resisted any fresh declaration because it was better to assume that dissenters were loyal; in any case a declaration would mean little or nothing. Peel then arose to explain his attempt at delay as coming only from a desire to look more fully into the matter, since a majority of the House clearly favored alteration. He opposed the existing situation, an annual suspension of the test, and suspension for a period of years; yet he did not wish complete repeal: he preferred to substitute a safeguarding declaration. This concession aroused conflicting responses. Some members would accept it rather than risk defeat; others demanded unquali-

[41] *Ibid.*, 816-833.

[42] *Ibid.*, 923-925, 1137, 1170-1171. Petitions also were presented to the Lords. On February 17 Lord Holland announced that over 860 were lying on the table.

[43] *Ibid.*, 1180-1207, 1329-1332.

fied repeal. To insure passage Russell himself approved a declaration.[44] The bill then had its third reading on March 31—and passed. The next day it went to the Lords.

When, a little later, Holland proposed the second reading in a learned and felicitous speech, he related with telling effect the burdens of the sacramental test.[45] The archbishop of York then declared his intention of voting for repeal because tests profaned a sacred ordinance and endangered religious sincerity. The bishop of Lincoln believed that whatever the earlier danger—and much had undoubtedly threatened—dissenters were no longer bitter toward the church; therefore he would support repeal. While concurring, the bishop of Durham regretted that dissenters based their claim on abstract right and insisted upon some test, political if not religious. Wellington emphasized the ineffectiveness of the penal acts in securing the Establishment. Goderich supported repeal because the test profaned a sacred rite. On the other side, Winchelsea found no injustice in the acts and thought the state justified in enacting such laws as were necessary for protecting the inseparable union of church and state; he therefore begged for some security. Eldon opposed repeal and belittled a declaration. After the second reading Lord Winchelsea moved to insert a clause giving the church stronger protection than a mere declaration. The clause, more like a bill than a clause, required a candidate to swear belief in the Bible and to promise not to injure the church; the king in council could exempt holders of inferior offices.

On the motion for going into committee considerable debating took place.[46] The earl of Rosebery wished to insure that the Scots, who labored under greater handicaps than English dissenters because while having their own Establishment they could still not hold office in England, would benefit from the bill. Eldon thought that the Act of Union with Scotland made the situation "excessively delicate" and opposed repeal. When the lively debate showed the tendency all in favor of repeal, twelve Lords protested formally against its menace to established institutions.

Soon, however, the House was hard at work trying to settle the issue.[47] When Eldon desired an amendment to protect the Protestant

[44] The declaration which Russell accepted read: "I, A.B., do solemnly declare that I will never exercise any privilege to which I am or may become entitled to subvert or disturb the present church establishment of the United Kingdoms, or either of them; and this I declare on the faith of a Christian." A month later, April 28, when the bill passed the Lords, the declaration had been amplified to read: "I, A.B., do solemnly and sincerely, in the presence of God, profess, testify, and declare, upon the true faith of a Christian, that I will never exercise any power, authority, or influence which I may possess by virtue of the office of ———— to injure or weaken the Protestant Church, as it is by law established in England, or to disturb the said Church, or the Bishops or Clergy of the said Church, in the possession of any rights or privileges to which such Church, or the said Bishops, are, or may be by law entitled"—*Test Act Reporter*, 451, 469. "Upon the true faith of a Christian" excluded Jews from Parliament until 1858.

[45] 18 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 1450-1520.

[46] *Ibid.*, 1571-1610.

[47] 19 *Parl. Deb.* (2 ser.), 39-49.

religion, Clarendon warned that the incorporation of his words would destroy any chance of aiding Catholics. Although Wellington refused to support Eldon's amendment, other Lords offered their approval of it. Nonetheless, it was defeated 71 to 31. Then Eldon sought to introduce another to somewhat the same purpose, which also lost. A few changes of a verbal sort eased the position of the dissenters in the matter of the declaration and otherwise, and the bill then passed its third reading on April 28. Early in May, having been returned to the Commons, it was accepted by that House.[48]

With its passage the dissenters had gained a long-sought goal. They celebrated accordingly.[49] On the evening of June 18, the anniversary of Waterloo, over four hundred people gathered at a dinner in London. So many toasts were given, so many speeches made, and so much fervor expressed, that not until "half-past one o'clock" did the diners, in "undiminished numbers to the last," stand for the final toast, "a long pull, and a strong pull, and a pull all together." The occasion was most happy. The duke of Sussex, long famed for his support of greater religious toleration, in the chair, Lord John Russell, Lord Holland, Lord Althorp, and the earl of Carnarvon uttered noble and appropriate remarks. The Catholics were well represented and were promised every assistance in their campaign. Although severe disabilities still restricted Protestant dissenters, they had secured an immense improvement in their practical and legal status, a happy augury for the future of religious dissent, whether Protestant or Catholic.

[48] *Ibid.*, 109-137, 156-186, 229-237, 289-300. The United Committee did not relax its efforts for a moment until victory was assured. In order that no slip might occur in the phrasing of the bill, Winter remained in constant touch with influential friends in both Houses.

[49] *Report of the Speeches and Proceedings at a Dinner to Commemorate the abolition of the Sacramental Test* (London, 1828).

A RELIGIOUS INTERPRETATION OF DEMOCRACY

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A GREAT deal has been written about the relationship of religion to democracy in recent days, particularly the Christian religion and often specifically the Protestant Christian religion. It is not my purpose here to argue that democracy is rooted in the teachings of Jesus as interpreted by Protestantism, or vice versa, but to address myself to two specific queries: What are the real problems of democracy from a religious point of view? and a corollary question: What can the study of religion, or the discipline of religious thought, contribute to their solution?

But before we attempt a direct answer two matters of definition should be cared for. One is a definition of democracy itself. As far as possible I shall attempt to adhere to the dictionary definition of democracy, namely: "Democracy is a form of government in which the supreme power is retained by the people and exercised either directly or indirectly," with the further implication of "equality of rights without hereditary or arbitrary differences in rank or privilege." Its essence then is popular sovereignty, in all areas and however implemented, with the perennial possibility of change of form and ruling personnel.

Inevitably, of course, one will be conditioned by his environment; and while seeking to avoid making all references to "democracy" mean only "American democracy," I shall no doubt be guilty frequently of thinking in such terms. American democracy and its problems will be most in my thought.

Secondly, with regard to religion, the use of this term will in all probability mean in most cases, the Judæo-Christian tradition and practice. This is largely unavoidable in the nature of the case. It is because religion-in-general has no existence save as philosophical abstraction for the purposes of classification and discussion. It is not a living social entity. Democracies have relationships only with particular religions, and their problems can in a real sense be viewed only from the perspective of a particular tradition. Therefore the subject of this paper will probably mean: What are the problems of democracy as viewed from the Judæo-Christian tradition, with particular reference to American democracy? And, what has the study of the relations of these two traditions, democratic and Judæo-Christian, to contribute?

If we shall consider the relation of religion and democracy, one of the first things which comes to mind, the most obvious if not the most

important, is the relation of organized religion to the national life, or the relation of state and church. This has been an important matter in all cultures, and we cannot hope to discuss the entirety of this problem here, even if desirable. There have been essentially theocratic states (witness the early Hebrew state) ; there have been national religions, where religion, especially in its official capacity, was an instrument and support of the state, as in Rome, Egypt, Babylonia-Assyria, China, Japan; there have been attempts to make the state and church one (observe the later post-exilic Jewish community), or attempts like those of Calvin and the New England Puritans, as well as numerous small communities. There have been official religions adopted by governments as the state religion, those who varied from the norm suffering persecution, though the religion was theoretically regarded as universal and not nationalistic.

The American experiment was one almost unique in its time, largely brought about by the presence of numerous competing sects, most of them fleeing from persecution elsewhere, and resolved to achieve equal status at least in the New World. It is the attempt to place all religious institutions upon an equal footing before the law of the land—though actually the Judæo-Christian tradition in its many forms has been the dominant one. On the whole, our establishment has been one of equality among different Christian and Jewish sects, rather than a religious universalism.

Be it noted, however, that even this arrangement has not resolved all our problems or released all our state-church, religious-secular tensions and that these problems and tensions are evident at many points in our national life. While we have no serious problem of dominant church groups exercising governmental power and wielding undue political influence, there are tensions in many other areas. For instance: What of the preferred position of religious institutions with regard to taxation? Is not this a kind of special privilege from which the democratic American life should be free in fairness to all? What of religion in public education? Can there be any religious education or Bible reading, which is not sectarian *per se,* and therefore in violation of the Constitution? Is the transportation of parochial children to their sectarian schools and the use of school facilities for religious instruction, or the granting of released time for such instruction elsewhere, a like violation? And finally, what of the conflict of conscience with national duty, say in the saluting of the flag by those with scruple against the practice, or the call to military service on the part of those with pacifistic convictions? These are all pressing issues affecting the working of democracy in many areas, especially at the state level.

These more obvious problems, however, but point to a deeper issue involved throughout, the *root* of religious-secular, state-church tensions,

namely, the question of authority. Whose authority, what kind of authority governs what areas of life, and how shall their conflicts be reconciled? Religious conflicts, to be sure, are not peculiar to democracies. Nearly every society with organized religion—and that means practically every society—can tell us of institutional conflicts within its history. But our interest here is not the history of any one or several such conflicts, but to note the basic character of all such conflict in the form in which it is to be found in democracies like our own.

The basic question at issue here is the question of truth. This is deeper than the matter of conflicting institutional claims; it has to do with the nature of truth, especially as it affects social behavior, its source, the method of achieving it, and secondarily with the means of making it known. Let us contrast the two contexts, democratic and religious, in this respect.

The apparent implication of the democratic position with regard to truth or right is that it would seem to consist in the opinion of the majority. What the majority desires becomes the law of the land; what most of the people desire most ardently is best. The function of the leader of a democratic society is to seek and to express the mind of that people. Even though leaders are presumably superior to their followers in wisdom, insight, and perception of the current realities and future prospects, their own private vision of the good, the true, and the desirable must not carry them beyond the point of speaking for those they represent. Their function is to bring to consciousness or expression in the minds of their constituents their constituents' own desires or convictions, and within that framework act as servants of the society. *Vox populi vox Dei.*

Practically this means that the *method* by which knowledge of the true or desirable is arrived at is by the public discussion of all ideas on any matter and the suppression of none: freedom of speech in newspaper, radio, pulpit, lecture hall, street corner, and legislature; the stirring around of all these ideas together in the democratic melting pot of opinion which will result in the separation of the dross and the refinement of the gold of pure truth. After all sides have been heard, then what at least fifty-one per cent of the people desire is the truly desirable.

On the whole this applies more to long-term decisions than to the immediate. In the latter area leaders have a certain freedom within this general framework to do what seems best to them as individuals. But in the end it is the people who will judge them; they will be supported or repudiated by those who have chosen them. And if we believe the truth of the homely dictum attributed to Lincoln that one can fool all of the people some of the time, and some of the people all of the time, but not all of the people all of the time, we shall be persuaded that this method in

the long run yields the truly desirable course of action, defines democratic truth.

In this method of arriving at truth democracy has often been likened to scientific procedure. There are here no a priori truths, which, because of a supposedly diviner origin or by the mere authoritarian quality of the dispenser of them, cannot be challenged. A course of action, to be approved, must meet all claims and counterclaims in the full public gaze. Scientific method, it is to be noted, does not assume, however, that majority vote is its final authority.

The implication of this pragmatic theory of truth and right for social organization and method is that they shall be experimental. There are to be no hard and fast traditional lines of organization or technique. Democratic social structure may be changed radically and frequently to serve the desired ends. There is no sanctity in one form as such above another but only in the utility which each pattern demonstrates in achieving the goals chosen by popular sovereignty.

Now contrast with this the religious approach to truth and right conduct. The latter can be characterized as authoritarian, intellectually in its apprehension of truth and morally in its determination of right; traditional and conservative in social methodology; and aristocratic in organizational structure. A word on each of these.

Religion looks to a special source for its guiding principles, usually in terms of a special insight or revelation. Truth comes to it, not by majority vote, even of ninety-nine per cent, but by eternal decree, made known only through chosen instruments and perhaps known thoroughly to only a few. It is not amenable to a public vote of confidence but subject only to proclamation; it is an eternal truth, a principle not open to debate but only to exposition.

This leads usually to a hierarchical structure of organization classically exemplified by the Roman Catholic Church and the lamaism of Tibetan Buddhism. To be sure, Protestantism in many cultures has tried to organize the life of religion on a democratic basis, but with varying success. Only a few rather small groups have been able to maintain anything approaching the complete democracy which they profess.

And the other corollary is a usually traditional and conservative approach to most social problams. Religion looks to its past heritage for guidance in the present and future crisis. It emphasizes continuity rather than novelty. It trusts in evolution not revolution to achieve the good society. And religions have in many cases been institutionally happier with favoring authoritarian political setups than neutral democratic ones.

How then, we may well ask at this point, is it possible for the democratic and religious principles to work together at all? Why are they not

in conflict at every point? Can they contribute anything to each other except strife?

It should be pointed out that what has happened in various democracies, especially in America, is something of a compromise. The latter for all practical purposes has conceded that it is a nation whose practices are supposedly consonant with the Judæo-Christian tradition. It has not attempted to judge between sectarian claims within this tradition but it has espoused and officially acknowledged the presence of this tradition in its national life. Instances of the latter are the presence of chaplains in its legislatures and armed forces; religious mottoes on its coinage; the exemptions given to religious institutions in the matter of taxation; proclamation of public, religious holidays like Christmas and Thanksgiving; the special provision made for the conscientious objector to military service.

There has also been a tacit acceptance of the general moral and social standards of the Judæo-Christian tradition and their support by law. One might say that the basic morality of the Ten Commandments has been largely accepted as the social and legal pattern of rights and duties. For a particular instance we might take the public regulation of sex relationships. In most parts of the United States adultery is defined as cause for divorce, or even as a punishable offence, and monogamy as the proper, perhaps even natural, interpretation of the sex relationship—Reno and Hollywood always excepted. Explicit acknowledgment of the Christian basis of our public morality is made now and again. One such instance was the Supreme Court decision outlawing the Mormon practice of plural marriage. Against the Mormon appeal to religious liberty it was stated that plural marriage is opposed to the Christian standard of monogamy which is the generally accepted standard of the nation.

Thus, though theoretically "truth" or "right" in a democratic society might seem to be merely a matter of majority vote or immediate convenience, it can be seen that democracies in actuality are dependent for their standards upon other sources, frequently religious and philosophical. Such standards can be more easily and readily applied if the majority of fifty-one per cent is of that opinion. Perhaps, indeed, moral standards which are not those of the majority in a democracy will inevitably be rejected by law in the long run. But this will be done on other grounds than mere majority opinion; it will be on some normative ground or by some absolute standard.

On the other hand, religion too modifies its claims in practice. Or if it does not modify its claims, it must of necessity modify its authoritarian practices and sometimes its structure. Denominations must compete against each other where all are given an equality. Parenthetically it should be noted that this absolute equality before the law exists only in a few

democracies, especially America. There are others, as England, where there is one official church, but in the absence of active persecution or important privileges given to members of the official church, the competitive principle still holds. Competing claims to uniqueness of doctrine or absoluteness of truth can be measured against each other in the public forum. In the midst of the democratic society the authority of a church cannot be too far removed from the practical desires and actual standards of its people; the absoluteness of its truth is often cross-fertilized by reference to popular appeal and personal experience. Sometimes, especially in North America, the very organizational structure of the church has been a product of its democratic context.

These practical adjustments on the part of both democracy and religion do not entirely remove the tension, however. The differing claims of each realm to authority over the conduct of the members of the community cannot be entirely reconciled to the other, probably to the good of each. In the rest of this paper I shall consider what this remaining and even desirable tension looks like from the religious pole, and suggest what the study of religion contributes to its fruitfulness.

The constant peril which threatens democracy, from the viewpoint of religion, is that it will sell itself short, either by misconceiving itself or by seeking to found itself on too shallow a philosophy. It stands always in danger of conceiving itself as a superficial, humanistic society excelling in secular techniques; of conceiving itself as a society without a past, only a present and a future; of living in the absence of tradition and principle, in terms of expediency; of making its syntheses too easily and too soon. Indeed one might say that it is the function of religion in a democracy to make it aware that all its basic problems are essentially religious problems and can be settled on no lesser level.

But what does such a statement mean, concretely? Something of this sort, I take it. No society can rightly function without a sense of direction, and direction usually refers both to origins and destiny or goal. Any society which lacks a strong sense of either is a danger to the world commonwealth in the same way that a derelict hulk, without compass or rudder, is a danger in congested shipping lanes. One of the great dangers to our modern world society is precisely this: Societies which have lost their sense of direction in terms of any *ultimate* meanings and are taking their bearings from near-by objects plunge headlong in whatever direction seems immediately desirable. In proportion as they are well-armed, numerous, fanatically misinformed, and scientifically instructed they are dangerous. Or there is the opposite danger: the large rudderless hulk that flounders about here and there, subject to every passing current. Democracies like our own, with few and short traditions, polyglot cultural

inheritances, and subject to popular whims are especially liable to this latter fate.

Now it is the function of a religious tradition to remind a society of its need of a sense of direction, *i.e.*, a basic philosophy of what it is all about, some stars to steer by. As suggested earlier, this means both a knowledge of the past and a hope for the future, both proximate and ultimate bearings.

With regard to the past: It would appear to be absolutely necessary for society to know itself in terms of the forces which have made it, both in terms of the historical facts of its origin and the basic philosophy which underlies its culture. Should we take a society such as our own, it would seem practically impossible to understand the United States in any profound sense without recognizing the religious factors in the founding of our society—or without noting the relation of our institutions to the Judæo-Christian philosophy of existence and human values. Yet it is constantly being done. Charles A. Beard could write a comprehensive and erudite history of the United States with scant reference to religious movements, ideals, or philosophies; and most secondary-school history is taught with almost no reference to our religious tradition for fear of sectarian entanglements.

With regard to the present and future: Society must be reminded that its fundamental problems cannot be solved alone in terms of scientific techniques or sociological empiricisms. Basic to any social structure, answered or unanswered, are questions of this sort: What is the relation of this society to its past, to its traditional philosophy and values? Is it discarding them or, while giving them lip service, actually evading or denying them in practice? One might say that there is such a thing as sociological schizophrenia, a division of society into its tradition-serving and its tradition-denying self. There is no doubt that much of the social malaise of our own society stems directly from the feeling of guilt arising from such a situation.

But it is not sufficient from the religious viewpoint to ask: Is this nation at odds with its traditional past? The questions of which it would remind society have a critical bearing on the present and future. Society must be reminded of the persistence of those fundamental questions which cannot be answered alone in terms of scientific techniques or sociological empiricisms. Basic to any social structure is the question of its ultimate goals. In other words: What, in your mind, constitutes the Good Society, and within that society the good life? This roots in turn in the following questions: What is man—in terms of origin, capacity, destiny? What is the meaning of history, if any? What is the nature and fate of human

societies? And the essential health of a society, its sense of direction, depend directly upon its ability to answer these questions.

Now be it remarked that these questions are basically religious in nature. They have to do with man's conception of his relation to the universe at large; as to what the nature and disposition of that universe toward him is, and what his response to it should be. Indeed basic self-knowledge, whether individual or social, is always religious in implication, resting upon an interpretation of the universe and the espousing of an active attitude toward it.

The study of religion would then have these two tasks at least to perform: One, to make a given society aware of its own religious past, both in terms of institution and social forces, and of the fundamental spiritual principles underlying its culture. The second task is to study the relation of present social structure and practice to the terms of that tradition, whether of loyalty or disobedience, conformity or evasion.

This is probably as far as an "objective" study of religion in a given culture can go. Conceivably it could be done competently by any sociologist, historian, or political scientist of sufficient acumen and catholic sympathy. But the remaining task of religion in a democracy can probably be accomplished only by one who speaks out of a personal religious loyalty, who has answered for himself the fundamental existential human questions. In such case, to use a philosophical phrase, he must present a relevant critique of contemporary social pattern from within a religious tradition; or speaking in political terminology, the religious man must represent many times the loyal opposition; and in religious terms, it is the function of the religious consciousness to be the conscience of its age and witness to it from its own deep convictions.

It may be that in accomplishing such tasks religion can save democracy. Our own American culture it can remind of its heritage of religious freedom; of the spiritual foundations of its doctrine of the worth of human personality in the Judæo-Christian conception of the Fatherhood of God. It may well challenge what seem to be merely utilitarian principles of action chosen in the absence of long tradition; and condemn rule of thumb expediency or confusion of means and ends in the light of what it conceives to be its own transcendent moral principles. It is barely possible that it can revive within us a new sense of direction and give us again a sense of destiny.

AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM

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GENUINE authority is for freedom. Such authority, concern for the common good, is of such a nature that the more it commands, the more freedom is also made real. As a matter of fact, the more authoritative is the concern for the common good, the less it is experienced as authority while the more it is understood to be true freedom. The kind of love which is concern for the common good is most authoritative even while it is least authoritarian. Any age, perhaps particularly our own, needs authority to make general freedom real. The nature of such authority and of such freedom is our subject.

Our thesis is that absolute authority inheres only in the will of God which is the source and centre of all concern for the common good. The will of God, being love, is always for the fullest possible measure of practicable freedom and is finally for the perfect freedom of every creature. Naturally we cannot here vindicate our right to this thesis in the realm of total truth.[1] We have, however, some opportunity to indicate the explanatory adequacy of this proposition for the topic at hand.

I

The inmost nature of love is to bestow freedom on its objects. Love does not let "good enough alone" to save itself effort or responsibility. Love is not content with the respecting of each one as an individual. Love cannot even rest satisfied with the recognition of the dignity of every man. Love seeks fullness of community. Such fullness demands the finding of the highest development of every part of the community and the most satisfactory relations on the part of the community both within and without. Love therefore bestows freedom on all its objects because it is creatively concerned with them. Love wants each one to become genuinely himself, but knows that no one can become his fullest and truest self apart from coöperative enterprise. The authority of love is the organic constraint for a coöperative community of free and genuine individuals. The fuller and wiser the concern, the more freedom is fostered within the total conditions of man's organic need for community. The dignity of each and all becomes respected, to be sure, but beyond such respect the deepest need for the self to become free within a concerned community is increasingly fulfilled. Concern can never endure mere tolerance of strange individuals or of differing minorities. It rather promotes their positive freedom appre-

[1] For fuller elaboration of this thesis compare my series *Reason and the Christian Faith.* Vol. I, *Faith and Reason,* deals with the problems of origins; Vol. II, *Evil and the Christian Faith,* deals with ends; and Vol. III, *Christianity and Society,* deals with our present practical difficulties.

ciatively within the acceptance of an inclusive community. Creative variety thereby enriches the total social organism.

The Greek name for this kind of love is *agapē*. When *agapē* becomes the final authority, we have an absolute which can never become fanatical. This we need. For mankind both longs for an absolute and dreads it. False absolutes, when seriously practiced, at best curtail freedom and at worst destroy. The history of religion records enormous cruelty and persecution. Religion, in general, is with real right considered to be a divisive factor. Narrow loyalties, served religiously, tear and destroy the social fabric. Many honest and competent thinkers have therefore dismissed religion as a unitive force of civilization. President Conant of Harvard in his baccalaureate address of 1950, for instance, pointed up this fact with regard to the college campus. Many thinkers see no hope for world order on the basis of religious faith. World culture, they feel, may digest religious faiths without too much cultural stomach-ache, but religious faith can by no means become the ground of world unity. Any attempt to achieve such a religious unity would rather be imperialistic and destructive of freedom.

Agapē by its very nature, however, cannot be fanatical and divisive, for it is organically constituted by inclusive concern. This concern precedes religious and culture content. It is the ultimate unitive function which engenders and lives in the forms of freedom. As such it is definite without being specific. A child can depend upon a mother's love, if real, without knowing specifically from day to day what the mother is going to do or to give. There is thus an absolute unity presupposed in *agapē* which nevertheless acts as a lure to freedom. *Agapē* includes by nature both the quality of belonging and the opportunity for creative self-expression.

Such concern cannot be fanatic or divisive, moreover, because beyond being completely inclusive by nature, it comprises a pedagogical principle whereby, as far as possible, each person or group is first of all accepted for himself where and as he is. The good is not forced on him, but offered to him at the point of concrete relevance. Persons are not subordinated to principles. Lives are not made means to moralisms. The good intention is not substituted for wisdom and concrete knowledge. The good will must rather be tested, as far as it can be, by the actual consequences which would ensue from its intentions. The more absolutely *agapē* is understood and accepted, therefore, the more inclusive and concretely wise it must seek to become. Concern for the common good, precisely as the nature of the ultimate, is consequently the greatest possible incentive to growth in freedom. *Agapē* as the absolute ensures as fully as possible man's intellectual, moral, and religious autonomy. That such freedom is, nevertheless, both social and responsible we shall see later.

Nor can *agapē* as authority be artificial in nature. Freedom is in

the nature of things. The child, if held too tightly, rebels. Man needs freedom. Organic need is, of course, not a matter of wants and wishes. It is a matter of the interrelations between the organism and the universe which produced it. A child may be "free" to eat mostly candy, for instance, but is not free from the consequences of such a diet. Personal needs are organic to the world out of whose womb the persons came. The authority for freedom is thus constitutive of the self and its world. With freedom we do not mean unconditional choice. We are not discussing freedom of indifference. We know, on the one hand, of no universe with push and pulls on the part of isolated bits of matter. A closed universe enacting exact equivalence of causal continuity we believe to be a methodological abstraction. We do not know, on the other hand, a world of haphazard, merely random choices. We know of no spontaneity in the sense of mere causelessness or of lack of prior motivation.

The freedom which we are discussing is rather conceived in terms of field theories where origination is both inside and outside the skin, where there is a give and take in the forces which impinge on the organism and a certain degree of plasticity in the selection of them and adjustment to them. The higher we rise into personal organisms, the more real this kind of freedom becomes.

Freedom may be looked at in some such terms as "the pattern of purpose" of a magnetic torpedo, which changes its own course with every change in the course of the ship which it pursues. We believe personal purpose to pervade the universe in accordance with the total unity which constitutes our world a universe. Particularly such purpose pertains to the discrete personalities which respond selectively within this general unity of the universe. The scope, the general kind, and the overarching direction of purpose we believe to be due to the authority which inheres in the total purpose for the common good. Freedom inheres in the will of God as the total unity of the universe. *Agapē* is therefore never artificial but expressive of the nature of reality. Only as we know the truth can we become free within the truth.

When concern for the common good constitutes the ultimate nature of authority, furthermore, freedom can never be arbitrary. There can then be no escapist otherworldliness. The more such an absolute is accepted, the more consequent concern there must be for our actual world with its total range of possibilities and problems. With *agapaic* concern there must be acceptance, appreciation, and proper use of all the good of the world, on the one hand, and a wise, patient concern urgently to change what is wrong in it on the other. Where *agapē* reigns, neither can there be any "pious" individualism which evades social responsibility. *Agapē* is, rather, complete concern for fellowship. Nor, again, can there be any externalism which relegates the bettering of the world to legislation. *Agapē*

is, through and through, personal and social in nature. People themselves must therefore be changed along with institutional improvement. As a matter of fact, each person must be cared for as such. The hundredth sheep is precious to the good shepherd. Individual freedom is intrinsic to reality. Solitude is a precondition for society. Privacy is a necessary ingredient in full community.

God's love is thus a principle and power which intends and achieves satisfactory freedom. It is an absolute which the more it is accepted in actual practice the more true freedom is actualized. Sovereignty and liberty are thus symbiotic terms; they belong together within the nature of reality. We shall be free only as we know and accept the truth. This truth, furthermore, cannot be arbitrary because it involves inclusively the common good. Freedom is not for the strong alone. Freedom is not for the majority alone. Freedom is not for the mass alone. Freedom is for all. Except freedom be responsible to this end, therefore, we neither know nor do the truth.

Nor does freedom remain mostly a duty. The more reality is known and accepted, the more freedom is changed from its reflection of reality as responsibility, *i.e.,* from its pedagogical status and function, to the reality which is a glad concern for the common good. In the language of high religion, our duty becomes our song. When we become freed within God's will for the common good, we lose the fever of life, the illusions of a false individuality, and find the reality of our organic needs fulfilled. As such freedom becomes more and more general, moreover, we obtain fullness of satisfactory relationships within the truth. The religion of law becomes experientially transcended and fulfilled by the gospel of love.

God bestows freedom responsibly. Life starts on the lowest levels and within the most complex conditions. Only as we mature in insight and within the experience of concerned freedom do we begin to glimpse the whole which was planned from the beginning. Even then genuine problems remain, but at least we can get a general vision which gives meaning to life and which helps to guide it. Penologists are now saying that the most important factor in raising socially oriented children is a father who is both strict and loving. God is such a Father. *Agapē* is completely concerned but also completely unsentimental.

We must consequently learn freedom within the ambiguities of nature and history. If reality showed us a clear face, we should never know the freedom of real and riskful choice. We should take automatically the best choice for our and the common good, but we should also remain immature children both as to the knowing and the doing of the good. We are stubbornly self-centered from childhood in order that we may not be puppets, mere qualifications of the absolute. At the same time we are also restlessly driven towards others by our sense of duty and drawn towards them by

our gregarious desires. Beyond human relations, too, we long to be right ultimately. We want to be more than socially adjusted. The unconditional demand of the right haunts us deep within, and the eternally good draws us towards the complete satisfaction of our being.

In such a way God has put us within a pedagogical situation with regard both to our nature and to our environment. We long for the fulfillment of self and for our acceptance within the best possible community. The history of self and society God also set within the uncertainties of nature, social processes, and finally of death. Eternity is set both in our hearts and within its negations in our kind of world. Although we may not here develop the point, this world is of such a nature as to make us seek organically for both freedom and fellowship. The finding of the will of God, who achieves such community, through the pedagogy of nature and history is the goal and ground of creation. God's will, we believe, reaches beyond the confines of our death. The total meaning of this life is therefore organically understandable only within the larger meaning and logic of the eternal love of God. Nevertheless since God has made and explains the nature of our lives and of our world, his will also provides the fullest meaning for life and explanation precisely for this world.

II

The authority for freedom which constitutes God's concern for the common good operates with and in the individual but also through institutions which are both expressive of the community and also instrumental in fulfilling the self. These institutions are primarily the family, the church, the school, and government. To discuss authority and freedom concretely, for our present purposes, involves the dealing with them in relation to these institutions.

The family is the group within which the child normally experiences its first understanding of authority and freedom. The parents should be authoritative but not authoritarian. They should be responsibly concerned with the development of the child's freedom as a member of a maturing community. The parents who continually decide for their children stunt their growth. The parents who allow the children too much their own way give them a false freedom and thus prevent their proper growth. Freedom should be responsibly and wisely bestowed according to the development of the child and in relation to the other members of the family. Institutional living is much harder than private living, and the family should give the child its first genuine understanding of the give and take of institutional life. For the sake of the children the parents should be strict. Inhibitions do not come from strictness but from an unloving thwarting of the children's wills. The inner security of the child is also destroyed by sentimental relations. The American home is threatened by sentimentalism

more than by undue severity. The inviolability and sanctity of righteousness becomes real through parents who exercise authority for the sake of the children in a wise and understanding way.

Authority should also know how to do away with itself as the children mature. There should be growth in freedom and the steady development of the assumption of responsibility. The more immature the child is, the more it should be safeguarded and developed by means of an authoritative (but not authoritarian) order. This is also true of society as a whole. The fount of wisdom should be present in the home, and the children should drink deeply from it before they are made to make serious choices. A companionship between parents and children should enable the parents to gauge the speed with which the different children should assume responsible choice. The constant having of one's own way and the having of practically no way of one's own are both sins against the children. Authority should be *flexible, but full,* at every level of need. Freedom should be real, according to the measure of the child's ability and maturity, and increased at the rate of its maturing. We know now that the way the child is set at home is the most important factor in its possibilities for a happy and useful life. When peace, order, and security are found at home, through strict and loving parents, the children are very likely to grow up well-adjusted and creative members of the community. "Social engineering" can do no better than to secure the fullest possible conditions for a happy home life, the continual living within the will of God for the common good.

To do so requires many conditions. In most cases and in the long run religious faith of a high and inclusive kind is the most important factor. Love in the individual and at home is found most fully when the parents genuinely believe in the love of God and when through authentic worship at home they find the kind of community which bespeaks the reality of their faith. Romantic rationalism and naïve idealism forget the stubbornness of sin. Through family worship the children are also allowed the knowledge of the prime source of authority for freedom. There they find the power to become delivered from the pressures of self and society. Love can be believed, for love seeks only the welfare of those who trust it. Love is therefore the essence of legitimate faith, and faith in God's love expels fear.

In order that to faith may be added virtue all the other conditions of a happy home are also to be sought. These cannot insure, but they can help to secure, such family stability and creative community. The family should belong to and actively coöperate with a high grade of religious community. The only standard for such a community is the inclusiveness, genuineness, and wisdom of its concern. Concern can be measured by the contribution any religious body makes to the community as a whole. No concerned institution lives for the sake of promoting its own life, but to be used for the common welfare within and without.

The economic order ought also to be of such a nature as to produce both real security and private initiative. The chance to work and to gain reward for hard work should be present as a stable factor along with real penalties for refusal to work or for careless performance. The degrees to which ability ought to be rewarded is hard to determine, but society should at least provide an economic system where work is always available at a rate to secure adequate income for any diligent supporter of a family. Both the authority and the freedom are false when the competent and the careful cannot find work or when the right to have income without work actually belittles the value of work. There is no *social* security in the beggar status and attitude regardless of the steadiness of the dole. The family, therefore, suffers grave temptations under a false socio-economic system. We could go on to discuss the relation of the family to inculcate the right understanding of authority and freedom to children in its capacity in terms of adequate housing, playgrounds, opportunity for education and so forth, but all we need to do here is to suggest that love lives not only by family worship and concern but in relation to a society that abets and encourages, by its very social and physical make-up, the freedom in fellowship which is based on responsible concern.

The family combines the religious, the moral, the legal, and the physical aspects of authority. There are times when to "spare the rod" is to sin against the children. Sanctions are actual and should be used as necessary. Family life to be effective, however, should be centred overwhelmingly in religious and moral suasion. Strictness should be clearly within the context of love. Shall we put the case this way? The exercise of physical sanctions should be at the minimum, though naturally there is an implicit physical force which backs up parental authority. This is as it should be. Children should not, for their own sake, be treated as little adults. Most important is the dependability of the moral order and of the love which backs it up. The parents should always be more interested in their children as persons than in principles, but they should also know that persons do not live well apart from principles. Certain principles are, therefore, regulative but always subordinated in attitude and action to the needs of actual growing persons. The principle of persons as persons should always have the heaviest weight which means, in effect, that persons transcend principles. The family is the home of persons in coöperative and creative fellowship, where the fellowship itself is prior to and more important than the coöperation and the creativity.

The church, moreover, is the institution where religious motivation is the only legitimate force. The religious group should be solely under the authority of truth; its constraint should therefore be the love of truth. With truth, again, we do not mean intellectual formulæ, but the content of the living truth which is, first of all, God's will and, secondarily, the

purpose for common good which underlies all creation and all social processes. The church is the place where authority ought to be present in its pristine purity. For this reason religious authority is the more legitimate the more it respects and encourages freedom. By freedom we mean not individualism but, rather, spontaneous or unforced concern for the common good.

Religious authority is characterized by inclusive freedom. Family life individuates and intensifies authority for freedom. But the very nature of the family makes limited responsibility and concern a functional necessity. That does not mean that the family cannot worship at the altar of the God of common concern and of creative adventure for the common good. It does mean, however, that the main bulk of living centres in the concrete cares of a limited group. The self expands intensively in relation to a very few. The family thus at least tempts to exclusiveness, even in attitude. The religious body must also, of course, be constituted by a concrete group and as such it, too, tends to tempt to a narrow loyalty. The specific and plain authority of the church, however, should be the God of the inclusive good in such a way that its functional diversity and creative variety ought not to contain the barriers which prevent full human community.

The church should be the antidote to the limited family. It should enact the unlimited family. It should stress by its very being, the extensive relation. The function of the true church is to uphold and to teach the authority which frees men from the fever of self and the divisiveness of limited loyalties and local groups. Each allegiance with its kind of socially structured authority ought to aid and abet loyalty to ever-widening groups. Religious authority ought to encourage the constant growth in inclusive and completely concerned freedom. The authority of the church is the will of God, and the inclusiveness of this will ought to be reflected in its organization, worship attitudes, and action.

With relation to the family the church should have no authority except moral suasion and spiritual power. The church is the family of God fulfilling the human family. The home within the context of heaven becomes delivered from its exclusiveness and gets the vision that whoever does the will of God is father, mother, sister, and brother. The family should be the intensive church at home. Here differences of ages, understanding, and interests are merged and transcended. The church, on the other hand, should be the whole human family under God. Thus are functionally combined the extensive and intensive modes of human community. Both should be under the judgment and within the lure of the love of God as the perfect authority which completely concerns itself with the development and enjoyment of freedom. The family has a measure of real autonomy of thought and action which should be kept sacred, even by the religious group. No other institution can substitute for the family with full effectiveness.

The basic function of the family is not mostly the control of sex, as some aver, but the creation of community. The intensive family and the extensive family, the church, thus complement one another.

The second basic aspect of the church's authority, though in a real way it belongs to the home, too, is making religion real. We have endless analysis of how things ought to be. Our schools teach and our government legislates in order to effect satisfactory human relationships. We need schools and cannot do without government. The tremendous fact remains, however, that we know a great deal how things ought to be, both personally and socially, but we do not do what we know ought to be done. The problem of authority is, therefore, crucially the problem of motivation. Laws are not enough. Knowledge is not enough. Ideals are not enough. We need to want to do and to have the power to do what is generally needful.

More and more the question of motivation becomes central to the problem of authority and freedom. Apart from the solution of this problem we can have no more than some theoretical rat races. We have to overcome ignorance, indifference, and sin. All of these, too, are deeply intertwined. If the church has mostly the authority of ritual, creed, or convention, it will fail mankind. What the church needs most of all is to be able to teach people how to worship at such a genuinely effective level that religion becomes a personal power and a social force for the good.

The authority of the church should consist in the knowledge of how to help people become delivered from the pressures of self and society which vitiate our social relationships and from the lack of convictions which frustrate creative coöperation. The authority of the church consists in the wisdom to help people to want and to find the freedom of the spirit. People need to become free souls. When worship helps set men free by the breaking of the power of sin and by the creation of free spirits, then alone will the church wield its true authority. When the church will help people to see beyond their limiting horizons towards the never-closing reaches of the unlimited love of God, then the church will have the authority of the truth that sets men free. When the church achieves within itself the level of freedom and faithfulness in fellowship under and within the love of God, the church will illustrate its native authority.

The church must be concerned with family life and worship, but cannot take their place; the church must be concerned with good schools, but should not take their place; the church should be socially concerned, but should not usurp the place of government, locally or generally. The authority of the church is a kind of community of concern which both illustrates and actively promotes every constructive effort for human betterment.

The intrinsic authority of the school is the authority of truth. All

enforcement of rules for coöperation is instrumental. A serious responsibility is laid by truth on the teaching profession. "Be not many teachers," is a wise caution. In the name of truth much harm has been done. Some of it has been done by fanatics, loyal to a limiting insight; some of it has been done by indifferent teachers, without concerned commitment.

The truth of God's concern for the common good should be the ultimate unity behind all teaching. Care for the inclusive welfare ought to be the bedrock of teaching conviction. There can be no sectarianism in such an attitude and action. Here we have religion both beyond and behind democracy. Here we have the absolute beyond but also within the relative. Here we have the cohesiveness of ultimate truth with ample room for real pluralism of cultural and religious development. Here we have transcendence and creativity joined in a happy and productive marriage. The schools are set under authority because they cannot escape the ultimate obligation of truth to be concerned with the common good, but they are set under an increasingly liberating authority.

The schools need real freedom in order to achieve their own end. When the government is too near the school system with too heavy a hand on its controls, the schools are likely to reflect distortingly the interests of the party in power or the narrower interest of the country. The government itself needs to be scrutinized by the truth as it is seen by those not directly involved in governmental decisions. In the divine economy of functions there is an independence accorded to the mind from direct action which ought to be observed in the relation of school to government. Good thinking delays critical response but by so doing improves its quality. When the government supports the schools, provision ought to be made for indirect control by interests not constantly dependent upon governmental favor so as to allow a real check and balance of function. Under every circumstance there seems need for some schools which are supported by consumers' funds and which are run independently of government help in order that the authority of mind be safeguarded from the distorting pressures which tend to impinge upon immediate decisions for action.

In a similar way the schools, in general, should be free from direct church control. The knowledge imparted in schools needs the context of religious faith and the power of religious motivation, but the church cannot take the place of the school or lord it over the school. Many church people complain bitterly because the school is not in effect a church, while many school people dismiss the church because it is not mostly an educational institution. But the two institutions are different and are endowed with different types of authority. The church and school should both carry out their intrinsic assignments but with the fullest possible coöperation. The Harvard report on *General Education in a Free Society* concludes that "to isolate the activity of thinking from the morals of thinking is to make

sophists of the young" (p. 72). Both in church and in school there ought to be a union of religious faith and knowledge, a blending of truth and action, but besides such a unity of perspective, there ought to be a real distinction of tasks, a genuine difference in control, and a final coöperation on the part of people who see the total need of man for disinterested search for truth and its effective communication, on the one hand, and the obtaining, on the other, of the lively concern which gives spontaneous motivation to the general good.

The authority of the school is ideally truth. We can see that the church as vested tradition and the government as vested interest might plead their authority over against the school. A conflict is then bound to arise which, very likely, the more it is settled in favor of the school the better. The church and the government want to prevent the teaching of the truth which challenges their content of authority. The school, however, does not enforce its authority on either church or government and should be free to find and to teach the truth that it finds. All the church and the government have to do, if the arena is free, is to point out the error in theory or application of what is taught.

Naturally we are not dismissing the authority of the past. No teacher is free to disregard the horizontal transcendence of accumulated knowledge and insight. Education is basically a social act and the deductive factor is necessarily overwhelmingly large. *For this reason there should be thorough indoctrination of the good.* The matters of common concern and freedom ought to be instilled into the depths of young character. To avoid commitment to truth or to the concerns of the content of truth is to teach false attitudes and to encourage ineffective and bad action.

The new good must naturally always be tested by, and related to, the old good. Experimentation in the fields of social relations and of vital faith must always be under the burden of proof. Social stability depends upon the transgenerational accumulation of patterns of insight and behavior. Even though, therefore, critical discussion, creative experimentation, and concerned testing of applicability ought always to examine the old truths, the old truths, in a large measure, have the authority of successful service and deserve real respect. Nevertheless all human knowledge and wisdom is relative, in some measure, and the authority of past skill must also meet the test of the new vision. Today's needs demand revision of yesterday's good. The pragmatic test is always a valid aspect of any criterion of truth as a whole. With however much reverence for the past, the faithful teacher will never owe ultimate allegiance to any dimension of truth except the vertical: the eternally transcendent will of God from which new light is ever ready to break forth and to become created.

The authority of government, furthermore, is neither the natural order nor positive law. It is neither physical might nor political control.

The final authority of government is, rather, the will of God for the general good which includes organically, to the full, the good of each person and of every group. No government is, therefore, ever sovereign as such. The very concept of sovereignty on the part of a human institution is idolatrous deification. The government is under divine authority to legislate, judge, and enforce all matters with the view to the individual and the common welfare. Thus no one person has the right to exercise arbitrary authority over God's other creatures. Neither can a group, even a majority, constitute itself the end of authority or even rightfully the wielder of authority. Every political institution is under divine obligation to foster, maintain, and protect all possible freedom on the part of all people, both individuals and groups.

Practically this means democracy as divinely ordained. Democracy is not majorcracy. Nor is democracy the running of a country or a community by a few on behalf of the many without effective participation of the many. Representative government can in effect deny the true nature and authority of democracy and destroy the government of free people. Democracy is, first of all, the fostering and protecting of the common good under constitutional safeguards of individual and minority rights, both by preventing its being thwarted by some dissident minority and by frustrating any mob rule by the majority. These rights are naturally subject to change whether by addition, detraction, or emendation, but the process should be so constituted as to ward against circumstantial discrimination.

Courts also ought to judge according to the rules of the common and the individual good, being more conscious of God's will for the common good than of immediate pressures from partial interests, even on the part of the majority. Every intellectually and morally responsible person should have the right to vote. The machinery for elections ought to be safeguarded and so constituted as to encourage independent, informed participation. Here the good government will welcome help from the other human kinds of authority. For such responsible and intelligent participation is a task of motivation for the home and the church; and a job of education for the school and the community. The principle of functional representation ought perhaps to be admitted in some secondary sense, but it should then be arranged in such a manner that the issues could be publicly known and the representation readily controlled. The referendum and the recall ought to be easily available channels for the registering of the general will. When church and school have true independence, they can assume particular responsibility for the finding and the dissemination of facts and evaluations beyond the immediate pressures of political interests.

Economic power, moreover, should not constitute de facto authority of government. We now have undue force both subtly and openly exercised by economic privilege. This is indirectly true not only in terms of ease

for voting, pressure on the employed, the power of money over the ministry and educators, but also through the control of means of communication and the backstage power over legislators. Kitchen cabinets usually have long ears for moneyed interests. Property exists under God, however, for the common good. Its function is to develop responsibility, initiative, concern, coöperation, and community. Property is adjectival or verbal in nature, not substantive. It is given for the development of both freedom and fellowship, both initiative and security. If social incentives are to rise in quality and intensity, we need to subjugate property to the common good with urgent but patient wisdom. Regulation, planning, or ownership by society of the large framework of property should remove the pressures of private groups which distort and destroy the common good.

On the other hand, there should be such genuineness of consumers' reward that real freedom be encouraged while individual initiative and responsibility be also developed. The fact remains, however, that, economically speaking, we do not suffer from overproduction but from recurrent underconsumption and maldistribution. We have, therefore, a creative opportunity for a better day when property is subject to man and not man to property. The point is not, however, to destroy the openness of the capitalist system or to do away with its real improvements whether in production or in the living conditions as a whole, but rather to fulfill it by means of a creative capitalism which might also be called a democratic socialism. Such creative capitalism will require a new high level of social incentive which cannot be had apart from the proper exercise of the authority of home, church, and schools. Totalitarianism of government and of property, on the other hand, destroy the genuine place which individualism and minority status should have. Marxism is a killing cure. We repeat that property is given in order that we may find freedom, responsibility, and initiative as well as concern for others, or perhaps we can put it better by saying, *within* concern for community. Any public regulation or ownership that thwarts or destroys such private incentive is deceptively social. True social security is not apart from individual initiative and enterprise. We seek a formula that will direct us towards freedom *and* fellowship even in the use of property. Marxism is, we repeat, a killing cure.

What we need, rather, is the progressive ridding of our system of its own contradictions and the development of its own strong points. This can be done only, we believe, as we continue in the general direction of the Social Security Act. The fire department, for instance, was once free enterprise with such slogans as "No money no squirty." We now know that fire is a social problem calling for social control. Such socialism is creative capitalism. The post office was once a private institution with conflicting and confusing rates. We now consider mail to be a problem

for the country as a whole. Such socialism is creative capitalism. No formula can be drawn, but the rule can be laid down that property ought to be increasingly regulated or owned by society as a whole with a view to the common good, but that consumers' rewards and workers' movements should always be ample enough to encourage private responsibility and to support religious, educational, and social groups, endowing these with real freedom to criticize and to change the government. *In some such way* we shall arrive—granting the right social motivation and educational attainment—at a dynamic synthesis of freedom and security, of the recognition and reward of the strong and of helpful concern for the week. *In some such direction,* we believe, lies wise concern for the common good.

Obviously sovereignty has been exercised by nations in the sense of final, earthly authority. There has been no organization above the state. In one sense, of course, the nation has legitimately carried on final social and physical control: God's control is indirect and mostly through units of delegated power. God does not directly control family, church, school, or state. There is need, therefore, for some over-all system of control and for the exercise of responsible sanction. The state has filled this need. The state is also under a moral and spiritual authority so interconnected with the righteous reign of God that creative and wise coöperation is the strength of a nation whereas division within it constitutes its weakness. Moral integrity and respect for law are consequently aspects of ultimate authority with proximate rewards. The kingdom of God is a social concept. The seeking *together* of righteousness adds the needed material blessings as well.

Now the time has come, however, when the nation can no longer afford to remain sovereign even in this secondary sense. Negatively, the weapons of destruction and positively, the opportunities for world-wide control by government and the increasing need for coöperative interdependence have made some form of effective supernational organization necessary in which can be vested the necessary power of sanction, not so much over individuals and groups as over the states themselves. The state may not claim natural law to protect its claim to sovereignty. Natural law is no static structure within a one-for-all creation; it is, rather, the meeting of the structural needs of society as these concretely appear. When the need for the state appeared, beyond the organization of the smaller groups, the nation, on its positive or constructive side, expressed God's will within natural law. Now when there is need for a sovereignty which transcends nationalism, natural law calls for some kind of subordinating of the state to supernational government.

The larger the unit of togetherness, however, the more the stress needs to be made that authority is for the sake of the fullest possible freedom in fellowship. Freedom is with and for others, not mostly as an

abstract ideal but as a concrete experience. When the authority of God calls for world-wide government on one level, then, the authority for actual freedom calls at the same time for the utmost diligence in the maintaining of all possible local freedom for creative independence and initiative. Thus local government needs to be made even more real and vital. Every rung on the ladder of bigness needs also to be treated with care as to its distinctiveness, from the smallest to the largest. More care should also be exercised increasingly with respect to functional diversity.

Peace is not a matter of the external control of strife. A few hydrogen bombs centrally located might become the possible instrument for that! Peace is rather a matter of fullness of satisfactory relationships on every level of life and in every dimension of experience. The more authority is centralized, therefore, in terms of the needs of ever-larger units of togetherness, the more liberty needs also to be developed from the smallest unit to the largest. Cultural pluralism and political diversity will find a real place for the nation. The state will not be abolished and absorbed, but fulfilled and protected, by the doing away with nationalistic wars and the emergence of world government and world planning.

III

The largest section of this presentation has naturally had to do with the concrete structuring of authority. Here we conclude with the discussion of the end of authority. Our presentation is mostly an experiential and logical limit which pertains proportionately to social and political realms. Apart from the complete realization of the kingdom of ends, the end of authority is never completely reached. Our kind of history is not the place for this perfection, but even within our kind of history the nature of the end of authority can be observed, and the more this end is concretely realized the better. We are not, then, talking of any proposed utopianism but rather of a possible measure of attainment towards which we must always aspire as individuals and as a society.

It is not enough to internalize authority. Ethics can be authoritarian in structure without external sanctions. A dictatorship or an autocratic kind of theology can indoctrinate its own point of view in such a way that individuals, even when away from the power of the authority, will *willingly* do what has been taught them. As a matter of fact, the psychological structuring of authoritarian ethics is usually such that motivation becomes a matter of habituated obedience. Freedom as riskful choice or as personal insight becomes a burden to those who have been kept immature. Voltaire sneered that a priest was worth ten policemen! Authoritarian ethics can thus be internalized and need not exist mostly as external authority. The difference between authoritative and authoritarian ethics is therefore not that of external and internal authority.

Authoritative as opposed to authoritarian ethics, however, can be discovered by the fact that it fosters genuine freedom. Freedom is authentic, not when people do what they want after they have once become indoctrinated by authoritarian standards, but rather when they do from personal insight and by personal choice the very things which accord with their fullest nature. *Authority can be judged as legitimate only by the genuineness with which it abrogates itself.* Love is interested in the doing away with itself as authority in order to mature freedom and for freedom to mature. This abrogation takes place both externally and internally. Jesus said that he had called his disciples servants but that now he would call them friends, for the servants do not know the what and the why of the master's doings. A friend does. The law exists to teach us the right relations which are for our own true good. When the lesson has been taught, we no longer need to live by the law as law. The external compulsion is abolished. The authority has become our friend. We live no longer by law but by love.

The same thing is true internally. What was once done as a duty becomes done as a privilege. The duty becomes our song in the night of our pilgrimage. Where there is no law there can be no trespass. The community is no longer lived on the legal level. Morals are no longer the compulsions or even the constraint of the right. Ethical obligation gives way to the inclination of concern for community. Man's life becomes characterized less by obedience and more by spontaneity. Man becomes a free soul, willingly and gladly accepting right relations. Authority is exchanged for freedom within the very citadel of life. The will of God for the common good becomes man's perfect freedom. Learning the better relations is no longer a mere duty or drudgery, but the desire of our life.

Instead of being over over against God and others we come to belong to the holy community within which true happiness arises. The shadows of the cave are exchanged for the light of the free day. Man is, to be sure, immeasurably far from understanding, let alone realizing, this freedom within the will of God, but the more his authority is understood and accepted, the more individual and social peace and constructive community is achieved. For the finding and the realizing of this end there can be no patented formula. Man, however, has freedom to learn better social relations. His life is not as though it were in a chicken yard where the chickens develop closed structures of pecking at each other! Man has freedom to learn better living relations. Though no formula can be concretely full, clear directives toward the personal and social finding of such conditions are minds and lives open and ready for the concern which is as concrete as every individual and as wide not only as the world but as the heart of God.

A MIDSUMMER SAGA OF OLD DENMARK

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One hardly expects mediæval traditions to linger in so Protestant a country as Denmark. Yet they do. On November 1, 1950, I took pilgrimage from Copenhagen—it seemed a good day for the purpose—to holy places at Tisvilde. A misty dawn turned into a soft autumn forenoon, bathing Gribs Forest, through which my way lay, in a wealth of autumnal colouring. Many a pilgrim had preceded me, including the great Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Varied legends surround Tisvilde. The Danish writer J. M. Thiele (1795-1874) tells, for example, how a Swedish princess named Helen, was murdered by evil men who cast her body into the sea; but a great stone bore her corpse to Tisvilde shore. Peasants found it, and wished to give it Christian burial; whereupon the cliff behind the foreshore opened, and they carried the body through the cleft. Where they first set down the bier a spring issued forth, which exists to this day. *En route* for the neighbouring Tibirke church, the bearers at one point used indecent words; and immediately the bier sank into the earth at a spot known as Helen's tomb ever since. Many other Danish variants of the same story exist.

Similar legends come from Sweden, just across the water, some of which make Helen to flee from an importunate king. One thinks of St. Catherine, or Karen, refusing importunate Maximian; and curiously enough there is a St. Karen's wood near Tisvilde. Perhaps these Helen sagas go back to pre-Christian days, for Tisvilde means Ti's *væld* or spring, and Tibirke means Ti's beeches; Ti being a heathen god.

I first made for Helen's grave, just outside Tisvilde village. The healing stories preserved, are, strangely enough, mostly from post-Reformation times, for the cures continued to within living memory. Of the chapel formerly enclosing the grave, only a low truncated wall remains. I was touched to see posies on the grave—mementos of present-day piety. When Kierkegaard visited the place in 1835, he too found piety, but also jollity and ridicule. Jollity reigned in Tisvilde village, at a St. John's Fair (called "Kildemarked"), doubtless mediæval in origin. Pottery, toys, cakes, and liquor were being sold. This commercialism jarred on Kierkegaard. "One gets a great shock," he says, "not unmixed, in the circumstances, with sorrow, to find a noisy din, tents, and tables. Strangely enough, all the vendors are Germans, as if to show that only foreigners

could conduct themselves in this way, and only in a foreign tongue could the place be so profaned."[1] Worse was to follow.

Going out of the village, you come to Helen's grave in the fields. There it stands, simple, quiet, and surrounded by a fence of rough stones . . . but as if to destroy all impression of sacredness, a tent has been pitched just opposite, where noises of revelry go on, and a large company of people have chosen to settle there in order to mock at those who come to see the place. A peculiar kind of activity goes on. If the visitors are from the surrounding countryside, they have imbibed, as with their mothers' milk, a tremendous respect for this grave and for the probable cures it helps to bring. (The cure used, is to sleep three successive years on the grave on St. John's eve, taking earth for oneself from the grave, for which a special spoon is provided. Moreover one must not forget the poor, for whose benefit a box is placed in the village.) These cures cannot be denied, and yet these scoffers try to convince themselves and others that they can ignore them, and they choose this method of making fun of the whole thing. When one approaches the grave, the whole scene produces a certain feeling of melancholy, called forth by the wonderful sense of the mysterious, and by the dark side—as elusive to the observer's eye as it is (however) suggestive of a whole system or *nexus*—which superstition always brings with it. One finds oneself surrounded by locks of hair, bits of rag, and crutches; one hears, so to say, the moans of the sufferers and their prayers to heaven; one hears the despairing cries of individuals who cannot get to sleep—it is altogether most beautiful that the condition for being cured is that one must *sleep* on the sacred spot, as though to indicate quiet, God-given peace—and all this at midnight upon a grave where they are surrounded by little wooden tablets like those memorials put on graves, which give information about sufferings so happily ended for those that were cured. Soon day begins to break. Dawn comes with its wonderful living motion, and the damp mists disappear. The sun in his majesty illuminates the landscape and hears perhaps the jubilant hymns of those whose health has been restored.

I lingered to read all this and more, and then walked shoreward to Helen's spring. It was now past midday, and the sun was shining brightly. I sat in solitude on the cliffs above the blue sea and ate my sandwiches. The eye could roam out toward those Swedish shores which share the Helen saga. When I descended to the white-sanded foreshore, I saw a solitary fisherman in the distance to my right. To him I made my way, for I knew he could tell me where Helen's spring lay. He was surprised to find a stray Englishman in those parts, and still more surprised to find me reading Kierkegaard. But I was equally surprised to find that he too had read the very volume. Pointing up to the cliffs, he showed me where Helen's spring was (there were originally three, says Kierkegaard), and I realized that we were standing by a cleft in the cliff, the very cleft (the legend asserts) made for the removal of Helen's body. The spring today is stagnant, but another spring wells pure on the shore near by. In

[1] Quotations are all from Kierkegaard's *Papirer,* Vol. I. None of them have hitherto been translated.

Kierkegaard's day Helen's spring was enclosed by a wooden shed, and there was an attendant. Today I rejoice to say there is neither.

The attendant [writes Kierkegaard] said that in the course of twenty years' residence there he had come across many who had been healed. However, I soon discovered that he did not put any particular credence on this, but merely praised the place for the sake of his own interest. And just as I had had no fear that my arrival would be a matter for ridicule from those mockers at the grave, for they would expect a person in modern dress, wearing spectacles, and having a cigar in his mouth, to be a being who stood on the same superior heights of intelligence as themselves, rather than one who journeyed hither from motives of piety (as in fact I did not); so the afore-mentioned janitor was embarrassed, for he feared lest his interests and the effects his stories had upon me might clash. He therefore seized upon the way of escape which I noticed many others made use of, namely, that those who were healed by these external means, were healed "through God's help." It is quite characteristic that such people should come to this conclusion; for since they cannot understand how health can come by the use of such methods, they push it over to something further away from them, in order to dispose of the whole thing. But by doing this they only make the matter more remarkable. For it is in truth remarkable that God's help should be conjoined with this method of healing. Consequently from their limited point of view, they must either deny the whole thing and demand that the facts should be fully proved, or, if they are more modest, push the explanation away for the time being.

I descended from the spring to the shore again. The tide was ebbing, and the fisherman pointed out to me, a little way out to sea, the very stone, shaped like a body, which was said to have brought Helen's corpse thither. Kierkegaard mentions the stone too. The fisherman also told me that his mother could remember quite well the pilgrimages and the cures on midsummer nights. That was but a generation ago.

The day began to decline, and the hoot of a train warned me not to get benighted. I had by no means finished exploring the romance of the district. There was still Tibirke church which was once buried by drifting sand. There was the ruin of Asserbo Slot, formerly a monastery, a few miles away. There was the village of Tisvilde itself. But all this I had to leave over for another visit.

UNRESTRICTED UNIVERSALISM

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When this essay[1] was nearly completed, this sentence came to my attention: "Rare indeed is he who comes to a matured appreciation of his own religious tradition, seeing both its values and disvalues in reasonable perspective."[2] I quote it, not as a boast of my achievement—far from that—but as a statement of my aim. I have tried to appraise Universalism, the concern of my early years, by the tools of philosophy, the concern of my recent years. And I have frankly limited myself to a discussion of Universalism as philosophy. The teaching of the Bible, the development of Christian thought, the history of the Universalist Church, the official pronouncements of that denomination, interesting and important as these all are, are not here under consideration. I begin with the word *universalism* and inquire how it is being used in contemporary religious and philosophical discourse. This analysis introduces the reader to some features of the climate of present-day philosophy in the United States. Ultimately it leads to suggestions for a reinterpretation of Universalism as a comprehensive philosophy for religious living. Doubtless, it may seem all too impractical to a pastor or ecclesiastical administrator. In any event, the application can be properly understood only on the background of the analysis.

The Meaning of Universalism

Without further introduction let us proceed to list some of the meanings of the word *universalism.* In philosophy the words *universe* and *universal* are commonplace. One may assume that *universalism,* however used, will refer to some doctrine about the universe or universals, or will assert the truth of some universal affirmative propositions. In some respect it will make use of all. Any universalism will seek to distinguish itself from partialisms which employ "some" and from nihilisms which employ "no." In enumerating types of universalism, one may well include those which fit the pattern, even if they do not parade the label. The list which is here presented for inspection includes the following types: humanistic, ethical, theistic, finalistic, scientific, logical, psychological, and educational.

Humanistic universalism is the ideal of a union of all individuals and tribes into a single world-wide community. Older than Christianity, it is the Christian ideal—a single human family community united in bonds of

[1] This paper is a development of my "Universalism as Philosophy," read before the Pacific Division of the American Philosophy Association, December 1951, and printed in the *Christian Leader,* 133, (March, 1951), pp. 91-94.

[2] Floyd H. Ross, *Addressed to Christians,* p. 115.

fellowship. Called by various names by various authors, it is definitely labeled "universalism" by Sir Arthur Keith.[3]

Ethical universalism may be construed in at least three senses. In the first sense it is the doctrine that there is a single set of ethical principles in the light of which all men ought to guide their conduct. Examples of this meaning are (a) the assertion that all men everywhere ought to follow the ethical leadership of Jesus and (b) Kant's categorical imperative. In the second sense ethical universalism is synonymous with the ethical teachings of the English utilitarians, often expressed in the slogan "the greatest good for the greatest number."[4] In the third sense it is the doctrine that every man, whatever his principles, should treat all other men according to a single code. It is this third interpretation which is stressed in this paper.

Broad has interpreted *universalistic* in this sense. "I take this to mean that . . . any two persons shall be treated alike unless it can be shown, to the satisfaction of an unbiassed third party, that there are such differences between themselves or their circumstances that better results on the whole are likely to follow from treating them differently."[5] His simpler statement reads: a universalistic code is a "set of moral principles which are supposed not to be restricted in their application to the members of a certain community as a whole or to those of a certain group within it, but are held to apply to every human being as such."[6] Such an ideal of morality is based, he says, upon "the ultimate and intrinsic value of human personality."[7]

In one form or another universalism is the dominant note of our ethical tradition. Stoic, Jewish-Christian, Kantian influences have been largely responsible. As we are so often reminded, William James condemned the block universe. But he did not deny that there is a universe. An ethical philosopher seeks, he asserts, "an account of the moral relations that obtain among things, which will weave them into the unity of a stable system, and make of the world what one may call a genuine universe from the ethical point of view."[8]

Theistic universalism is the belief that there is one God and one God only, whose creatures all men are in every time and place. Vision of a single divine Being, in whose sight all men are equally entitled to universalistic ethical treatment, emerged from earlier polytheisms through

[3] Sir Arthur Keith, *Evolution and Ethics,* p. 49.

[4] Frank C. Sharp, *Ethics,* pp. 334 ff.

[5] C. D. Broad, "Review of Julian S. Huxley's 'Evolutionary Ethics,'" reprinted in Herbert Feigl and Wilfred Sellars, *Readings in Philosophical Analysis,* p. 572. (Hereafter referred to as Feigl and Sellars.)

[6] *Ibid.,* p. 570.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 572.

[8] William James, *Essays in Pragmatism* (The Hafner Library of Classics), p. 65 (from "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life").

international and philosophical clashes as terrible and as significant as those of our own era. The Old Testament contains many fossil remains, as it were, of those earlier days. Even Christianity contains vestiges of polytheism. Dualism of God and Devil survived in 1950 to grieve even sectarians among Jehovah's Witnesses.[9] I recall that my own assertions that the New Testament teaches the universal fatherhood of God used to arouse on the faces of partialist clergymen smiles of indulgent superiority at my naïveté. And even those of us who assert a universal God often behave like polytheists in our reliance on Mars, Mammon, and Majorities.

Finalistic universalism is the doctrine which the Universalist Church has long promulgated. Stated negatively, it denies that the one God differentiates among men with a dualistic ethics by assigning the wicked to endless punishment. Stated affirmatively, it asserts a "far-off, divine event, towards which the whole creation moves," universal salvation, a final harmony of all souls with God.

Scientific universalism has several meanings. For contemporary science is universalistic in at least three senses: it ignores national boundaries (current ideologies notwithstanding); it proclaims the ubiquity of process; and it assumes a universe of law. When Whitehead writes that science is differentiated from other movements by its universality,[10] he is expressing the first meaning. When he writes that "everything is everywhere at all time,"[11] he is expressing the second meaning. When he affirms that the Maxwellian equations are supposed to hold throughout all space,[12] he is expressing the third meaning.

It is this third meaning of scientific universalism that is most challenging and also the most frequently challenged. Is the world one? Is there a genuine universe? Or to use more modern phraseology, "Are all events fundamentally of one kind?"[13] Is the totality of entities characterized by a certain determinate mode of interconnection? Think away this property of the world and, we are told, it ceases to be a universe.[14] Comparing the Greeks with the Indians (and he might have added with the Israelites), Santayana writes, "The Greeks, too, looked up into the heavens and cried, 'The All is one' . . . but . . . the Greeks made a new thought of it. What was now discovered was the system of nature."[15] That nature is one, and that the highest laws of nature are not limited to

[9] *Christian Century*, 67 (Aug. 23, 1950), p. 1005.

[10] Alfred N. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (Mentor Books), p. 3.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

[13] Rudolf Carnap, "Foundations of the Unity of Science," in Feigl and Sellars, p. 413.

[14] Moritz Schlick, "On the Relation between Psychological and Physical Concepts," in Feigl and Sellars, p. 407.

[15] George Santayana, *The Philosophy of Santayana* (Modern Library), pp. 366 f. (from "Soliloquies in England").

our solar system or to our era but apply with unrestricted universality, this was the conviction of scientists of the Newtonian period.[16]

Logical universalism, like scientific universalism, has more than one meaning. There is the universalism of discourse. Our language "enables us to *speak about everything* though it does not enable us to list each thing."[17] More fundamental is the universalism which affirms that, although the expressions of truth are local, truth is universal.[18] There are many ways of saying this. For example, one may argue that reason is universal, since experience handed on by tradition and rationally criticized comes to acquire a universal aspect.[19] Or one may argue that the naturalist's admission of logical principles into inquiry implies that those principles are not completely arbitrary.[20]

Psychological universalism has at least two meanings. In one sense it refers to psychological components which are common to all men, the recognition of which has been minimized by the current emphasis on individual differences. Not only in rational equipment, as stressed by the Greeks and the scholastics, but in sensory, mnemonic, emotional, and conative equipment, human beings, in spite of individual variations, are significantly alike. "A truly empirical study of human nature and social conduct discloses a considerable common denominator in at least the basic needs of all individuals living in the context of coöperation and mutual dependence."[21] Taken in this sense, psychological universalism underlies the idea that art is, or should be, universal. It underlies also the idea of universal brotherhood among men. It negates all partialisms of race, color, and status. It underlies humanistic and ethical universalism.

In the second sense psychological universalism, admitting that each man and woman is uniquely different from every other person, stresses the importance of the maturing and integration of each single individual personality according to its own unique pattern. The phrase "universality of personality" has been used in this connection.[22] And the mature religious sentiment, argues Allport, is a *uniquely* integral system aiming to direct the life of the personality as a whole.[23]

Educational universalism is another phrase of many meanings. In its simplest form is the theory that all men should be educated. But it means something more: the idea that formal education for all persons

[16] Felix Kaufmann, *Methodology of the Social Sciences,* p. 73.
[17] Wilfred S. Sellars, "Realism and the New Way of Words," in Feigl and Sellars, p. 427.
[18] Etienne Gilson, "Medieval Universalism and its Present Value in the Concept of Freedom," in Ruth Nanda Anshen, *Freedom, Its Meaning,* p. 152.
[19] Roscoe Pound, "Toward a New Jus Gentium," in F. S. C. Northrop, *Ideological Differences and World Order,* p. 2.
[20] Ernest Nagel, "Logic Without Ontology," in Feigl and Sellars, p. 195.
[21] Herbert Feigl, "Logical Empiricism," in Feigl and Sellars, p. 25.
[22] Walter W. Argow, "Mental Hygiene on the College Campus," in *A. A. U. P. Bulletin,* 36, (Autumn, 1950), p. 476.
[23] Gordon W. Allport, *The Individual and his Religion,* p. 54.

should include, but not be restricted to, a common nonspecialized segment.[24] It refers to general education, to education in the humanities, to philosophical education in its most general sense.

It should be obvious that *universalism* and *university* are words of close relationship. Whatever may be the history of the latter term, it has come to mean an institution where the sources of all knowledge are brought together and made generally available. Thus in theory every university may be said to be dedicated to educational universalism.

The eight types of universalism described above can be subsumed under two inclusive headings: assertions about human nature and its possibilities, and assertions about the nonhuman world, material or divine, in which man finds himself. Taken together they constitute unrestricted universalism. As to man, unrestricted universalism asserts a common humanity permeating individuals who are qualitatively unique, an educability which permits each individual to approximate a mature wholeness, and a capacity for cultural development towards a universal ethical society. As to the world of nature and of whatever else there may be, unrestricted universalism asserts that it hangs together as a logically consistent whole, whether it be studied by scientist, historian, theologian, artist, or philosopher.

Objections to Universalism

The most obvious objection to universalism is that, in the face of insistent facts, it is preposterous. The world is so full of misunderstandings, enmities, clashing ideals, tribal and national wars, mental illnesses, ethical failures, unrealized dreams, as to suggest that sensible men should turn either partialists, striving to save a remnant here and remnant there, or nihilists, prophesying doom and regarding anyone as a bold optimist who timidly proclaims the possibility of even partial salvation.

Consider again Sir Arthur Keith and his humanistic universalism. In spite of its loftiness and its antiquity and in spite of the fact that there are few in whom the universalist feeling is altogether lacking, Keith asserts that the ideal has never been really welcomed. He himself regards it as unfeasible and utopian.[25] For there is a counterforce working against it, the force of evolution, which has entrenched in man's nature a double code of morals.[26] One code is for home affairs; the other, for foreign affairs. One is allied with the core of coöperation; the other, with the crust of antagonism. They are Spencer's rival codes of amity and enmity.[27] Universalism negates evolution. Consequently, Keith abandons it and its heaven for evolution and hell. He accepts what he calls "limited universalism," that is, nationalism.

[24] Alexander Meiklejohn, *Education Between Two Worlds*, p. 286.
[25] Keith, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 59.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 109.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 113 f.

This argument has recently been restated by Russell. Tribal cohesion began as loyalty to a small group reinforced by fear of enemies without. Today it is fear of an external enemy which supplies the cohesive force holding individuals together in a national life. If a world state could be established, it would have no enemies to fear, and hence it would lose cohesion and fall apart.[28]

These remarks refer to the preposterousness of a culturally single world. Similarly doubts are expressed about the oneness of both the material and of the spiritual worlds. In our day scientists are not so certain as were their ancestors that ours is genuinely a universe. It is sometimes asserted that those statements which men once believed to refer to laws of nature holding throughout all time and space merely describe what is happening during the human era in our part of the so-called universe. This limits science to a restricted universalism, formulating laws which are universal only for the here and now. Russell has somewhere called our world "higgledy-piggledy." Even the universality of the principles of thought has been denied by some logicians.

That finalistic universalism as taught by the Universalist Church has seemed preposterous is evident from history. Church fathers of the early centuries were adjudged heretics by later generations for having proclaimed universal salvation. That doctrine seems never to have been generally accepted. And as for the Universalist Church of America—most Americans have never heard of it.

A pragmatic objection to universalism is that all practical attempts to bring men together into any kind of universal organization have failed. Cæsars have sought to conquer the world, only to fall short of complete conquest and only to have their limited empires disintegrate. The Christian church has always claimed to be universalistic—"catholic" and "ecumenical" mean "universal"—but too frequently among all denominations of Christians universality has signified merely that many other denominations and perhaps all non-Christians are to be excluded.[29] Other world religions have similarly traveled the trail of isolationary fragmentism. As a Jew, John the Baptist limited salvation to those who might heed his call to come to an obscure river in an obscure corner of the empire. Paul, occasionally more universalistic, never outgrew his conviction that God had written an only-favored-nation clause into his covenant with the Jews. Even Jesus, whose parables call up the vision of a possible universal religion, presented his gospel through "cultual localisms," translatable only with difficulty into the languages of other times and places.

Another enterprise in which universalistic goals have not been achieved is science. Even after several centuries of endeavor scientists have not

[28] Bertrand Russell, *Authority and the Individual*, pp. 16, 19. [29] Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 52, 59.

yet succeeded in "the construction of one homeogeneous system of laws for the whole of science."[30] Physicists have accomplished much in developing a system of laws in their own field; much less has been done in the biological and social sciences. There are some who hope for a translation of all descriptive statements about nature and man into the language of physics, but so far this is largely a dream. And even among those who entertain it there is doubt as to whether the laws of physics will ever adequately explain behavior of living things and social groups.

A moral objection to universalism is that, even if it could ever be attained, it is undesirable and not a goal to be striven for. Occasionally there is some confusion on this point; the theological partialists sometimes seem to be trying very hard to save everybody and the theological universalists often seem to be doing very little to help. On the other hand there are partialists who give the impression that they would be exceedingly disappointed to discover their exclusive superiority unwarranted.

The undesirability of universalism used to be expressed in criticism of the conventional picture of heaven as a dull and monotonous region, and in such remarks as "heaven for climate, but hell for company." "After man had transferred all pain and torments to hell," wrote Schopenhauer, "there then remained nothing over for heaven but ennui."[31] Currently, however, it is expressed in the idea that universalism implies uniformity, and that uniformity implies a planned society, and that a planned society will take all the novelty, originality, and variety out of life. Or more cynically, there is the feeling that "life would lose its savor if there were no one to hate."[32] To many, humanistic universalism means totalitarianism, dictatorship, a police state.

These, I take it, are the three chief objections to universalism: it is logically unthinkable; it is practically impossible; and it is ethically, æsthetically, and politically undesirable. Any proponent of universalism, and especially a proponent of unrestricted universalism, must recognize these objections. I shall attempt only a sketch of a reply to them.

Universalism and the Logic of Science

If my readers were polled, I should expect nearly all of them to be universalists with respect to at least one of the eight types, but very few of them to be universalists with respect to all of them. That is, if one is a universalist, one is likely to be not an unrestricted universalist, but a restricted universalist. By an unrestricted universalist I do not mean one who asserts the truth of universal propositions contrary to evidence. I mean rather one who, in doubtful cases, is more inclined than otherwise

[30] Rudolf Carnap, *op. cit.*, p. 422.
[31] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, Bk. 4, par. 57.
[32] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

to regard universal affirmative propositions as meaningful and worthy of acceptance. What can be said for unrestricted universalism in philosophy?

To initiate an answer to this question, let us return to the situation in science. Scientists have not yet arrived at a unified science. Yet "there can be no living science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the existence of an *Order of Things,* and, in particular, of an *Order of Nature.*" Science rests upon a "trust that the ultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness."[33] Scientific description and explanation of the world in terms of a set of universal laws of nature is thus not an accomplished fact; it is an ideal. Scientific universalism is a "regulative principle of inquiry," "a rule of procedure," "a postulate."[34]

A somewhat similar situation exists in logic. For several centuries it was believed that man had intuitive and reliable knowledge of assorted self-evident principles, from which, either with or without the aid of sensory observations of nature, he could infer generalizations about mankind, about nature, about God, and about the future life. There are philosophers, Thomists and others, who continue to hold these beliefs and to assert that human knowledge in natural science and natural theology, quite apart from revelation, is absolutely certain knowledge. But such a point of view departs from current convictions held by probably the majority of American philosophers, logicians, and scientists. This essay does not argue the issue, but it does assume the modern view as a basis for discussion, since this view is often taken as implying a denial of universalism.

The kernel of the modern logical approach to philosophy may be put, all too simply, in this fashion: The only method by which any assertion can be proved true is by assuming that some other assertion or assertions are true. These in turn can be proved true only by appeal to still other assertions. If we are to avoid an infinite regress or a circular argument, we must assume the truth of one or more statements as a basis for argument and proof of other statements. Hence all argument, including scientific discourse, rests upon "primitive" or unproven postulates. Formerly these were taken as axioms or self-evident truths. Now they are recognized as assumptions or postulates.

Some of these assumptions are about logical processes themselves. That is, the validity of the rules of logic can be justified only by appeal to, that is, by an assumption of, the very rules for which a proof is being attempted. Furthermore, when we make inductions, that is, when upon the basis of observations of some men, or some natural objects, or some beliefs, we assert something to be true of all men, or all objects of that

[33] Whitehead, *op. cit.,* pp. 4, 19. [34] Kaufmann, *op. cit.,* pp. 127, 239.

kind, or all beliefs, we do so by virtue of a principle of induction, which is generally believed to be neither demonstrated nor demonstrable. Consequently some logicians hold that this principle is an assumption, or, as some prefer to call it, a prescriptive rule.[35] They admit that induction requires the assumption that statistical frequencies are stable and the optimistic belief that we can obtain samples of nature and of experience which warrant generalizations.[36]

It is sometimes claimed that logic is pluralistic, that there are several logics, and that logic is therefore not universalistic. Obviously there are senses in which this statement is true. Logical classes and relations of Navahos are often not those of white men. But given a significant sentence in one language, its cognitive meaning is translatable into the other language.[37] Both languages utilize common fundamentals. And all discourse assumes that in spite of superficial differences the minds of all rational creatures provide a ground for agreement. Try to convince me, if you will, that logic is not universalistic. In the very attempt you assume that, could I but grasp the facts and relations which you grasp, my fundamental rational processes would force me to agree with you.

The assertion of logical universalism sometimes appears unexpectedly. For example, one author, after designating as meaningless such a question as "What is the right conception of truth?" presently asserts, "It seems to be obvious that the only rational approach to such problems would be the following."[38] That is, he rejects "truth" only to readmit it under the name of "only rational approach." Similarly a defender of humanism rejects "truth" as a cosmic category, only to assert on the next page that "Humanists are ever seeking a closer approximation to the truth."[39]

As an another example of the unexpected, one may point to at least one occasion when the apostle of a higgledy-piggledy "universe" believed in logical universalism; for he condemned the tender-minded for "sweeping aside not merely the laws of physics, but the whole apparently immutable apparatus of logic, with its fixed concepts, its general principles, and its reasonings which seem able to compel even the most unwilling assent."[40]

Since logic underlies the scientific interpretation of observed data, the modern conception of logic has led to an abandoning of the older notion that scientific truths are absolute truths. Instead, scientific generalizations, theories, and laws, like all other inductions, are regarded as highly probable truths. At first thought it may seem nonsense to argue that the

[35] Feigl, "The Logical Character of the Principle of Induction," in Feigl and Sellars, p. 303.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 300 f.
[37] Paul Marhenke, "The Criterion of Significance," in *Proc. Amer. Phil. Asso.*, 23:6.
[38] Alfred Tarski, "The Semantic Conception of Truth," in Feigl and Sellars, p. 65.
[39] Corliss Lamont, "A Humanist Metaphysics," in the *Humanist*, 11 (Jan., 1951), pp. 34 f.
[40] Bertrand Russell, *Selected Papers of Bertrand Russell* (The Modern Library), p. 325 (from "Current Tendencies").

law of gravitation, the chemical equation describing the union of hydrogen and oxygen to form water, and the generalization that all human beings placed in an atmosphere of carbon dioxide die, are known to be true, not with certainty, but merely with high probability. But the thesis is more plausible if put thus: The scientific attitude is characterized by a readiness to modify any assumption or generalization in the light of any new evidence which may be discovered; meanwhile one is justified in accepting the most firmly established probabilities as rules upon which to base present and future action.

Two writers of very different background have expressed the scientific attitude in simple language. "All prophecies as to the future of mankind should be treated only as hypotheses which may deserve consideration."[41] "The only finality a mature Christian can know is his vocation to be a pilgrim or explorer."[42]

If in science and in logic propositions which were formerly taken for absolutely established truths are now regarded as postulates or rules, one should expect a similar reinterpretation in philosophy and theology. The objection that universalism is logically unthinkable is cogent only if it be presented as a demonstrated eternal truth or set of truths unmodifiable in the future. It should be obvious that for none of the types of universalism set forth earlier in this paper can such a claim be justified. But if universalism be presented as a set of postulates, around which individual and group life may be organized, it is logically thinkable, and, more than this, it will fit the accepted logical pattern of our era.

Thus universalism replies to the charge of being logically unthinkable by affirming that contemporary logic is itself a form of univeralism. Although, as already suggested, some logicians struggle to avoid this conclusion, they find it difficult, if not impossible, to remain logicians and deny that the principles of logic are postulated as universals. To affirm that there is a universal rule of reason does not mean that men always act as purely rational creatures, nor that they should do so. It is rather that there cannot be two logics. Insofar as we are considering correct thinking, and not the differences of factual content or of arbitrary classifications and relations, there cannot be one rational process for parent and another for child, one for Republican and another for Democrat, one for philosopher and another for artist, one for man and another for God. If in a given situation two rational creatures behave differently, it is not because there are two conflicting types of correct reasoning, both valid, but because of differences in experience, knowledge, and purpose. This assumption is thus a ground for striving towards mutual understanding and a national solution of personal, domestic, and international problems.

[41] Russell, *Authority and the Individual*, p. 43. [42] Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

Similarly that there are universal laws of nature is still the assumption of all research in pure science. Many individual studies are necessarily prosaic and partialist. But research and theorizing in the grand style, together with attempts to resolve discords in a Unity of Science, are universalistic. And just as a belief in law underlies the study of nature, so a belief in purpose underlies the study of history, insofar as history is not identified with nature. To a universalist the purpose sought and sometimes apparently revealed in the study of history is divine, at least to the extent that it has positive ethical value and is universal.

The assumptions of universal laws of thought, of nature, and of history do not demonstrate either the existence or the nonexistence of God. But the postulate of a Universal God is compatible with them and thus does not necessitate intellectual conflict between loyalties to facts and loyalties to values.

The Possibility and Desirability of Universalism

We now turn our attention from logical considerations to philosophy as a guide for living. To speak of philosophy in this sense blurs the boundary between philosophy and religion. So far as there is a boundary, I mean by philosophy the intellectual formulation of a world view, and I mean by religion the living commitment to this philosophy and the drive which puts it to work. Just as scientific universalism may be thought of as a set of "universal propositions by which, in combination with singular propositions, predictions can be attained,"[43] so philosophical and religious universalism may be taken as a set of universal propositions by which, in combination with singular propositions, decisions may be arrived at and significant actions initiated.

Universalism in every area of thinking is first of all a postulate or rule. Consequently, if one is to live one's universalism, the quest for certainty must be replaced by a quest for commitment without certainty. All creeds are similarly assumptions, or derived by the aid of assumptions, but of this their adherents are often unaware. Within the field of the practically possible universalism assumes that the following are sufficiently possible to serve as humanistic goals: universal peace, a universal ethics, universal maturation of personality, universal education. These are interrelated goals, each being a means to the others. Here only a summary discussion of them will be presented.

The possibility of psychologically and religiously universalizing or integrating human lives, and at the same time preserving the unique individuality of each personality, has been convincingly developed by Allport.[44] The current plea for education in the humanities reëmphasizes an old

[43] William P. Montague, *The Ways of Things*, pp. 112 f.
[44] Allport, *op. cit.*

idea—the need for a universal element in the curriculum as well as an inclusive scope for education.

There is no magic in labels. Not everyone who cries, "All, all," is proclaiming universalism. There are several words which refer to totalities, and there is more than one kind of wholeness. *Totalitarianism* and *universalism* might conceivably signify the same kind of wholes, but actually they do not.[45] In both ecclesiastical and political thinking the two are often confused. Totalitarianism connotes war, dualistic ethics, dictated partialism in education, and denial of personal individuality to all but a few. It is thus an antithesis of universalism, in aim, in method, and in promise.[46]

It is because universalism joins other postulates with its assumed possibility of a world peacefully organized that the biological and sociological objections become not insurmountable. Bergson, recognizing these obstacles, nevertheless proclaims that some new leader, some mystic element of human nature, some dynamic religion, may render possible the apparently impossible.[47] James urged the development of a moral equivalent for war. Russell suggests the need for substituting in place of fear a consciousness of unity of culture.[48] A valuable bibliography may be found in an essay on "Modern Universalism" by Mulford Q. Sibley.[49] The uncertainties of the twentieth century need occasion no retreat from the mature conclusion arrived at by Kant at the close of the eighteenth: Nature guarantees lasting peace, not to the extent of enabling us to predict it with absolute certainty, but the certainty suffices for practical purpose and makes it one's duty to work towards it.[50]

The ideal of the universal brotherhood of man at the factual level refers to whatever evidence there may be that mankind is one in origin, nature, and needs. It refers to whatever friendly relations may have existed, or may now exist, between individuals or between groups. It refers even more to a goal for me, for us, for all, insofar as man may determine the outcome of history.

A universal ethics or conscience at the factual level refers both to the agreement concerning fundamental moral principles which underlies the diversity of details in morals, and to the agreement concerning fundamental ethical principles as stated by the great ethical teachers. As a goal it refers to the progressive elimination of that ancient partialism, according to which every man must employ two codes, one for friend, the other for enemy. Indeed it looks to an ethically classless society, in which,

[45] Elmo A. Robinson, "Universalism or Totalitarianism," in *Christian Century*, 59 (Aug. 12, 1942), pp. 978 ff.
[46] Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 86, 137.
[47] Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, pp. 255 ff.
[48] Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
[49] Mulford Q. Sibley, "Modern Universalism," in Joseph S. Roucek, *Twentieth Century Political Thought*, pp. 219-244.
[50] Immanuel Kant, *Eternal Peace* (first addition).

insofar as they imply ethically differentiated treatment, the distinctions of Jew and Gentile, Greek and Barbarian, American and Alien, We and They, shall have withered away.

Finalistic Universalism

All propositions are created equal in the sense that before the bar of reason all propositions shall be treated with equal fairness. These which are asserted in religion and theology are not entitled to lenient favoritism. In my youth I accepted certain theological doctrines as indubitable. Now I recognize that all generalizations involve the postulate of induction. But there are at least three fairly tough-minded contemporary philosophers, Schlick, Lewis, and Pap, who have asserted that the question as to whether a mind may survive death of its body is a meaningful question.[51] If they are correct, then surely one may meaningfully inquire whether all or only some survive, and whether this future existence is blessed or cursed.

The doctrine of universal salvation was taught by Origen and some other early Christians, and revived by Eriugena. Indeed it has been argued that universalism, rather than endless punishment, is the plain teaching of the Bible. Universalism came to colonial America through several channels, and appealed to persons of a wide diversity of opinions: unitarian and trinitarian, Calvinist and Arminian, mystic and rationalist.[52] Some adherents were neo-Platonic in their expectation of a final restoration of all souls to an original harmony.

Finalistic universalists have more often looked to poets than to philosophers for support. Yet occasionally philosophers have spoken for them. I would not contend that Leibniz was theologically a universalist. But I find him writing, "God will have the greatest care for spirits and will give not only to all of them in general, but even to each one in particular, the highest perfection which the universal harmony will permit." And again: "A single spirit is worth a whole world."[53] With a similar reservation Rousseau can be quoted. The religion of man, he says, "acknowledges all the human race as brothers, and the society which unites them dissolves not even at death."[54] Santayana suggests that we may well think of God as the active good of the universe, which involves the love of every creature.[55] "It is pleasant to think," he writes, "that the fertility of the spirit is inexhaustible, if matter only gives it a chance, and that the worst and most successful fanaticism cannot turn the moral world permanently into a desert."[56]

[51] C. I. Lewis, "Experience and Meaning," in Feigl and Sellers, p. 142; Moritz Schlick, "Meaning and Verification," *ibid.*, p. 160; Arthur Pap, *Elements of Analytic Philosophy,* p. 301.
[52] Richard Eddy, *Universalism in America,* vol. I.
[53] Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics,* par. 36.
[54] Rousseau, *The Social Contract,* book 4, ch. 8.
[55] Santayana, *op. cit.,* pp. 591 f. (from "Ultimate Religion").
[56] *Ibid.,* p. 482 (from *The Realm of Essence*).

James speaks more positively. Admittedly he does reject what he calls "universalistic supernaturalism" in favor of occasional injections of the supernatural into the natural.[57] But that does not contradict finalistic universalism. Most religious men believe, he writes, "that not only they themselves, but the whole universe of beings to whom the God is present, are secure in his parental hands. There is a sense, a dimension, they are sure, in which we are *all* saved, in spite of the gates of hell and all adverse terrestrial appearances. God's existence is the guarantee of an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved."[58] And again: "If the hypothesis were offered us of a world in which . . . utopias should all be outdone, and millions kept permanently happy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of lonely torture, what except a specifical and independent sort of emotion can it be which would make us immediately feel, even though an impulse rose within us to clutch the happiness so offered, how hideous a thing would be its enjoyment when deliberately accepted as the fruit of such a bargain?"[59] That finalistic universalism need not mean a completely determined universe he argues by the analogy of a chess game, in which God does not know what moves are to be made by his opponents or by himself. Of one thing, however, God may be certain: "and that is that his world was safe, and that no matter how much it might zig-zag he could surely bring it home at last."[60]

My youthful universalism was expressed by joining with others in the proclamation of our beliefs in the universal fatherhood of God and the final harmony of all souls with God. What modification is now necessary? For one thing, the idea of static finality must give place to the idea of a universe from which novelty is never absent and in which the cessation of significant events is never possible. Moreover, as I have watched friends battling over such issues as theism versus humanism, I have found myself more and more inclined to speculate less about God and the future. I prefer to wait and open my gifts on Christmas morning. To me propositions affirming or denying immortality and God's existence are all hypotheses.

Since life sometimes forces choices between these alternatives, and since present knowledge permits rationalizing, no matter how one chooses, I find it convenient to continue the assumptions of my youth. The significant difference is that I now recognize them, as I did not then, to be assumptions. But if my assumption that God exists should be correct, then

[57] James, *op. cit.*, p. 135 (from *The Varieties of Religious Experience*).
[58] *Ibid.*, p. 133 (same).
[59] *Ibid.*, p. 68 (from "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life").
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 64 (from "The Dilemma of Determinism").

it seems only reasonable to assume that he is a universal God, with no nation or race or religion singled out for special favors. And if there be human survival after death, it seems only reasonable to assume that it is universal survival with no regional segregation. If there be both God and survival, I assume that the future will offer a period of graduate study, for which a grade of B in this life is not a prerequisite, and that God will be recognized as the Great Teacher, whose educational methods are universally successful.

Conclusion

All systems of philosophy, James tells us, spring from preferences.[61] To what postulates shall one give preference? Why the postulates of universalism, rather than those of partialism or nihilism? For one who takes them seriously they add to the burden of life. They multiply our responsibilities and call upon us to extend our conscience to include the whole world and our love to those whom we shall never see.[62]

Although postulates are chosen by preference or perhaps intuition, one may seek to justify the preference. The choice of universalist postulates may be justified, first because philosophy is basically a search for the most general and the most inclusive truths. Investigation may disclose facts which require revision of postulates, but at the beginning anything less than universalism is a prediction of failure. Secondly, because universalism is more adventurous and more challenging than the cautions or negations of its rivals. Thirdly, because in some of its forms at least, universalism has justified itself pragmatically.

My problem has been to reappraise my early universalism in the light of later philosophical experiences. I find that my denominational forebears, in selecting "Universalism" as their name, thereby attached themselves to a concept which they and their successors have interpreted in far too restricted a sense. For I find also that in science, in ethics, in logic, and in other fields of knowledge, there is almost universally a tendency to universalize. To be a philosopher in any sense is to be a universalist in some sense. This suggests the possibility of an unrestricted universalism as a basic position, both in philosophy and in religion. If the generalizations of such universalism are stated as rules for thinking, for discovery, for interpersonal relations, for life in all its phases, they lose their otherwise dogmatic character and offer to minds with diverse philosophical emphases a common intellectual faith.

[61] James *op. cit.*, p. 24 (from "The Sentiment of Rationality").
[62] Yves R. Simon, *Community of the Free*, pp. 21 ff.

ROBERT WAKEFIELD AND THE BEGINNINGS OF BIBLICAL STUDIES IN TUDOR ENGLAND

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THROUGHOUT the long history of Western Christianity much work was expended upon the proper understanding and translation of the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, and this achievement, which has truly made the Bible a "Book of a Thousand Tongues," carries in it the story of vast labor and learning.[1] The sixteenth century was one of the most pregnant periods in the development of biblical scholarship in which Christian scholars translated from Hebrew originals into Latin and composed in Latin the comprehensive grammatical and lexical handbooks for biblical Hebrew and Aramaic, and began talmudic and oriental studies, thus preparing the way for the expansion of learning into the history of civilizations. Venice, Wittenberg, Paris, and ultimately Basel were the centres of these biblical labors; and its pioneers were men such as Bomberg, Levita, Reuchlin, Luther, Vatable, Pagninus, Münster, and the Buxtorfs. Some account, however, should be taken of the beginnings of Hebrew scholarship in Tudor England, a humanistic interest that was to issue within a century in the great achievement of the King James' Bible and the monumental *London Polyglot* of Bishop Walton.

English Christians had made their valuable contribution to the biblical learning of the late Middle Ages; we think here of the Franciscan school of Oxford, Bishop Grosseteste, William de la Mare, and Roger Bacon who was responsible for the Decree of the Council of Vienne (1311), recommending the study of Hebrew and Arabic at five universities, Oxford among them. The remainder of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, preoccupied with the great questions of a rapidly changing society, do not continue these promising advances into Greek and Hebrew linguistics. It is only with the Renaissance and the Reformation that English humanists, following in the footsteps of their colleagues from across the channel, again devote themselves to this field of inquiry.

In the earlier centuries the study of Hebrew had been taken up by Christians mainly for apologetic and missionary purposes, which interest now declined before the growing academic and cultural concern. Instead of remaining a cause of contention between Jew and Christian, as it had been before, the knowledge of Hebrew and the interpretation of the Scriptures are made the object of acrimonious theological dispute between

[1] On the study of Hebrew among Christians see Wm. Bacher, *Die hebr. Sprachwissenschaft vom 10. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert* (Trier, 1892) and Otto Kluge, "Die hebr. Sprachwissenschaft in Deutschland im Zeitalter des Humanism," *ZGJD* (1931-1932).

Catholics and Protestants;[2] but they could not thus remain confined very long, since the formal and accepted systems of exegesis did not contain and could not provide the materials which would be commensurate with the wider interest in cultural learning and the rising critical inquiry.

The Renaissance or, properly speaking, the humanist occupation with Hebrew seems to have been singularly or almost exclusively academic, content to provide a grammatical and lexical apparatus.[3] In the Mediterranean world Jewish scholars had developed the grammatical science of Hebrew, the whole field of etymology, syntax, and literary structure of the biblical text. This "science of Hebrew grammar" did not come into the purview of Christian Hebraists until the age of the critical periods after 1450, which might indeed suggest a kind of coördination with the Latin Renaissance. Then men desired to study Hebrew according to the same standards and with the same fullness as Latin and Greek, and not only as an apparatus for scriptural exegesis. The Hebrew tongue came to be a field of rich and interesting knowledge as one of the three historic languages of the West.

To come back to England. It can readily be seen that throughout the 1500's linguistic activities there could not compare in magnitude of effort and production with those on the Continent. It was from abroad that English students received their teachers, their books, even their inspiration for this strange, new task. Among the earliest of native English students of Hebrew were Robert and Thomas Wakefield. Relatively little is known of Thomas, the younger of the brothers, except that he was appointed Regius Professor of Hebrew at Cambridge in 1540 where he died thirty-five years later. Whether he studied Hebrew under his brother Robert or on the Continent can not be accurately ascertained. Apparently, both brothers were born at Pontefract, Yorkshire—John Wakefield, comptroller of the household of Archbishop Cranmer might have been their brother or kin—and Robert received his A.B. at Cambridge in 1513 or 1514.[4] He then went abroad to study Greek and Hebrew, and we find him at Louvain in the fall of 1517 before accepting short teaching positions in Paris and Tübingen. It is here that he met the great old man of Hebrew studies, Johannes Reuchlin (1455-1522), whom he came to regard as his teacher and whom he succeeded as lecturer at Tübingen. However, in 1523 he had already been summoned to return to England. In the appendix to Wakefield's *Oratio* we find a letter of Ferdinand, the brother of Charles V, to his nephew Henry VIII, imploring him to grant a longer

[2] One might think here of the use of Hebrew by Luther and his school in their doctrinal struggles with other Christian groups. *Cf.* L. Diestel, *Die Geschichte des alten Testamentes in der christlichen Kirche* (Jena, 1869).

[3] See Kluge's articles mentioned above and Frank Rosenthal, "The Rise of Christian Hebraism in the Sixteenth Century," in *Historia Judaica,* VII, 2 (1945).

[4] Michaud, *Biographie Universelle,* vol. 44, p. 214 and *Dictionary of National Biography,* art. "Rob. Wakefield" and related materials, mainly vol. 58.

leave to "that excellent scholar Wakefield." The rector of the University of Tübingen suggested the same to the chancellor of Cambridge. Both letters were written in March, 1523. But, as we learn from the preface of the *Oratio,* dated April, 1524, these requests had been of no avail; and Wakefield, appointed chaplain to the king upon recommendation of Dr. Richard Pace, began his Hebrew lectures at Cambridge in the same year.

In 1530 Wakefield began his lectures at Oxford, to judge from a reference in his *Syntagma de Hebræorum Codicum Incorruptione* which appears to have been printed in London during the same year. Our scholar passed away October 8, 1537, leaving to his brother Thomas his considerable library of valuable manuscripts which he had but recently acquired from the forced sales of the lesser monasteries.

Wakefield's major publication is the *Oratio de Laudibus et Utilitatum Trium Linguarum* of 1524, of which single copies are in the libraries of Harvard University and the Hebrew Union College. In the dedication to Henry VIII, which contains the then usual fulsome praise—*ad invictissimum illustrissimumque Henricum Angliæ et Franciæ regem ac fidei defensorum* (to the most invincible and illustrious Henry, King of England and France, Defender of the Faith) and two more pages of same —he begs the king to accept the little work "whose third part had to be omitted from publication then because the printers lacked the necessary Hebrew types."[5] However, Wakefield will discuss in the present study the purity of Hebrew codices, the use of vowel points and signs, the accents and cantillation, the errors of the Septuagint and of Jerome, the Hebrew idioms of both the Old Testament and the New Testament, and the need of the theologian to know this sacred tongue. And, apparently, as a sign of royal approbation, this preface is followed by a full-page woodcut of Henry's coat of arms, the lions, the fleur-de-lis, crown, rose, angels, Latin motto and all.

The *Oratio* proper commences with another praise of the king and of Cambridge. Upon the advice of Dr. Reynoldo Polo (better known as Reginald Cardinal Poole) Wakefield has been appointed to teach Hebrew, and these are the objectives of his undertaking: 1. to prove Wakefield's own proficiency in this task of sacred instruction in public and not just as a private pastime; 2. to establish the relation of Hebrew, Chaldaic, and Arabic; 3. to refute objections—even those of an historical nature—against the scientific study of sacred writ and its languages, and to serve as a basis for the correction of Jerome's version, the Vulgate; 4. to pay a debt of thankfulness to Cambridge whose intellectual leaders delight in new things.[6]

[5] Preface to the *Oratio* (London, 1524), p. 2: ". . . cuius tertiam partem propter inopiam hebraicorum characterum quibus impressor caret, nunc prætermittere coactus sum."

[6] *Oratio,* p. 2 of text.

Immediately—as was the custom of the century—some sound authorities must be cited to support the writer's position. Thus, the first references are taken from the works of Maimonides, Augustine, Jerome, David Kimḥi, and Origen, all of whom are found to emphasize the need of multi-lingual studies for the understanding of the word of God. Even the Bible is shown to be full of non-Hebrew words, Persian, Egyptian, Greek, Aramaic, and Arabic; not to mention the fact, already observed by Maimonides, that each prophet employs his own characteristic and particular idioms. Among these foreign words Wakefield lists the names of the months (of Persian origin!), the etymology of the name Moses, words of four radical letters, etc. In connection with a brief survey of the fate of Hebrew studies among the Fathers and in the mediæval church, our author stresses the custom of Jews and Moslems who study the sacred books by day and night and who instruct their boys in them from infancy. This reference is perhaps intended as an indirect criticism of his own, less literate, Christian society.[7] He is careful to add that present-day Jews have but few qualified teachers, since they speak Hebrew "but do not know its linguistic theory," a Renaissance complaint met with in the writings of Petrus Nigri, Reuchlin, and many others. Wakefield next refers to some contemporary English students of Hebrew, such as John Tailor, orator of Henry VIII, Reginald Poole, and Richard Pace, Greek reader at Cambridge, diplomatist, and dean of St. Paul's. After mentioning his own teacher, Kaspar Ammon in "Bavaria," and paying tribute to some others, Wakefield once more assures the reader that he will now teach him the fundamentals of Hebrew, Chaldaic (Aramaic), and Arabic, so that the student may understand all the interpretations that are the basis and ratio of the Christian faith. He will also be led into Bible and Mishna, in which are found the learning of the East; the Talmud, wherein the Hebrews employ words of *all* languages; the Targums of Onkelos and Jonathan, Gemara, Mechilta, Midrash, and even Kabala—in short, the entire biblical and postbiblical literature of Judaism, law, folklore, hermeneutics, *moralia,* exegesis, and everything else, too, in less than 100 pages! It is quite obvious that all this learning—only a most exceptional scholar could ever hope to master this tremendous body of knowledge in a lifetime—was known to our friend just by its titles and an occasional reference. Here these strange-sounding terms are listed simply to impress the reader. As a matter of record, by 1525, Hebrew scholarship among Christians had not yet passed its most elementary stage; the fundamental grammars of a Levita and a Münster, and the first handbooks of biblical Aramaic were yet to be printed. And it was not until one whole century later that Johannes Buxtorf of Basel published his great talmudic dictionary which brought this body of Jewish law and learning into the ken of Christian students. Should any reader still doubt Wakefield's pro-

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 12.

ficiency—even after these stupendous presentations—he is reminded that our scholar studied the language for twenty-four years.

Then follows a long discussion proving the superiority of Hebrew, the "lingua Dei." If we worship the tunic and the cross of Jeshu [in block letters] why not much more his sacred language which directs man on the road to eternal salvation?[8] Apparently the printer did not yet possess any Hebrew type, and therefore just a few words are inserted of which the tetragrammaton and the name Jeshu are the first examples. A total of 212 Hebrew and fourteen Arabic words are employed in the *Oratio* and all letters of the Hebrew alphabet excepting K are found in the woodcut types. Most of the frequent Hebrew references are transliterated in Latin type.

All who do not know Hebrew should be called stammerers and those "of heavy speech," Wakefield asserts by quotations from Ezekiel, the Psalms, the Song of Songs, and Proverbs; the prophetic portions of the Bible and the Salomonic literature are the most "exquisite" *ars rethorica;* Hebrew meter is perfect; the magic and spiritual character of Sacred Scripture is invaluable as can easily be seen. Our author, however, surpasses himself when he exclaims that Hebrew is easy to teach and that its grammar is simple and easy to learn. Look, says he, at Pico de Mirandola who studied the language in one month or at Dr. Richard Pace who acquired a knowledge of Hebrew, Aramaic, and Chaldaic (*sic!*) in three months; not to mention Origen, Reuchlin, or even Erasmus, all of whom commenced these linguistic labors only after reaching manhood. And our scholar repeats the story that Nicolas de Lyra occupied himself with Hebrew literature while approaching the weakness of old age.[9] Since God is the author and teacher of Hebrew, it is obvious that the method of writing this language is the most natural of all. The Greeks, indeed, have corrupted even the names of God and Jesus Christ in their translations, not to mention the corruption of the letters of the alphabet, which have their natural meaning only in Hebrew, such as *beth* (*domus*) or *gimel* (*retributio*), *etc.* That Hebrew lacks the neuter gender is simply additional proof of its naturalness, since nature does not desire strict distinctions of gender which she often leaves quite indefinite in her creatures.

Some of these arguments might appear rather ludicrous, if not downright erroneous, to a modern reader. To a sixteenth-century Cambridge scholar, setting out upon a strange and certainly frightening venture—to study an Oriental language, using a method of writing different from his accustomed Latin and employing grammatical rules quite alien to those of Greek and Latin—each one of these points would be a great assurance, and the many quotations from the Hebrew Bible an inducement to carry the examination a step further and further. An ever-increasing number

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 20 and 31. [9] *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

of Hebrew phrases are transliterated, and more and more words are found in block letters. By comparing these Hebrew words and sentences with their Latin transcriptions the reader is led in easy stages to acquire a knowledge of these alien signs and symbols. In the same descriptive vein Wakefield talks about nouns and adjectives, singular and plural forms, and, addressing a gentile audience, he calls special attention to the simplicity of Hebrew word roots, usually consisting of three letters, and how the transposition of any one of these basic letters completely changes the meaning of the words.[10] With a quotation from Gerundensis (Ramban) Wakefield closes this discussion: "We have a tradition that the Torah has been written in black fire on white fire."[11]

A few words are then said about conjugation of verbs. Though Wakefield in general adopts Reuchlin's Latin terminology, he seems to be more concerned about illustrating the great changes of meaning in the various conjugations, such as *lomad:* "to learn" in *kal,* and "to teach" in *piel;* or *adam:* "to be red" and *he'edim:* "to become red." This *coniugationum vis* accounts for the relatively small number of verb roots.[12] Much space is devoted to show how great a number of Greek and Latin words are derived from Hebrew roots, such as *balsamum, saccus,* and others, which might perhaps be an additional proof for the value of this study. When Politianus claimed Aramaic to be a corruption of Greek, he should more properly have reversed his statement since most biblical names and terms are found to be corrupted in Greek and Latin codices.

This matter of names and their adaptations in other tongues raises the great problem of translation and semantics which occupies some fifteen pages of the *Oratio.* Copious quotations from both Jewish and Christian authorities are employed:

> Indeed who does not know that Moses, the man of God, after leaving Egypt, was philosophizing in the desert where, according to Jerome, he was taught by a rustic monk for forty years, so that he might lead the Jewish people.[13]

From here it is but a short step to repeat the old claims of both Jewish and Christian Fathers which made Moses the possessor of all human wisdom, Ethiopian, Greek, and Egyptian:

> Moses, the origin, fountain, and father of all prophets . . . and Plato is no more than Moses speaking with the most artistic Attic tongue (*cf.* Iustin Martyr, Eusebius, and Theodoritus) . . . and did not Clearchus claim in the *de Sommo* that Aristotle was taught a great many things by a certain Jew?[14]

[10] *Ibid.,* p. 38. One of the examples Wakefield employs concerns the three letters ב, ק, ר. These may be transposed to form nine distinct three-letter words.

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 39.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 45.

[13] *Ibid.,* pp. 69-70: *"Verum quis nescit moshe ish hoelohim derelicto Egypto, in heremo philosophatum esse, ubi, secundum Hieron., ad Rusticum monachum, ut populo Judeorum præesset, 40 annis eruditur."*

[14] *Ibid.,* p. 71; *cf.* the discussion of Clearchus of Soli in R. Wilde, *The Treatment of the Jews in the Greek Christian Writers of the First Three Centuries* (Washington, 1949) pp. 34 ff.

David and Solomon receive the usual praises, the one as the prince of poets, the other as the man of greatest wisdom and knowledge and as the first author of medical science, that science "which was transmitted by God to the angels, by the angels to the Hebrew, and by the Hebrew to Egypt and India."[15]

It goes without saying that the Jews have provided excellent physicians, such as Maimonides and a certain Dr. Rabi Iitschak filius Ben B'nitous (whose identity, however, eludes this writer); not to mention their excellence as astronomers, smiths, carpenters, jewelers, crossbreeders of livestock, and interpreters of dreams.[16]

All these varied arguments should convince the Christian student how valuable a knowledge of Hebrew would be, not to talk of its great advantages for a better understanding of the secrets of Christian theology. But how ridiculous to dispute with Jews without a knowledge of Hebrew! It is one thing to believe in the message of Christ and to sing psalms in church, but another thing to refute one word of the Jewish calumnies unless one commands Hebrew and the Jewish traditions.[17] Just as Goliath was beheaded by David with his own sword, so the Jews have to be defeated by their own weapons. We may maintain easily that the Hebrews interpret the Bible according to the letter and the Christians according to the spirit; we still have to convert them to mother church through their own writings, not by severity, war, and persecution.

But enough has been said of the Hebrew language:

Quæ cum ita se habeant, nihil profecto in ecclesia dei magis necessarium, nihil sanctius, nihil commodius q vetustissimam hanc omniumque primam, simplicissimam, pudicissimam, purissimam, incorruptissimam, perfectissimam, copoisissimam, fœcundissimam, sacratissimam, utilissimamque linguam in primis excolere . . . ac nunc vero ad chaldaicam et arabicam veniamus.[18]

The discussion of Aramaic emphasizes the usual things: its relation to Hebrew, its use in Bible, Targum, and Talmud. What is new is that Wakefield includes in this argument a lengthy vituperative attack against Luther, the scholar, interpreter, and theologian whose "knowledge of Hebrew was elementary, but who judged *temere* (rashly and blindly) what he does not know."[19]

The Arabic tongue, finally, is advantageous to a student not only because of its similarity to Hebrew and Aramaic or because of some Arabic words found in Scriptures, but even more because of the great philosophers who wrote this language, not to forget works in the sciences, astronomy, military arts, and medicine, translations from Greek, and the writings of

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 86: *". . . aliud enim est (mihi credite) in ecclesijs Christo credentium psalmos legere, aliud Iudeis singula pœne translationis nostræ verba calumniantibus & in hebræo non esse asserentibus respondere."*
[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 91-92—which, this writer feels, defies translation.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 95-100. Among other examples, Luther's translation of Deut. 4:19, Exod. 28:37, and Psalm 119:78 are referred to.

Jewish scholars and teachers.[20] And if one recalls that in modern Palestine —as of 1524—people speak "Arabic or Syriac, called now *maurisco* or *turkisco* (!) all of which like other Oriental languages show much affinity to Hebrew, it becomes obvious that by knowing one you cannot be ignorant of the others."[21]

Another appeal to Henry VIII to emulate royal benefactors of scholarship, such as Alexander or Francis I or the king's uncle Ferdinand, closes the *Oratio.*

It was thought that Wakefield's *Syntagma,* probably printed in 1530, was that missing portion of the 1524 *Oratio* that was referred to in the preface.[22] A perusal of the eighty-four pages of the later work—thirty pages of which are devoted to the king's divorce—shows, however, that the *Syntagma* is more of a repetition rather than an addition to the first treatise. Very few Hebrew types are employed, and they are about as primitive as the block letters of 1524. If we recall the high development of printing—whether Latin, Greek, or Hebrew—especially in central and southern Europe, where Hebrew books had appeared in considerable numbers even in the decades prior to 1500, this backwardness of English scholarship is the more noticeable.[23]

Robert Wakefield's memory was forgotten soon after his death. We know little of the success of his teaching or of the number of students that attended his lectures. With the progress of the Protestant reform during the reign of Edward VI—when Wakefield had been dead more than a decade—Continental scholars were invited to come to England for the teaching of Hebrew. Paulus Fagius and Julius Tremellius were among the men who accepted this call. These students and their English colleagues, trained in Basel, Paris, and Wittenberg, laid the scientific foundations that made possible the English version of the Bible, the *London Polyglot,* the critical works of a Selden, or the inspired understanding of a Milton. We like to think that all these men had a kind thought for Robert Wakefield, the first Englishman in time after Roger Bacon, who before the forum of public opinion argued, defended, and furthered the cause of a widening humanism and the value of learning that would free the minds of men from the misunderstandings—even though well-intentioned—of the past and lead them back to the bases of religion and culture.

[20] *Ibid.,* pp. 104-105; Wakefield lists the following: Avenpace, Maimonides, Alpharabi, Algazel, Albumasar, Abumaron, Abucaten, Abensira, Abenrusd, Hali, Ibnalchatib.

[21] *Ibid.,* pp. 110-111.

[22] *Syntagma de Hebreorum Codicum Incorruptione* (s.d.e.l.). Wakefield's third known publication, the *Kotser Codicis* (s.d.e.l., probably London, 1532), is devoted to the *cause célèbre,* the king's divorce. Ten arguments are presented in its 108 pages, providing elaborate Scriptural proofs that a marriage to a brother's widow is *"illicitum, interdictum, et inhibitum"* according to the law of nature, the law of God, and the Catholic Church. The Folger Shakespeare Library possesses the only copies of these books available in the United States.

[23] See Alexander Marx, *Studies in Jewish History and Booklore* (New York, 1944). It is of interest to note that Hebrew type was not employed in Scotland until 1644 (John Row, *Hebr. Ling. Institut.*) and in America until 1675 in a study written by Increase Mather, if we overlook the few Hebrew letters that appear in the preface of the 1640 *Bay Psalm Book.*

THE RELEVANCE OF RUSKIN

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It is always a matter of importance to consider how contemporary or how outworn are the analyses and commentaries which have survived in our literature out of the past. This is basically the question of what is universal in human life and thought, and to what extent the wisdom of the world is communicable from one age to another, with all of the variations in time and circumstance. Doubtless, there is much of what even the wisest say and write which, like contents of an intensely relevant sermon, is not of a character to survive for very long the historical and social setting in which it was first offered. And yet it is doubtful that there is no continuity in our experience and that the sense of the persistence of problems and of the relevance of older ideas is illusory. In John Ruskin's writings on the moral, social, and economic questions of his day, there is a power of insight and a breadth of perspective which seem to reach beyond the nineteenth-century predicament in which they were expressed.

John Ruskin entered Christ Church, Oxford, in 1836 with the intention to prepare for the ministry. By the time he took his degree, in 1842, Ruskin had turned his attention to art and literature, and in the following year there appeared the first volume of his *Modern Painters.* In this and other works, Ruskin gave evidence of a broad and thorough comprehension of art and expressed his approval of the innovations and spiritual views of the Pre-Raphaelites. Into these writings on art, moral and social considerations were introduced almost from the beginning, and these matters received increasing attention as time passed. Finally, toward middle age, Ruskin turned away from art criticism to devote his talents directly to social and industrial problems, particularly the conditions of life among the lower classes of the society of his day. "It is the vainest of affections," he came to believe, "to try to put beauty into shadows, while all real things which cast them are left in deformity and pain."[1]

In 1860, Ruskin began the publication of essays in social criticism in the *Cornhill Magazine,* then edited by Thackeray, and these essays were later printed in book form under the title *Unto This Last.* In the preface, Ruskin wrote that he considered these essays ". . . to be the best, that is to say, the truest, rightest-worded, and most serviceable things I have ever written; . . ." With *Unto This Last,* Ruskin became the champion of a doctrine of the beautiful and harmonious life for all who work, to the

[1] *Catalogue of the Educational Series,* Prefatory Remarks, as quoted in E. T. Cook, *The Life of Ruskin* (London: George Allen, 1912), Vol. II, p. 4.

realization of which life men are ". . . summoned by every plea of pity and claim of right."[2] Ruskin abandoned the religious orthodoxy of his earlier years only to take up in his middle and later years the preaching of a religion of spiritual and social regeneration. The last forty years of his life were given over to the expounding of his teachings through lectures, letters, articles, and serial pamphlets. Ruskin's intellectual activities were balanced in a sense by many practical experiments in social reconstruction, among these being his assistance to F. D. Maurice, Charles Kingsley, and others in the founding of the Working Men's College, and his founding of the Guild of St. George to work for actual purification in society.

The main occupation of Ruskin as critic of the theory and practice of his own society was the repudiation of the dogmas of orthodox political economy. In a concise, simple style, in contrast to the somewhat florid and decorative prose of the works on art, Ruskin assailed the fundamental materialism behind the formulas of the orthodox economists of his day. This materialism, as Ruskin saw it, was utilitarian in its philosophical foundations, being based essentially upon Bentham, as Bentham was based upon Hobbes. Its main premise was the allegation that the only springs of human action are the promptings of self-interest, man being as he is merely a "covetous machine" governed by ". . . laws of labour, purchase, and sale . . ."[3] In this mechanical scheme the social affections are the accidental and superfluous, avarice and the desire for progress the basic and constant factors. The exponents of this conception of human nature had trusted to enlightened self-interest to redeem the latent chaos of covetousness. To Ruskin, this was a totally false doctrine, and he assailed it as the conceptual foundation of an industrialized society marked by ugliness and the abject poverty of a degraded working class.

In *Unto This Last,* Ruskin gave an interesting and penetrating analysis of what he thought to be the basic fallacy of the philosophy of the "old" political economy, which in 1860 was at the height of its influence. "The politico-economical view," as Ruskin designated it, excludes all non-mechanistic factors from its equations and consequently can be expected only to yield results in which such elements are deficient. In this rests the essential inadequacy and inapplicability of this view, and the seeds of its dogmatism. The materialist will admit no interpretation of social experience which embraces elements in human nature which he has decided to ignore. The rigor of the materialistic account of human experience is gained at the expense of shallowness and impoverishment, particularly in the pretension to prediction of the course which any human transaction

[2] *Unto This Last* (New York: Dutton, 1913), "Ad Valorem," p. 193.
[3] *Unto This Last,* "The Roots of Honour," p. 115; *cf. Fors Clavigera,* Letter [illegible]

will take in accordance with calculations of personal interest and advantage. For Ruskin it is the potential operation of "such affection as one man *owes* to another" which renders all of the attempts of the political economist "to deduce rules of action from balance of expediency" nugatory. To the *balance of expediency* Ruskin opposed the *balance of justice* as a superior order of action open to every man.

Ruskin assailed, further, the contention of the political economists that out of the unfettered competition of enlightened interests there must accrue the largest benefit to the whole community. This dogma was perhaps the greatest snare of the utilitarians. If it be granted that it is generally advantageous for a society to produce the greatest possible sum of goods and services, there is nothing in this as such to guarantee that all interests which are party to such production will be properly furthered in the society. Improvement in basic human well-being for *all* individuals within a society does not follow automatically upon the increase in national income.[4] Where interests are joined in initial inequality, it is hardly likely that the operation of *balance of expediency* will yield in time less rather than greater inequality. And where in a society emphasis is placed upon initiative in acquisition and production, the dispossessed may be thought to have as much as they deserve.

Ruskin saw, as we have had to see also, that the most efficient industrialized society may also be the most unjust and the most inhumane. Enlightened individualism, when unfettered, may be efficient and productive but it is not automatically just and humane. For Ruskin the problem of wealth is ultimately a matter of distribution and use, and fair distribution is a moral responsibility which must be thought of in terms of absolute justice rather than expedience.[5] It is true that Bentham had held that the individual must count for one and none for more than one, and that the end of legislation should be to augment rather than to diminish happiness. But there is nothing in Bentham's philosophical scheme itself to support the realization of the best possible life in society. And where J. S. Mill admitted the necessity of treating of value qualitatively as well as quantitatively, it would seem that he had really abandoned rather than enlarged the old foundations of utilitarianism.[6] The defect in "the politico-economical view" is the absence of any indication of what distinctly *human*

[4] "The whole question, therefore, respecting not only the advantage, but even the quantity, of national wealth, resolves itself finally into one of abstract justice. It is impossible to conclude, of any given mass of acquired wealth, merely by the fact of its existence, whether it signifies good or evil to the nation in the midst of which it exists." *Unto This Last,* "The Veins of Wealth," pp. 140-141.

[5] *Unto This Last,* "The Roots of Honour," p. 118.

[6] "I should have regretted the need of pointing out inconsistency in any portion of Mr. Mill's work, had not the value of his work proceeded from its inconsistencies. He deserves honour among economists by inadvertently disclaiming the principles which he states, and tacitly introducing the moral considerations with which he declares his science has no connection." *Unto This Last,* "Ad Valorem," p. 164.

condition of life, in worker as well as in entrepreneur, is to be promoted by material wealth. For Ruskin, this condition cannot be a function of private balances of pleasure over pain but is, rather, an absolute *quality* of life as realized in "full-breathed, bright-eyed, and happy-hearted human creatures." It is the distinction of humanity to live by the laws of right rather than by the laws of supply and demand. It is the sense of what is owed to human life as such which alone is capable, as a ground of social action, of bringing about ". . . ultimately in the world a state of things which will not issue in pillage or death."[7]

Ruskin continued his assault upon "the politico-economical view" in his distinction between true political economy, with its proper understanding of wealth and its purpose, and mere mercantilism, as "the art of establishing the maximum inequality [of wealth] in our own favour."[8] Ruskin stressed a distinction of categories which places wealth-using above wealth-getting and makes wealth itself merely a means to the highest life of man. However trenchant at times his style, which brought a storm of protest in his day, there is much that is plain and sound in Ruskin's insistence that "consumption . . . is the end . . . of production; and wise consumption is a far more difficult art than wise production."[9] This particular idea was not, of course, original with Ruskin. Its roots are to be found in Aristotle and in many exponents of the doctrine of natural law. In his own century Ruskin merely continued the attack on organized commercial society which had found expression in Carlyle, Dickens, Kingsley, F. D. Maurice, and the Christian Socialists. Ruskin sharpened his assault in his criticism of *mercantile wealth* in contrast to *real wealth.* Real wealth is constituted of actual property or possessions held for use, such as houses, land, and various stores or supplies.[10] Mercantile wealth, on the other hand, is power over labor, which arises from scarcity or inequality in possessions and which ". . . is greater or less in direct proportion to the poverty of the men over whom it is exercised, . . ."[11] It is not the inequality of possessions which is condemned by Ruskin but rather the abuse of the advantage which any and all inequality gives. Inequality of wealth provides the situation in which the stronger may set a price to the weaker which is oppressive and ruinous. Whatever the apparent yield of such commercial practice, ultimately it destroys more than it provides, particularly with respect to the human potential which is paralyzed and the productive operations which are hindered.[12]

[7] *Unto This Last,* "The Veins of Wealth," p. 142.
[8] *Ibid.,* p. 135.
[9] *Unto This Last,* "Ad Valorem," p. 179.
[10] *For Clavigera,* in the Works of John Ruskin, edited by E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn (New York: Longmans, Green, 1907), Vols. XXVII-XXIX, Letter LXX.
[11] *Unto This Last,* "The Veins of Wealth," p. 134.
[12] *Unto This Last,* "The Veins of Wealth," p. 141.

Flowing from Ruskin's conception of real wealth and its abuse in mercantile life is his theory of labor and wages. As part of his general assault upon the law of supply and demand as defined by the orthodox economists, Ruskin pointed out what he regarded as the obvious consequences of this rule in its operation as a principle of employment. In the competition among workers, under circumstances favorable to the entrepreneur, the cheapest labor is invariably employed. The saving to the entrepreneur in such transactions permits him to hire additional labor at reduced wages. The general result of such practice is the concentration of more and more power in the hands of the individual employer and the diminution of the power of the individual worker in his command of the goods and services essential to a good and decent life. This entails, as a moral and social consequence, the depression of the class of workers, exposing them to the "worst disabilities of poverty" and placing each man "under a maximum of difficulty in rising above his position." Ruskin's alternative is clearly and simply stated. The price of labor, morally considered, cannot be a function of supply and demand. It must be determined, rather, on the basis of "absolute exchange," in ". . . giving time for time, strength for strength, and skill for skill."[13] In this, one is morally restrained from accepting as labor from another more than one is willing to return for the same function to be performed.[14] Here in Ruskin is the idea of the *minimum wage* as a matter of moral obligation primarily, whatever attending legal sanction it may and should enjoy. This wage cannot be affected by the number of persons applying at a given time for the same employment and must be paid according to a "fixed rate" or "invariable standard," depending upon the general estimate of society placed upon the service involved.

Ruskin did not plead for equality of remuneration for all work. He insisted throughout his writings upon the impossibility of equality among men, there being "an eternal superiority of some men to others." Accordingly, he insisted that the kinds, ranks, and quantities of labor must not be confused with its qualities; a private is not to be given the same pay as a colonel. Each employed person must receive a fair and sufficient wage in accordance with his place in a descending series of offices or grades. But the wage even at the lowest level, for the bad laborer as well as for the good, must be such as to preclude the penalties of poverty and to permit the improvement of one's condition.

In his plea for a society free from ugliness and suffering and poverty, Ruskin did not ask so much for a social upheaval as for a moral and

[13] *Unto This Last,* "Qui Judicatis Terram," p. 151.

[14] "The abstract idea, then, of just or due wages, as respects the labourer, is that they will consist in a sum of money which will at any time procure for him at least as much labour as he has given, rather more than less." *Ibid.,* p. 152.

spiritual regeneration of society as it is. Ruskin clearly felt that the life of the ordinary man could be saved from coarseness and want without the necessity of a rise in social rank or an assault upon the general structure of society.[15] If Ruskin's ideas were to be thought dangerous because they were "socialistic," here indeed was a loophole for the conservatives whom he had disturbed. Ruskin shared with Carlyle a great abhorrence of anarchy and appeared at times to stand all too firmly for the cause of *order,* as in his joining with Carlyle in the defense of Governor Eyre's ruthless suppression of the insurrection among the Negroes of Jamaica in 1865. In his insistence that social justice is more important than political reform, Ruskin held that the basic reform of the laws bearing upon work and exchange was more important for England than the extension of the franchise. Reform is moral and not political; it is an individual matter and not a matter of class. But what the conservative may take for a loophole in Ruskin is really a snare. In Ruskin's approach to reform, however subdued at times, there are the seeds of radical social revolution, such as has gradually and peacefully taken place in England itself since his time.

The debt of social reform to Ruskin is considerable. His writings have been moving forces in the shaping of public opinion and public policy on social questions. In 1906, just six years after his death, a canvass of the labor members of the new Parliament revealed that the reading of Ruskin's *Unto This Last* had influenced the greatest number in their convictions.[16] Much that Ruskin argued for as social purification and reconstruction has been either enacted into law in England and elsewhere or generally recognized as desirable as social good.[17] There is still in contemporary life, however, much of the sordidness and ugliness by which Ruskin was horrified and to the relieving of which the later years of his life were devoted. There are still slums in our great and small cities, and we are still producing wealth which we are either unable or unwilling to distribute equitably for use. The threat of materialism and its sordid consequences is a constant one and, in spite of what has been achieved of moral vision through the struggles for social reform, materialistic views have perhaps today a greater voice than in Ruskin's time. To the old dogmas of political economy have been added psychological, historical, and sociological dogmas which would leave even less room for the constant

[15] "Thus, I think the object of a workman's ambition should be not to become a master; but to attain daily more subtle and exemplary skill in his own craft, to save from his wages enough to enrich and complete his home gradually with more delicate and substantial comforts; and to lay by such store as shall be sufficient for the happy maintenance of his old age . . . and sufficient also for the starting of his children in a rank of life equal to his own." *Time and Tide* (New York: Dutton, 1913), Letter II, p. 9.

[16] E. T. Cook, *The Life of Ruskin* (London: Allen, 1912), Vol. II, p. 14.

[17] *Cf. Fors Clavigera,* Letter LXVII, for Ruskin's statement of the constitution of the Guild of St. George.

"social affections" and moral aspirations which Ruskin stressed in his writings. In all of this, something other than human nature acting through its rationality and its aspiration becomes the chief factor determining the character of human existence, leaving little or no place for a sense of "absolute justice." Even Ruskin could hardly have anticipated the extent to which the emperio-metric sciences of human existence *would* go to show that "there is no such thing as a Man; . . ."[18] It is not insignificant that the advocacy of moral rights and duties has not ceased to be attacked by ethical and cultural relativists, in their reduction of value to private pleasure and social convention. The consequences of this development should be clear. With the removal of moral constants, there are no duties upon which individuals are obliged by nature and reason to agree, and there is no ground for contending that any individual's social condition ought to be improved beyond his own power to improve it.

Ruskin's interest in human betterment was never a concern merely for the wider distribution of consumer goods. Material comfort is merely the necessary condition for the proper expression of a life of beauty, in one's immediate social surroundings as well as in creations of art flowing from the ". . . human contemplation of the natural phenomena under whose influence we exist . . ."[19] For Ruskin, there is a direct and intimate connection between the economic and the æsthetic. In a world governed by social justice, free from "useless affliction of . . . anxieties and uncertainties," art must have its place as the expression of individual and of national character. The principles of justice, as existing in men's hearts, being entirely consistent with what is expressed in the higher forms of literature and art, in the best human situation the life which is sensitive to the demands and provisions of justice would be sensitive to the demands and consolations of literature and art. Art (which for Ruskin is never for art's sake) enters into life because the best life is at once moral and æsthetic. "Life without industry is guilt, and industry without art is brutality."[20] Only a society which surrounds men with the consolations of art as well as of industry can really be regarded as representing human progress. In a sharp reply to a Manchester correspondent who had complained of Ruskin's failure to appreciate the elements of progress represented in Manchester, Ruskin commented that ". . . taken as a whole, I perceive that Manchester can produce no good art, and no good literature. . . ."[21] For Ruskin, the increase of material goods as such must not be mistaken for the enrichment of life, ". . . the sum of enjoyment depending not on the quantity of things tasted, but on the vivacity and patience of

[18] *Fors Clavigera,* Letter V, v.
[19] From *Deucalion,* as quoted in E. T. Cook, *The Life of Ruskin,* Vol. II, p. 425.
[20] From *Oxford Lectures on Art,* as quoted in E. T. Cook, *The Life of Ruskin,* Vol. II, p. 565.
[21] *Fors Clavigera,* Letter LXXXII.

taste."[22] Food and clothing may be sources of life and means of moral discipline or they may be means of guilt, dissoluteness, and death.[23] For Ruskin, ". . . the material wealth of any country is the portion of its possessions which feeds and educates good men and women in it; . . . the wealth of a country is in its good men and women, and in nothing else."[24] This goodness is a moral dignity arising from discipline in the use of things and from the expression of all of the powers of life.

There is much that might be said concerning the religious foundations of Ruskin's thought. Ruskin regarded his religious opinions as unorthodox but not for that reason unchristian. He was reared in the strictest religious atmosphere, dominated by his mother. Few people today know the text of the Bible as Ruskin knew it from endless readings with his mother, and to this he attributed his sense of style and of the sound of language. Out of the acceptance of the Bible as most literally interpreted Ruskin was gradually shaken as he became more and more deeply versed in some branches of natural science. In Bishop Colenso's work *Pentateuch Critically Examined,* published in 1862, Ruskin found expressed scholarly conclusions on biblical criticism to which he, as a man of letters, had come independently. His reformed religious position, lying beyond the conventional requirements of faith of his time, emerged with *Unto This Last* and *Munera Pulveris* as a religion of humanity, "full of sacred colour and melancholy shade."

As the years passed for Ruskin, the tones of intellectual skepticism were softened and mellowed. One observes in the reading of *Fors Clavigera* that which Ruskin himself confessed, namely, that his writing gradually became "much more distinctly Christian in tone," influenced at one point by his studies of the frescoes attributed to Giotto in the Upper Church at Assisi. But it was to the last the religion of humanity or rather faith in the service of mankind which Ruskin understood as Christian. As he summed up the matter in one of the last letters of *Fors Clavigera,* ". . . nothing remains to man, nothing is possible to him of true joy, but in the righteous love of his fellows; in the knowledge of the laws and the glory of God, and in the daily use of the faculties of the soul and body with which God has endowed him."[25] John Ruskin remains for us the profoundly religious man, preaching a gospel of spirituality against the errors and excesses of materialism, with faith in the creating Spirit as the source of beauty and in the governing Spirit as the founder and maintainer of moral law.

[22] *Unto This Last,* "Ad Valorem," p. 193.
[23] *Time and Tide,* Letter XI, pp. 44-45.
[24] *Fors Clavigera,* Letter XC.
[25] *Fors Clavigera,* Letter LXXXIX.

From Off the Campus and On

For nearly thirty years Crozer Quarterly has sought to bring to its readers material which would be of value to all who are interested in religion in its widest and most comprehensive reaches. Through the years there has never been any attempt to regiment thought or to limit its appeal to any one group. It has sought to be a journal in which men who have had something worth saying and who knew how to say it might find the opportunity to present their views. Articles have been accepted and rejected on that basis and that alone. We believed that there was a place for such a journal, and we have kept it through the years at a price that all could afford to pay. In the case of readers who continued to find it of value but were unable to continue to meet the modest subscription price we have been happy to find the way to continue them on our list. Only once since its establishment by vote of the Crozer trustees in May, 1923, has the subscription price been raised. In this day of spiraling costs and prices it is a pleasant memory that we tried to hold the line. With this issue Crozer Quarterly bids its readers good bye. It would be idle to deny that the staff feels deep regret at this necessity, and it would be ungracious to hide the fact that the many letters of regret which have come to us in consequence of the Announcement which we carried in the January number have been very welcome. We are happy that so many have found of value what seemed to us of value too. We are sure that the unusually large number of articles and reviews in this issue will leave a pleasant taste in your mouths. To all our friends, readers and contributors alike, Hail and Farewell.

Dean Batten needs no introduction to any to whom the name Crozer is known. A graduate of Temple University, he has been since 1935 on the Crozer campus, first as a student, then as a member of the staff, as acting president, and subsequently as dean and professor of religious education. Since the retirement of Dr. Neisser, he has been business manager of Crozer Quarterly. It is particularly fitting that his matriculation address, delivered in the Crozer chapel at the opening of this current academic year, should have the place of honor in this issue.

Charles F. Mullett is professor of history at the University of Missouri, where he has been located since 1925. He holds degrees from Syracuse, Clark, and Columbia. He has taught also at Syracuse, DePauw, Franklin, Nebraska, and Northwestern. During 1937-1938, while a research fellow at the Huntington Library, he carried on extensive investigations in the relations of religion and politics in England. He is the author of books on the British Empire and the history of medicine and has published many articles on the history of ideas—scientific, religious, and political—in various learned journals. It is a pleasure to welcome this distinguished scholar to our pages.

Professor King is no stranger to readers of Crozer Quarterly, for we have been privileged to publish several of his racy articles, the latest being in the April, 1951, issue. His B.D. is from Andover Newton, his Ph.D. from Harvard. Following seventeen years in the pastorate, serving Methodist and Congregational churches in New England, with a three-year stint as an army chaplain, he went in 1949 to Grinnell College as dean of the chapel and associate professor of philosophy and religion.

Professor Ferré is another scholar too well known to require more than a hearty greeting. For several years, after finishing his graduate work at Harvard, he was professor of theology at Andover Newton. He now holds a similar chair at Vanderbilt. During the present year he is an exchange professor at Mansfield College, Oxford. He is the author of several much discussed books and of many articles. His last article in these pages was "A Religion for One World" (July, 1948).

Our readers, we are sure, will enjoy the charming little piece by Dr. Croxall as much as did the editor. He holds three degrees from Oxford (B.D., D.D., and B.Mus.). At present he is (Anglican) chaplain to the Embassy and to the English and American colonies at St. Alban's, Copenhagen. Formerly he was successively curate of St. Aldate's, Oxford; organist at Calcutta cathedral, India; and vicar of St. Michæl's, Cheswick. He is also lecturer to the Royal Musical Association, the Ecclesiological Society, and at the University of Copenhagen. Long a student of Kierkegaard, he is preparing a volume on the latter at the moment. An earlier volume, *Kierkegaard Studies,* was the outgrowth of his two Oxford theses.

Professor Robinson holds degrees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, St. Lawrence University, and Stanford. Since 1928 he has been on the faculty of San Jose College, first as assistant professor of mathematics and since 1933 as associate professor of philosophy. Before going to San Jose, he spent seventeen years in the parish ministry, serving Universalist and Unitarian churches in Pennsylvania, New York, Indiana, Ohio, and California. He is the author of many technical and professional articles. It is a pleasure to welcome him back to our pages.

Dr. Rosenthal came to the United States in 1936 after completing his secondary education in Europe. His college and graduate work, resulting in a Ph.D. (1945), was done at the University of Pittsburgh and was largely concerned with the intellectual relations between Jews and Christians in the time of the Renaissance and Reformation. Since 1946 he has been on the faculty of Drake University with the rank of associate professor of European history.

Dr. Banner is associate professor of Christian history and thought in the School of Religion of Howard University, and literary editor of the *Journal of Religious Thought.* He holds degrees from Pennsylvania State (A.B.), Yale (B.D.), and Harvard (A.M. and Ph.D.). An earlier article, "What Is Our Christian Heritage?" was published in our pages in October, 1948.

We present our grist of books, reviewed in some detail or more briefly appraised, with particular satisfaction. Sixty-seven books from fifty-two reviewers—we think this is a record which will not soon be surpassed. Through the years this section of Crozer Quarterly has apparently been highly prized by our readers and by libraries and students. It would not have been possible without the support of a large number of distinguished and willing scholars, many of whom have become regular members of our reviewing staff through their constant readiness to perform this so valuable service. Especial thanks goes to them for the present offering which of necessity required many of them to readjust their busy schedules in order to get their copy in on time for inclusion in this issue. To you, *amici certi usque ad aras,* go thanks and affection by no means indicated by the mere listing of your several names. Dr. Abrams is assistant professor of sociology at Pennsylvania. Dr. Albright is professor of church history at the Evangelical School of Theology, Reading, Pa. Dr. Alley is

editor of the *Religious Herald.* Dr. Anderson is head of the department of history of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Dr. Aubrey, sometime president of Crozer, is head of the department of religious thought at Pennsylvania. Mr. Ayres is technical assistant to the executive vice-president of the Gulf Research & Development Company and author (with C. A. Scarlott) of the recent volume, *Energy Sources—The Wealth of the World.* Dr. Bean is associate professor of church history at Crozer. Dr. Beck is head of the department of Bible and religion at Syracuse. Dr. Brush is professor of church history at Andover Newton. Dr. Cranston is dean of the School of Religion of the University of Southern California. Dr. Crosby is professor *emeritus* of Greek at Pennsylvania. Dr. Dabney is dean of Andover Newton and professor of preaching. Dr. Davis is professor of theology at Crozer. Dr. Ebersole is a lecturer in sociology at George Washington University. Dr. Ferm is head of the department of philosophy at Wooster. Dr. Gaines is professor of romance languages at the University of Richmond. Dr. Gordon is professor of Assyriology and Egyptology at Dropsie College. Dr. Grant is professor of New Testament at Union Theological Seminary and editor of the *Anglican Theological Review.* Dr. Grey is the long-time minister of the First Congregational Church, Woburn, Mass. Dr. Harkness is professor *emeritus of* church history at Crozer. Dr. Helm is a professor of philosophy at Wake Forest. Dr. Herrick is president *emeritus* of Andover Newton. Dr. Igler is Baptist student pastor of the Christian Association of the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. John Langdon Jones is an instructor in the department of romance languages at Pennsylvania. Mr. Keighton is professor of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. Lowry is rector of the Episcopal Church at Chevy Chase, Md., and a former professor of theology at the theological seminary at Alexandria. Dr. Matthews is professor *emeritus* of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. McCracken is minister of the Riverside Church, New York City. Dr. McDanel is professor of American history at Richmond. Dr. Minear is professor of New Testament at Andover Newton. Mr. Morey is head of the Swarthmore (Pa.) School District. Dr. Morrow is dean of the college at the University of Pennsylvania. Dr. Orlinsky is a member of the faculty of the Jewish Institute of Religion and Hebrew Union College, New York City. Dr. Outler is professor of theology at the Perkins School of Theology, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. Dr. Parsons is professor *emeritus* of New Testament at Colgate-Rochester. Dr. Perry is professor of New Testament at Bangor Theological Seminary. Dr. Petry is professor of church history at Duke. Dr. Pritchard is professor of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Rasmussen is professor of systematic theology at the Lutheran Theological Seminary, Gettysburg. Dr. Richardson is minister of the University Baptist Church of Baltimore, Md. Dr. Roberts is professor of the philosophy of religion at Union Theological Seminary. Dr. Rose is minister of the First Baptist Church of Philadelphia. Dr. Schaeffer is secretary *emeritus* of the Board of National Missions of the Evangelical and Reformed Church. Mr. Scholefield is minister of the First Unitarian Church, Philadelphia. Mr. Smith is assistant professor of applied Christianity at Crozer. Dr. Speiser is professor of Semitics at Pennsylvania. Mr. Starr is librarian of Crozer and curator of the American Baptist Historical Society. Dr. Tappert is professor of church history at the Lutheran Theological Seminary, Philadelphia. Dr. Van Dusen is president and professor of systematic theology at Union Theological Seminary. Mr. Westphal is minister of the Lansdowne (Pa.) Baptist Church. Dr. Williams is associate professor of theology at Chicago Theological Seminary. Dr. Wright is Stone professor *emeritus* of philosophy at Dartmouth.

BOOK REVIEWS

Theology of the New Testament, by Rudolph Bultmann, translated by Kendrick Grobel, Vol. I, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. ix, 366, $3.50.

Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament* is not yet complete, but the parts which have already been published in Germany have won a widespread welcome on the part of New Testament scholars everywhere. The first installment (covered in the present volume) deals with (I) Presuppositions and motifs of New Testament Theology, *i.e.,* the message of Jesus, the kerygma of the earliest church, and the kerygma of the hellenistic church aside from Paul. Part II covers the theology of Paul, which is classified as follows: (a) Man prior to the revelation of faith, *viz.,* the anthropological concepts and the Pauline ideas of flesh, sin, and world and (b) Man under faith, *viz.,* the righteousness of God, grace, faith, and freedom. Part III, which has recently appeared in Germany but is not included in this volume, deals with the Johannine theology. Part IV, which will complete the work, will deal with the development toward the ancient church. Those of us who have been using Part III on the theology of John are deeply interested in the continuation of the work. Those who have not yet seen it will, on the basis of the volume before us, be most eager to obtain it.

The great and outstanding feature of Bultmann's New Testament theology is his complete acceptance of thoroughgoing historical and literary criticism. Too often books on the "theology" of the New Testament have been written by conservatives or "moderates" who hedged on matters of criticism and could not bring themselves to accept textual, philological, historical, or literary criticism. The result was often a blurred, one-sided and unsatisfactory account of the interrelationships of New Testament thought. Systematic theology barged in at various points and commanded the New Testament writers to stand up and recite the Nicene creed. Those of us who regularly recite the Nicene creed of course believe that it is true, but there is no reason why the first-century Christian writers should be required to affirm it. They lived too long before that creed was framed to make it possible for them to understand its language, let alone recite it. The situation makes us think of the sarcastic remark of the second-century Rabbi Ishmael (who drew up the thirteen rules of exegesis which are still found in the Jewish prayer book). He was criticizing an exposition by Eliezer ben Hyrcanus and said, "Truly, you say to scripture, 'Be silent while I expound'" (Sifrā on Leviticus, 13:49).

Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament* is "radical" in the best sense. It goes down to the root meanings of the New Testament terms and it follows through to the end the implication, as well as the methods, of thoroughgoing philological and historical criticism. Professor Bultmann never bats an eye when face to face with a difficulty of text or interpretation, and he never tries to "save appearances" by a few well-chosen words of edification. The result is that the theology of the New Testament—or its religious thought, in case one does not recognize a "theology" here—stands out in all its pristine glory and power. It was a body of theology inspired by a new and transforming religious experience almost too great to be put into words. It was a movement of thought so vital and contagious that its aftereffects have not died down, not even after nineteen centuries. Of course, it is not really a "theology," *i.e.,* a theological system, like Thomism or Calvinism; but it is a "theology" in the broad sense. If one can speak of a "theology of the Lake Poets" one certainly can

speak of the "theology" of the New Testament writers. Neither group was a company of theologians; nevertheless any group of intellectual, thoughtful men, deeply moved by religious faith, is bound to be more or less theological, and that is our justification for using the term, "theology of the New Testament."

If one is to point out limitations in Bultmann's interpretation it will be chiefly on two scores: (a) his orthodoxy is a little too much of the Barthian stripe. To many this will appear an advantage, not a handicap. To some of us, however, the whole Barthian approach to the New Testament seems hopelessly unhistorical, and even a slight strain of Barthianism is a disadvantage. (b) Dr. Bultmann is far more at home in Hellenism than in Judaism. The Jewish element in the New Testament does not appeal to him as strongly as the hellenistic element does. A further criticism which might be made is his assumption of an extra-Christian or non-Christian Gnosticism, which eventually—and at a very early date—infected the church. Of course, this is more or less a matter of names rather than of things: and certainly it was a type of thought widely spread throughout the hellenistic world which, without calling itself *gnosis,* maintained all the elements of what later was called Gnosticism, *viz.,* the fall of the soul, its imprisonment in the body, salvation by secret knowledge of the truth, etc. Bultmann is certainly right in assuming—as we all must—that Gnosticism was no intraecclesiastical product but swept into the church from outside.

Other points, however, which call not for criticism or a demurrer but for strong commendation are: (a) his insistence that the message of Jesus was "a presupposition for the theology of the New Testament rather than a part of that theology itself" (see p. 3); (b) the frank acceptance of eschatological views in interpreting Jesus' teaching; (c) the recognition of the place of form-history in the study of the tradition of Jesus' teaching—this is the first thing we would expect of Bultmann; (d) the realization that the question of Jesus' "messianic consciousness" is simply not solved, and perhaps never can be solved; (e) the recognition of the church as the eschatological congregation; (f) the recognition of a strong gentile Christian movement prior to Paul and quite apart from his missionary activity; (g) Paul's indebtedness to a non-Palestinian hellenistic type of Judaism; (h) the sacraments as found in this earliest type of gentile Christianity as well as the activities of the Spirit; and (i) the prevalence of Gnostic motifs. To my mind, valuable as Part II is, dealing with St. Paul, far and away the most important part of this work is the 180 pages on the presuppositions and motifs. This is the part of the book that theologians, ministers, teachers, and students should read and reread and ponder. There has been nothing like this since Book I of Johannes Weiss's *History of Primitive Christianity,* dealing with pre-Pauline Christianity.

A word of gratitude should be added, both to the translator for his part in producing the book—the translation is both readable and accurate—and to the publishers who must have invested a good deal of money in this volume since it contains a fair amount of hand composition. I trust that both will be suitably rewarded, for I believe that the book will still be in use fifty years from now—and maybe longer.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

John the Baptist, by Carl H. Kraeling, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. xii, 218, $2.50.

Any work from the pen of Dr. Kraeling is worthy of careful consideration by Christian scholars especially those interested in the biblical field. This volume offers no exception to that attitude. It contains the Haskell Lectures delivered in 1946 at the Oberlin Graduate School of Theology, and they are published "substantially as delivered."

The lecturer has felt during his years of teaching the need for a concise statement in English of the findings of modern scholarship regarding John the Baptist as a person, a preacher, and a religious leader. While such discussions existed in French and German, those in the English language left much to be desired. They were generally influenced by their theological climate and in nearly all cases have their value damaged thereby. As for American scholarship, the discussions have been essays dealing with single phases of the Baptizer's activity and influence, and no comprehensive presentation has appeared. To these suggestions of the author no important objection can be made. Consequently there will be gratitude that he has taken away this reproach. This reviewer, however, cannot forget the excellent preliminary work done on the subject by the late Professor Clayton R. Bowen who had long planned a comprehensive discussion of John the Baptist and who published partial results. His untimely death prevented the completion of the project. The regret felt by many of Dr. Bowen's colleagues in the field increases the sense of obligation to the author of this volume.

Within the framework of six lectures entitled: John the Baptist and the Wilderness; John's Preaching, the Proclamation; John's Preaching, the Exhortation; John's Rite of Baptism; John the Baptist and Jesus; The Later History of the Baptist Movement; Professor Kraeling subjects the material concerning John the Baptist to a rigorous examination. The principal conclusions follow. John was of priestly descent, and the natural and appropriate procedure would have been for him to follow his father's footsteps. He did not, and our author presents the hypothesis that John's choice of the wilderness may be due to a strong revulsion against the worldliness, pride, and selfishness of the privileged Jerusalem priesthood. But the wilderness itself had profound influence on John and his inner life, and moving religious experiences there had much to do with his becoming "a bright and shining light."

His proclamation was fundamentally that of the imminence of judgment, sometimes directed specially against the recreant religious leaders at Jerusalem. It is questionable whether his message contained any messianic reference or prediction, but if it did, it was of the transcendental type and did not concern itself with any human person. On the hortatory side the message was a challenge to repentance, to a change of spiritual and ethical attitude, a message with hope and denunciation mingled, a call to a life of vital piety, symbolized in baptism and marked by sincere prayer and by fasting. John called for a supreme national effort in view of the imminent judgment. It is small wonder that the people hailed him as a prophet.

That baptism was an outstanding feature of his movement is seen from the title placed upon him: "The Baptizer." The baptism "by spirit and by fire" is carefully considered and is connected with a phase of thought regarding judgment in Persian, Jewish, and Christian eschatologies. It symbolizes the punitive and destructive aspects of the final judgment. John's baptism was a dramatization of this in which the individual "symbolizes his voluntary submission to the final divine judgment." It was therefore fundamentally eschatological. It was probably not sacramental; yet it was associated with the "forgiveness of sins." On its personal side it was "an act of self-humiliation before God" symbolizing a voluntary expression of true repentance which brought in its train divine forgiveness.

As to the relationship of John and Jesus the lecturer says that Jesus was attracted to John and his message, for he himself was convinced of the imminence of judgment. Jesus submitted to baptism as a symbol of his expectation of that imminent judgment. The break between John and Jesus stems from the realization by Jesus that the kingdom was not only imminent but was in a very real sense actually present. God's saving will is already in action.

The story of the later history of the Baptist movement is well done. There is an interesting and brilliant suggestion that a large part of John's movement merged itself with that of the followers of Jesus after the rise of the resurrection faith. This is given as a partial explanation of the almost incredibly large numerical increases of the Nazarene's disciples recorded in the early chapters of the Acts of the Apostles. Only a hardened core of the Johannine movement perpetuated it.

While this statement of conclusions may have exceeded the ordinary limits of a review it by no means conveys an adequate impression of the careful and judicial thought of the book. To gain that it should be read and read carefully. Subsequent thinking about both John and Jesus must take it into serious consideration. There is such close and candid examination of the scanty and difficult evidence that no review can do it justice.

But anyone who has worked on the problem and considered the evidence knows full well that many of the conclusions must remain in the conjectural stage, no matter how brilliant they may be. Many of the suggested reconstructions must remain hypothetical no matter how appealingly they are presented. The author would be one of the first to admit this. But he has, on the whole, presented his arguments so well that a reader finds strong inclination to follow. Because of the quality of the evidence, especially its adaptation to later situations and interests, it is difficult if not impossible to present a discussion of the problem in which varying degrees of probability are not manifest. Inevitably there will be details and partial conclusions which will invite question. Only a few such can be mentioned within our limits. This reviewer thinks that the "realized eschatology" attributed to Jesus by the author is made to carry too heavy a burden. There are other statements and other attitudes just as legitimately attributed to Jesus as those which the author uses which point in a different eschatological direction. The discussion on baptism by spirit and fire, while brilliantly done, seems not to do adequate justice to the matter of spirit baptism in the early days of Christianity. These however are details.

There is an unobtrusive, constant, and excellent use of "life situations" and of general historical background in matters of close interpretation of evidence. The treatment of Eisler's Slavonic Josephus and of the Mandean documents, both of which caused flurries some years ago, is very good and leaves little to be desired.

This reviewer laid down the book with a sense of admiration of the scholarly balance and richness of the lectures and with a feeling of satisfaction that there now exists in the English language a discussion of the problems involved that merits the term "adequate." The notes, which are gathered in the back of the volume, are especially valuable for those who wish to pursue further investigation.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

The Joy of Study, edited by Sherman E. Johnson, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. xii, 163, $2.75.

This is a *Festschrift* for Frederick Clifton Grant on his sixtieth birthday. It consists of a foreword by the editor, thirteen essays mostly on New Testament subjects written by former students, colleagues, and friends, and a list of Dr. Grant's publications. This amazing list contains 187 items but does not include his many book reviews published in eighteen different journals. Dr. Grant deserves any scholarly honor brought to him. His books on the New Testament are rich in content and balanced in judgment. He writes articles not only for scholars but also for practical and devotional needs of the church and for its lay teachers. He can turn his gifts to a Christmas ballad, to ecumenical concerns, to biography, to translations especially

from Greek and German, to church history, to theology and, to hymns and sermons. These facts can be quickly gleaned from his list of writings. Dean Johnson writes admiringly of his varied capacities as rector, dean, professor, editor, churchman, and scholar.

For "The Parable of the Guests at the Banquet" F. E. Beare sketches competently and compactly the history of its interpretation. Both Luke and Matthew partly allegorized the parable, and its progressive allegorization is illustrated from the Church Fathers. The Middle Ages largely repeated earlier expositors. The Reformation is marked by Calvin's return to the plain sense of Scripture. A new phase began with Jülicher and another aspect begins with form criticism.

B. H. Throckmorton discusses the tangled topic of "The Teachings of Jesus and Pacifism." Thus is a timely and important essay. The pacifist errs when he insists that resistance is always wrong and the nonpacifist when he insists resistance is the clear duty. "There is only one law in the gospel—the law of love—and no other law is always binding" (p. 25).

John Knox contributes "A Note on Mark 14:51-52," which records a young man's escape when Jesus was seized. After questioning the story as an interpolation or from Mark himself or from Old Testament prophecy, Knox suggests, somewhat fancifully, that the story is an anticipation of the empty tomb since Mark originally intended to end his story at 16:8.

H. H. Graham writes about "Community in the Synoptic Gospels." In these days of communistic ideas this is a most useful survey of the earliest Christian community. In Israel there was the community of family or of covenant, symbolized by some common token like a meal. Judaism knew well the fellowship of rabbi and students. The Synoptics present three main ideas of community: 1. of Jesus and disciples; 2. of the brotherhood; 3. of the kingdom of God.

In "Overconversion in the Pauline Churches" H. J. Cadbury analyzes interestingly some of the problems faced by Paul as he directed his criticisms to Christian converts who had overdone his teachings. These excesses, whether about the parousia, the law, idolatry, or resurrection, were carried out in spite of him but under his influence. But in modern times "the simple gospel is rarely taken in overdose" (p. 50).

R. M. Grant in "The Wisdom of the Corinthians" shares honor with his father. He points out that the ideal of the wise man had permeated the self-esteem of the Corinthians. Certain Christians thought they were wise, and Grant correlates their thought with Stoic ideals and then illustrates Paul's attacks on the wise Corinthians as he preached Christ crucified. Among the Jews the ideal wise man was exemplified by the Essenes. Grant suggests that the learned Apollos permitted the Corinthians to interpret their religion as a form of popular philosophy which Paul had to modify.

After study of two excellent recent commentaries by Selwyn and by Beare on "Saint Peter's Epistle," Philip Carrington supports Selwyn in his argument for Petrine authorship. The good Greek of I Peter is the composition of Silvanus. There is no dependence on Paul. Lack of evidence of persecution of Christians in Pontus provides no help in dating the epistle. Its idiom could be as well explained by hellenistic Judaism as by the mystery religions. Evidence is lacking among Christians and Jews for fictitious authorship of letters with the supposed author living or recently dead. After the evidence is cited, the personal judgment of Carrington opposes the personal judgment of Beare, both worthy scholars.

On the basis of a visit to Palestine Sidney Temple points out pertinent parallels between local conditions and seventeen selected references to "Geography and Climate

in the Fourth Gospel." This readable descriptive comparative study tends to establish confidence in the complete knowledge of the conditions shown by the author of the Fourth Gospel.

In a penetrating, heavily footnoted study of "Soma Christou," C. T. Craig shows that the weighty theological term, "the body of Christ," carries three different meanings: 1. the physical organism of Jesus; 2. the bread of the Lord's Supper; 3. the church. Only Paul thinks of the church as the body of Christ. The bulk of Craig's discriminating essay deals with this third meaning. Recent study establishes Paul's thought as Hebraic not Hellenic in anthropology. "In the main Paul looked upon the body as the person" (p. 75). (The Scripture reference should read Rom. 6:12, not Rom. 7:12.) Craig traces the idea of the church as Christ's body through Paul's letters and ends with some decisive theological observations about the evidence.

For ministers M. S. Enslin's open letter to preachers on "Preaching from the New Testament" is alone worth the price of this book. This article is a maverick unbranded by the usual learned devices that sometimes deter busy clergymen from reading. It is a sparkling appeal for ministerial scholarship adequate to present the New Testament in a way worthy of its origin and treasures so that people will know and love it. It is a lively example of that which it advocates. No man starting to read it will fail to finish it. Following its counsel a preacher will be a workman who needs not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth.

A. H. Forster studies "Miracles and Adamnan's Life of St. Columba." Adamnan, in accord with his age (sixth century), was interested not in biography but in prophecies, miracles, and visions. After a brief review of St. Columba, Forster turns to the saint's miracles. After these wonders are explained as due to natural causes, exaggerations, inventions, or poetry turned into actual incidents, there still remain some cures by suggestion and some "second sight" experiences which indicate supernormal faculties of mind possessed by the saint.

The longest essays are the two which close the book. Arthur Jeffery writes on "The Descent of Jesus in Muhammedan Eschatology," a field in which this reviewer can give no judgment. This essay with its ample citations and documentations shows how the Second Advent assumes an important place in Muslim teachings about the Last Things. It is usually accepted in later Islam that Mohammed taught the Second Coming of Jesus. Familiar figures like the beast and antichrist pass through the pages in which Islam expressed its need for a coming redeemer who is Jesus adapted to Islamic faith.

With a happy turn of thought A. D. Nock discusses two ancient expressions of gratitude, "Soter and Euergetes," as a token of his appreciation of Professor Grant. Nock searches diligently and exhaustively through the wide ranges of classical literature and modern scholarship to discover all meanings for *soter* (savior, deliverer) and *euergetes* (benefactor). The later term appears but once in the New Testament (Luke 22:25) while the former is found mostly in late writings like the Pastorals. *Soter* could be used of gods or men. "We have to ask this question each time: who is the deliverer and from what did he give deliverence?" (p. 127). "Soter had a wide range of meaning and emphasis in paganism" (p. 129), denoting always a function, not class membership in the hierarchy of beings. Less dramatic than *soter* but often used with it, *euergetes* has its roots in the human area and indicates gratitude for benefactions. Applied to men, emperors, and gods, *soter* came also to be used as a title for Christ and even as a personal name among Christians. "Soter and euergetes were politically neither provocative nor invidious" (p. 147). To Nock's voluminous footnotes may be added B. S. Easton's word study of *soter* in *The Pastoral Epistles* (Scribner, 1947), pp. 229-232.

DWIGHT MARION BECK

The Travail of Religious Liberty, by Roland H. Bainton, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. ix, 272, $4.

Seeking the answer to the quest for and proper nurture of religious liberty, Roland Bainton turns to the religious leaders—persecutors and persecuted—of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The result is this three-part historical narrative and analysis, in inimitable Baintonian style including his own drawing of quaint contemporary wood-cuts, of Catholic and Protestant persecution, the toleration controversy, and the freedom of the individual.

In a review of this compass it must suffice simply to say that the first part is given to the vivid portrayal of the peak of Roman Catholic persecution under Thomas of Torquemada, the peak of Protestant intolerance under John Calvin, and the high point of persecution in Michael Servetus. The second section shows how this intolerance bred the toleration controversies supported by Sebastian Castellio, who counted the breaking of one's conscience worse than taking his life; David Joris, who supported tolerance with mysticism; and Bernardino Ochino, who in the quest for liberty sought support in the cultivation of the inner life and in the happy though modest resolution of the problem of man's freedom in his *Labyrinth,* where he maintained that man should act as though he were free, but when able to do good should always give God the glory as though he were necessitated. The third section deals with the development of the freedom of the individual in the seventeenth century in John Milton, who sought the way to truth through free discussion; in Roger Williams, who found an open door of liberty in America; and in John Locke, who saw that conscience cannot be regarded by the state as an absolute, and whose very dependence on technology to enhance the comforts of this life has now brought all humanity face to face with the possibility of extinction.

While the casual reader will find these nine biographical studies completely fascinating, most scholars will find Bainton's constantly growing edge in his introductory chapter and his comparatively brief but extremely pertinent concluding "Reflections" the most significant. Here he wrestles with the contemporary problem of liberty in religious and other forms. He sees correctly that persecution has not been the tool of atheists alone, for some of the worst persecutions have been perpetrated by leaders of the Christian churches. He holds that persecutors have three prerequisites: 1. a belief that they are right; 2. that the issue is important; and 3. that coercion will be effective. He points to the sharp distinction between the Catholic and Protestant bases for intolerance; the former was based on canon law while the latter claimed a somewhat tenuous biblical support. Actually Protestants have had great difficulty in finding any indigenous ground to support opposition to human freedom even though Calvin revived the curious mediæval concept that the enormity of the offense depends upon the person against whom it is committed and so justified the burning of Servetus, whose antitrinitarianism was a sin against God himself. Bainton's pages 17 to 30 are an excellent supplement to James Hastings Nichols' recent thesis in his *Democracy and the Churches.*

While Bainton writes of "the ability of truth to shift for itself and in the long run to command assent," he also realizes that even though democracy is the form most conducive to tolerance "democracy of itself is no guarantee of liberty." In his concluding "Reflections" the author is scholar turned prophet as he pleads for acceleration in our social changes since we cannot wait now for three centuries to elapse as did our fathers who waited until the nineteenth century to bring to reality the fine teachings on religious liberty of the sixteenth. He warns against a comfortable relativity in religion and points out the serious problem about the certitude

of truth in the field of religion. While one might challenge the author for elaboration of his distinction between faith and reason (p. 255), we must agree that he clearly sets out for the first time in this long struggle for toleration and freedom a proper distinction between "knowledge sufficient for private consolation and knowledge adequate for public legislation."

This course leads directly to the support of Castellio's contention for the superiority of conscience, when Bainton writes: "Nothing is more precious than conscience, and no quality is more integral to the sound life of the body politic." Sensing all the problems of our world order, even the fact that all sides do not abide by the same rules of struggle, Bainton makes bold to suggest guiding principles for those who must use restraint: constraint should never break down integrity but only prevent overt inimical acts; no continuing penalty after the peril is past; no deprivation of citizenship, since he who refuses to serve the state in time of war may prove a most devoted public servant in time of peace; a constant cultivation of humility, since acts that one generation deems subversive often come to be regarded as innocuous by the next; states should exhaust all other possibilities before employing prison and concentration camp; "one word may be extricated from the long travail of liberty in the past and made a watchword for the present, and that word is 'reasonableness.'" He concludes with a plea for a philosophy which honors integrity, respects the dignity of man and the compassion of God. RAYMOND W. ALBRIGHT

The Structure of the Divine Society, by Frederick W. Dillistone, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. 263, $4.

Certainly in the first main stages of the modern ecumenical movement, the Anglicans were foremost in vision, zeal, and leadership. But, as the ecumenical hope has gained more actual substance, and we have come to the point where questions of polity and ecclesiology are central and urgent, it often appears that some of the Anglicans (the so-called "Anglo-Catholics"), together with some of their orthodox brethren, are going to be the most intransigeant of all. At Edinburgh, it was discovered that there was already a remarkable area of theological agreement. But at Amsterdam, despite a general and unwavering resolution to hold together, it was plain that in respect of the doctrine of *the church and the ministry,* the divergences were deep and wide. Since Amsterdam, the impasse has become more explicit and the difficulties increasingly acute.

For a veteran "ecu-maniac," therefore, it is a momentous and joyful event to discover a good book by an established Anglican scholar which treats this whole problem from a fresh angle and which just might possibly point the way beyond the present deadlock. At the very least, we have important evidence in Dillistone that the issues are viable and not already concluded and this, in itself, gives promise. At the very most, if there were will and wit to implement Dillistone's main proposal, the whole ecumenical enterprise might find a strong forward impetus toward even higher ground.

He begins by making a prime distinction between two basic conceptions of the church which he calls, respectively, the *organic* and the *covenantal.* This distinction corresponds, somewhat loosely, to the distinction which Amsterdam made between the notions of the "given" and the "gathered" church. But Dillistone goes significantly beyond Amsterdam in his demonstration that neither of these notions is complete or final; that the tension between them is, or may be, more fruitful than either out of dialectical relation with the other. He traces the history of both ideas and shows the predominance of the organic concept in the mediæval church (with

its stress on the living magistracy of the hierarchy) and the predominance of the covenant concept in the Reformation (with its emphasis upon the compact-relation between God and all his faithful children). There is an excellent chapter on the final flowering of the covenant idea in seventeenth-century Puritan ecclesiology, both in Great Britain and America.

Against this historical background, Dillistone evaluates the six "types of community" which he has seen in the course of Christian history: monastic, imperial, organic, covenantal, contractual, and sectarian. Rather more readily than our Roman, Congregational, and Baptist friends would accept, he rejects the first two and the last two as radically defective and then tackles his main problem: how to marry the organic and the covenantal notions without sacrificing the former's concern for *order* and the latter's concern for *creativity*. The concrete analogy which furnishes him his confidence that this is possible is the good family in which "the organic and covenantal principles . . . are held together in a creative relationship" (p. 221). He recognizes the powerful intransigeance of the Anglo-Catholic "school of thought" but appears to believe it possible that this group may "abandon its rigid philosophy of organism and be willing to bring into the *ecumenical* church its emphasis upon structures and continuities in worship and in life, which is so valuable a feature of its outlook" (p. 243). "If a truly united Church is to come into being, it must give full place to both the organic and the covenantal principles" (p. 243). He then gently reproves the hard-shelled Anglicans who "can only conceive of union through absorption—a union which would swallow up forever the dynamic and creative dialectic of the Church's life'" (p. 244). He rejects the hard-shelled Presbyterians who "can conceive of union only in terms of complete assent to the given standard—a union which involves a rigid uniformity and would allow for none of the variety-in-unity which constitutes the glory of God's creation" (*idem*). He recommends, as the right strategy for the current situation, regional or territorial mergers (pp. 233 ff.). He gives positive (though not unqualified) approval to the South India scheme and he appears to regard some form of union between the Church of England and the Church of Scotland and between the American Episcopalians and Presbyterians as live and desirable possibilities (pp. 240-245). He has no present sanguine hope of including Methodists, Congregationalists, and Baptists, but there might turn out to be room for them, too, if they came to make more of the covenantal principle. His ecumenical ideal is "a living organism which is flexible enough to include vigorous covenanted fellowships within its integrated life: a federated community which is diversified enough to include growing organic societies within its constitutional covenant" (pp. 245-246).

It is, of course, unlikely that many readers will agree with all the details of this thesis and its argument. But this is not a book to quibble about. Its main proposal is readily grasped as a whole and can be, and ought to be, judged on its merits even if, here and there, one feels the impulse to scribble queries and demurrers in the margins. This is a good book with a big idea, and this idea ought to be pondered and appraised by all whose consciences are pricked by the present disunity of Christendom. For those who approve our fragmented Christian community, obviously the case is quite different.

But who will hear this man and who will do anything about his idea? Will his fellow-Anglicans, who are accustomed to containing their prophets? Will the Presbyterians, to whom he holds a gracious olive branch, but who have already been jilted once? Will the Methodists who, conscious of their strength, feel able to go it alone if provoked? Or the Baptists, who *prefer* to go it alone? Is this the kind of utopian notion that broad-gauged men do not condemn but merely leave to die of

admiration. Is the ecumenical movement going to achieve a high level of consent in theology and ethics and then fall into tragic desuetude because of this quarrel about the church and *the ministry* (for *there* is the epicentre of the strife!)?

Who can say? This reviewer cannot. But it is clear to him that if there were more Anglicans of Dillistone's mind and temper, the prospects for ecumenical progress in the next decade would be much brighter and the forthcoming Third World Conference on Faith and Order might be able to achieve a marked advance beyond Amsterdam. At any rate, here is a book which makes a claim to decision about a vital question in our time—and therefore which stands out from the general run and must be reckoned with.

ALBERT C. OUTLER

Aristeas to Philocrates, edited and translated by Moses Hadas, New York, Harper (for Dropsie College), 1951, pp. vii, 233, $4.

In common with so many other documents of antiquity (*e.g.,* the various parts of the Hebrew Bible, the early Greek and Roman sources), and for essentially the same historical reasons, the so-called "Letter of Aristeas to Philocrates" also went through a very long period of unqualified acceptance, which was then followed by a period of increasing scholarly incredulity (beginning with Hody's masterly *exposé* in his analysis *De bibliorum textibus originalibus* in 1705). Nowadays, on the other hand, the "Letter," once again in common with other ancient documents and for the same reasons, has come to regain a considerable portion of its prestige and authority. Newly uncovered archæological and epigraphic data, together with a less skeptical and even cynical attitude on the part of the investigators, have combined to make this significant change possible.

After a brief "Summary of Contents" (pp. 1-2) and a discussion of the "Purported authorship and date" and the "Objections" to them (pp. 3-9), the erudite editor deals with the internal and external evidence for dating the "Letter" (pp. 9-54). His independent analysis of the political, topographical, exegetical, linguistic, and other materials bearing on this not unimportant matter, leads Hadas to 130 BCE as a hypothetical date: "None of the external evidence here cited provides anything like conclusive proof of dating, but their cumulative tendency definitely points in the direction of a Ptolemaic and perhaps even an early Ptolemaic period . . . . such a date seems least liable to objection." Quite meritorious are the editor's lucid and illuminating discussions of "Aristeas as a Greek Book" and "Aristeas on Judaism and the Jews" (pp. 54-66). Chapters on "Aristeas on the Septuagint" (pp. 66-73), "The Septuagint Legend after Aristeas" (pp. 73-84), and "Modern Study of Aristeas: Bibliography" (pp. 84-90) complete the up-to-date and useful introduction. The bulk of the volume is naturally taken up by the Greek text (Thackeray's revised text; see p. 90), accompanied by a fresh, readable, and authoritative translation into English, and a commentary of critical notes where the translation deserves elucidation (pp. 92-227). An index brings the volume to a close.

Perhaps because he is primarily a classicist, Hadas' approach to the subject enabled him to see the document in much better perspective than is generally possible for the professional Semitist. Hadas is to be lauded for his fine perception of the document as a discourse not on the origin and authority of the Septuagint but "obviously in the tradition of 'apologetic' Alexandrian Jewish writings whose general aim was to demonstrate the high antiquity and respectability of Judaism, for the purpose of strengthening the self-esteem of the Jews themselves and perhaps heightening their esteem in the eyes of their dominant environment" (p. 60). The simple fact is that this basic element in the document, and even its *raison d'être,* was utterly ignored

by learned Christians in antiquity (and by the Jews themselves when they gave up, after the destruction of their commonwealth in A.D. 70, such other Greek works of Jewish origin as the Septuagint, Philo, Josephus, and the Apocryphal literature), and the relatively unimportant Septuagint element was emphasized by them because the Greek text had replaced the Hebrew text as the Christian Bible. Josephus, the earliest witness to our document, called it simply "The Book of Aristeas"; but Eusebius called it "The Translation of the Law of the Jews," and the Church Fathers used the document essentially *causa* Septuagint. The Christian world was naturally not interested in those parts of Aristeas' composition which glorified Judaism and the Jews.

Following in the footsteps of the early Christians, modern scholars generally failed to understand the nature and purpose of the document, and devoted much of their research on it to conclude that the author was "a clumsy cheat" and guilty of "Jewish propaganda under a heathen mask." It is nothing of the kind. The document was never intended to be a history of the origin of the Septuagint or a history of Palestinian-Egyptian political and cultural relations in the days of Ptolemy Philadelphus II. This is clear enough from the simple fact that the author was aware that everyone knew that the kingdom of Israel had been destroyed four and a half centuries before this Ptolemy could have authorized six elders from each of the twelve tribes of Israel, seventy-two in all, to make the Greek translation of the Torah. Hadas is right in his contention that "Aristeas is not claiming to write history."

The reviewer would agree heartily with Hadas' rejection of a late date for the document; but he wonders whether even 130 B.C. is not too late a date for its composition. There are several facts which would point to a date earlier in the second century B.C., certainly before *ca.* 170.

1. Bearing in mind his eagerness to point up both the intrinsic worthwhileness of Judaism and the beneficent interest and goodwill which the Egyptian royal house displayed towards the Jews and Judaism, it is difficult to understand why Aristeas did not make mention of the fact that a temple of the God of the Jews had been built in Leontopolis. It seems reasonable to believe that anyone who wrote after the erection of this temple (*ca.* 160 B.C.) and the introduction of the Jerusalem temple's system of sacrifices could hardly have failed to indicate in some way his knowledge of this fact.

2. Any glorification of the good relations between Egypt and Judea after about 170 B.C. would scarcely leave unmentioned, if only by implication or even unintentionally, the extremely important struggle of the Jews against Egypt's major enemy, Seleucid Syria. The Jewish war of liberation under the Maccabees, coming as it did against Egypt's most important rival for the hegemony of the Western Asiatic remains of Alexander's empire, could scarcely have escaped some reference or inference in Aristeas' document—unless Aristeas composed this document prior to the Maccabean struggle against Antiochus IV Epiphanes.

3. It may be that Hadas is justified in regarding much of the form and content of the document as "romantic" in the hellenistic sense, so that Eleazar the high priest is in reality only "an idealized ruler" (p. 50). And yet it is precisely after the Hasmoneans came to power in Judea that the internal struggle between the high priest and the secular king flared up bitterly, and continued to burn fiercely thereafter until the high priests became essentially mere puppets in the hands of the ruling groups in Judea. If Aristeas wrote so "romantically" about the temple and the high priest, without indicating, no matter how indirectly, anything of this bitter

and important struggle, it may well be that he was writing in the pre-Maccabean period.

4. The temple, the priesthood, the paraphernalia, etc., were indeed close to the heart of Aristeas. There is, *e.g.*, the detailed description of the golden table and flagons, and the large mixing bowls of silver and gold which the king offered to the temple in Jerusalem (§§51-82). It is true that Aristeas introduces this major division as follows: "I shall now give a detailed description of the works of art, as I promised. They were wrought with extraordinary artistry. . . ." Furthermore, it is "the king (who) made (these) generous grants and supervised the craftsmen at every step. . . ." Yet the fact remains that it is the temple paraphernalia which are really in Aristeas' mind, and the works of art which are the gifts of the king are really, where they are not actually the biblical material in Exod. 25–31 and 35–40, only variations on the biblical theme. The same is true of much of the description of the temple complex and procedure (*e.g.*, the doorway, curtain, altar, water supply, sacrificial ministrations of the priests, the high priest's vestments) in §§83-104.

Julius Popper observed long ago (*Der biblische Bericht über die Stifthütte* [Leipzig, 1862], pp. 172-177) that the Septuagint translation of Exod. 35–40 is younger than that of chaps. 25–31 (the Hebrew text of 35–40 being later than that of 25–31; cf. my discussion of *skēnē* in 35–40 as against *aulē* in 25–31, in "*Ḥāṣēr* in the Old Testament," *JAOS*, 59 [1939], pp. 35-36 and n. 42). Chaps. 25–31 constitute God's instructions (*via* Moses) on the matters which pertained to the tabernacle, its architecture, paraphernalia, services, vestments, and the like. In chaps. 35–40, "In the main, the narrative is repeated *verbatim* from the instructions in c. 25–31, with the simple substitution of past tenses for future . . ." (S. R. Driver, *Introduction to the Literature of the O.T.*, ed. 1913, pp. 40-41). Thus Aristeas uses *epoiēsan* (= Hebrew *way-yaʿᵃsū*) as in the Septuagint of Exod. 35–40.

What I am driving at here is that there may be a point of contact, in time as well as in interest, between the (priestly?) circles which produced the Hebrew and Greek texts of Exod. 35–40 and the author of Aristeas §§51-82.

5. Albright (*From the Stone Age to Christianity*, p. 336, n. 18) has observed "that the list of Jewish names given by Pseudo-Aristeas [§§47-50] in connection with the translation of the Septuagint contains authentic personal names of the third century. . . ."

6. Père L. H. Vincent, in a detailed discussion of the topography of "Jerusalem d'après la Lettre d'Aristée" (*Revue biblique*, 5 [1908], 520-532; 6 [1909], 355-375), arrived at the conclusion that our document was composed during the third century B.C. It is true that those who argue for a later date either ignore this material or else get around it by asserting "that Pseudo-Aristeas employed older materials" (Albright, *loc. cit.*; Hadas, pp. 13-14). However, it does not seem likely that Aristeas had readily available such descriptions of Jerusalem and the temple complex, and no such earlier materials have been identified.

7. Zeitlin's opinion (*apud* Hadas, p. 138, on §97): "it seems likely that the whole story from 83 is a later addition . . . written after the destruction of the Temple," on the ground that Aristeas wrote that "upon his breast he [*viz.*, the high priest] wears what is called the 'oracle,'" whereas in reality (continues Zeitlin) "During the Second Commonwealth the High Priest did not wear a *hoshen* oracle . . . as it had been abolished by the Pharisees." Zeitlin's objection to the correctness of Aristeas' statement is met fairly if we assume an early date (say of about 200 B.C.) for the composition of the document, in pre-Pharisaic times.

8. There are other factors which point to an early date. Thus it is Hadas' conviction that "In the light of the Zenon papyri there is nothing so fanciful in the relations between Palestine and Egypt as depicted in Aristeas as to impel us to assume that the book was written at a long interval after its fictive date. . . . Either, then, the date of Aristeas is to be pushed backward, or the author had sound traditions of the period to which he attributes his story." Again, it is tempting to follow other scholars (for the references to Schürer, Motzo, and Tramontano, see Hadas, pp. 26-27), in the belief that the Jewish philosopher Aristobulus (perhaps about 180-150 B.C.) cited from and thus demonstrates an earlier date for Aristeas' document. However, it seems safest to agree with our editor (p. 27) that "Aristobulus is . . . of no great help in fixing a date for Aristeas."

This review is far too long already. I shall limit myself in closing to a few small matters. There seems to be some unclear thinking in the matter of the "seventy-two" elders who are said to have made the Greek translation, and the title "Seventy" (Septuaginta) which this translation acquired. Thus Tarn (*cf.* Hadas, p. 42; *cf.* also Hadas' comment on §32, p. 111) speaks "of the seventy sages we should expect from the title of Septuagint and from the number of Moses' elders (Ex. 24.1, 9)"—as though Aristeas himself ever used the Greek term for "seventy" for the translation (*hermēneia* is what he calls it, made by *hermēneis*), and as if Aristeas was duty-bound to use Moses' "seventy" elders as his prototype! Hadas suggests that Aristeas utilized an earlier tradition about the Greek translation, a tradition which knew "perhaps seventy rather than seventy-two" translators (p. 70), and that Aristeas simply "chose the multiple of twelve nearest to seventy" (p. 39); but, again, why should anyone nowadays expect in the first place that Aristeas select seventy-two instead of seventy, and then be compelled to go looking for an explanation in an alleged earlier tradition about which nothing is known? What is really involved here is merely the problem of how the term "Seventy" sometimes came to be used in place of "Seventy-two" as the title of the translation. Many scholars believe that the translation made by the seventy-two elders came to be called the "Seventy" because the latter is a round number of the former. However, I have pointed out elsewhere (*Biblical Archæologist,* 9 [May 1946], p. 23, n.3), "I have been unable to discover other instances, either in Hellenistic-Roman or Jewish circles, where such a number as seventy-two was shortened simply because of oral convenience." The simple fact appears clear (*cf.* Hadas, pp. 71-72) that "Seventy" sometimes replaced "Seventy-two" as a title for our translation because the former number was frequently associated with authoritative bodies, such as the aforementioned elders in Exod. 24:1, 9, or the seventy disciples in Luke 10:1 (where some manuscripts read seventy-two). As for Aristeas' seventy-two, Février (see Hadas, pp. 38-40) may well be right in seeing much of Ezra-Nehemiah behind various aspects of Aristeas, including the number twelve. And it is now of further interest here that in Bulletin II (Louis M. Rabinowitz Fund for the Exploration of Ancient Synagogues, Jerusalem, June 1951) E. L. Sukenik has discovered in the ancient synagogue at Yafe, near Nazareth (pp. 18-23) a mosaic from about A.D. 300 with the symbols of the twelve tribes, "the first time such motifs have been discovered in the decoration of ancient Jewish synagogues in Palestine."

In his understandable desire to find hellenistic parallels to Aristeas, Hadas comments on the text in §308 (p. 221; *cf.* p. 52), "the community of Jews at the place where the translation was executed, and read it out to the entire gathering . . .": "Such a public manifestation is a virtual fixture in the Greek romances." But one need not go to Greek sources for a pertinent parallel; as I have pointed out elsewhere (*Biblical Archæologist,* 9 [May 1946], p. 23, n.2), "This was the

traditional Jewish procedure in announcing an official and authoritative document, or in renewing its authority. So, for example, Moses and the Law (Exod. 24:1, 7), Joshua and the Law (Josh. 8:34-5), Josiah and the Law (2 Kgs. 22:10, 23:1-2), Ezra and the Law (Neh. 8). The same procedure is evident, for example, in Jer. 36; 51:60-64." The reading of the Law is represented in one of the Dura Europos Synagogue frescoes (see E. L. Sukenik, *The Synagogue of Dura Europos and its Frescoes* [in Hebrew], Jerusalem, 1947, plate facing p. 41).

Our editor has allowed himself to be misled by Kahle's determination to discover several independent Greek translations prior to the Septuagint. Thus, after correctly observing that the Septuagint was not a major factor in the document (*cf.* E. J. Bickerman, "Some Notes on the Transmission of the Septuagint" [*Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume,* English Section (New York, 1950)], p. 156, n. 25, ". . . above all, Ps. Aristeas' work was not written as propaganda for the LXX. He rather used the historical event of the translation as the starting point of a tale intended to glorify Jerusalem . . ."), Hadas turns right around and accepts the theory "that what is here (§311) dealt with is a *revision* of the original translation, to which official sanction is here given. In this view the present passage is central to the whole book." In §30, too, Kahle would find evidence of a Greek translation earlier than the Septuagint, by rendering the word *sesēmantai* by "(The books of the Law of the Jews . . . are written in Hebrew characters and in the Hebrew tongue, and) they have been translated (somewhat carelessly and not adequately . . .)" (*cf.* Hadas, commentary on §30, p. 110); on the other hand, Herzog (*apud* F. X. Wutz, *Die Transkriptionen von der Septuaginta bis zu Hieronymus,* Part I [1925], pp. 128 ff.) stated that already the Letter of Aristeas provided support for Wutz's Greek transcription theory in that *sesēmantai* = "transkribiert . . . in griechische Buchstaben." In my review of Wutz's *Systematische Wege,* etc., (*JBL,* 57 [1938], 216) I wrote that "a careful study of the use of *sēmeioō* in the *Letter* (as also in Josephus, etc.) proves conclusively that it means simply 'make marginal notes, interpret, annotate,' etc." And more recently Bickerman (*loc. cit.*) noted that "Ps. Aris. 30 does not refer to a previous careless translation of the Torah, as Kahle, 135 repeats, although he acknowledges that this interpretation does violence to the plain meaning of the Greek. In fact *sesēmantai* means *notare,* mark with writing . . . I add that Aristobulus . . . uses the term *sesēmankamen*) in the same meaning: 'note down.'" Wutz's transcription theory is now dead (Wutz himself having ceased to operate with it subsequently in his commentary on *Das Buch Job* [1939]), and Kahle's theory of pre-Septuagint Greek translations has failed to attract many followers; *cf.* the reasonable discussions in Bleddyn J. Roberts, *The Old Testament Text and Versions* (Cardiff, 1951), pp. 107 ff., 111 ff.

Prof. Hadas is to be congratulated for his learned, useful, and stimulating edition of Aristeas' important document, and the Dropsie College is to be thanked for having undertaken to publish so splendid a series as the *Jewish Apocryphal Literature.*

HARRY M. ORLINSKY

A History of the Cure of Souls, by John T. McNeill, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xii, 371, $5.

Dr. McNeill's forthright statement of purpose is, itself, the best description of this pioneering study in an unworked area of historical research. Recognizing well the pitiful inadequacy of "a scientific psychiatry indifferent to religion and philosophy," the author affirms his own faith in the expanding rôle of the "religious physician of souls." Modestly, but with the quiet authority born of extended acquaintance with

the pertinent sources, Professor McNeill lifts up the hands of all those dedicated to the healing ministry of the entire man. Now, for the first time, literally, the curate of souls may escape from the "danger of obsession with the contemporary." He may enter into the liberating consciousness of his standing in the long, nobly mutualizing succession of God's ministering servants throughout the ages.

The author dares to hope that his book may help induce clarity of historical perspective and invigorating confidence of divine mission into all true curers of the soul. He desires, likewise, to supply for a wider reading public a general, historical treatment not hitherto available in any language. He has realized his double intent to a remarkable degree.

The range of the work is, of necessity, tremendous, even as its depths are truly profound. There are balanced chapters on the spiritual guides of Israel, the philosopher-physicians of Greece and Rome, and the spiritual directors of Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Islam. Within the span of Christian history and experience the book treats, in wise equilibrium, the New Testament and Patristic periods, Celtic penitential discipline and the rise of the confessional, growth and decay from the advent of the mendicants to the Renaissance, together with the cure of souls in every basic situation of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, as well as the pertinent record of the Eastern Orthodox and Armenian churches. Would-be critics of such a sweeping attempt need only be reminded that it is just this irenically tempered, historically universalizing, survey that has so long been needed.

Here is a positively oriented, Christian commitment placed in its proper, agelong perspective. Nothing less can transcend the cultic smugness that has settled over our vaunted "scientific psychiatry" and much of our "religious counseling" as well. Actually, Professor McNeill wastes little time on direct refutation of the thinly veneered scientism that masquerades as restorative power in our day. He is most appreciative of what the opening vistas of modern scientific knowledge can mean to the church that utilizes all this truth wisely and without servility. His main emphasis, however, falls quite rightly upon the great bequest of curative resourcefulness that the historic church has held all too unwittingly and loosely in its hand. What could provide a better incentive to pastoral care in its most richly socializing and personalizing qualities than this authoritative history of Christian victory so often and so heroically overcoming Christian failure?

In every chapter the author bases provocative conclusions upon intensive source analyses, coupled with well-proportioned assessments of the best secondary literature. For example, the effective treatment of discipline and consolation in the Church Fathers focuses repentance and confession amidst the growing everyday issues encountered by such leaders as Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian, Ambrose, Basil of Cæsarea, Chrysostom, Gregory the Wonder-Worker, and Gregory the Great.

The section on Celtic penitential discipline and the emerging confessional is one of the ablest of the book. This might have been anticipated from Dr. McNeill's previously demonstrated mastery in this intricate field. The chapter is almost as valuable for its historiographical method and insights into related aspects of canon law as for its delineation of such penitentials as those of Columbanus, Theodore, and Burchard of Worms. Many of the Kinsey *Report's* most fascinated readers might, indeed, have found Burchard's eleventh-century *Corrector* equally good reading, as Dr. McNeill suggests—and this for reasons as little fundamental to the implied purposes of the mediæval bishop as to the purported motives of the modern scientist. "The writers of the penitentials probably never supposed that what they wrote was sensational or morally questionable," Professor McNeill thinks.

Any one familiar with the Franciscan and Dominican traditions must applaud the deft handling of these epochal movements in relation to the *artes prædicandi* and the mendicants' popular ministry. Here, as in previous books, the author is at his best when evaluating briefly, but forcefully, the vast wealth of individual source items as they fit into the totality of leaders, movements, and issues. The chapters on the cure of souls in Lutheranism, Calvinism, Anglicanism, Presbyterianism, Methodism, Romanism, and many other communions could have been written only by one experienced throughout a lifetime of mature, firsthand researches. Without detracting from the very real merits of Christian pastoral ministry in the Middle Ages, Dr. McNeill shows exactly what Luther, Calvin, and other Protestant leaders brought afresh into the revitalization of the *cura animarum*. Pages 163-177 and 197-209 are hardly to be matched for their compact, cogent exposition of the Lutheran and Reformed care of souls. The analyses of literature and experience within Anglican, Presbyterian, and Puritan groups are sanely constructive, as they are, also, when applied to Congregationalists, Baptists, Quakers, and Methodists. The same appreciatively discriminating insight marks the survey of soul care within the Eastern Orthodox and the Latin churches. In each case the key literature is fairly described and inspiringly assessed.

Dr. McNeill has the happy faculty of writing books in which specialists of many persuasions find their fields dignified and enhanced, and in which general readers learn with relief the significance of researches, far beyond them, for the world within and around them. This is such a work. Here, in a centre of Christian life too often distorted, Professor McNeill brings his historical studies to their most beneficial focus. Few historians have demonstrated so well as he the canons and objectives of their craft while responding so directly to the immediate claims of contemporary church and world upon the cumulative ministrations of their art. RAY C. PETRY

Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and Religion, by J. Donald Butler. New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xiii, 551, $4.

Education and religion thrive in society without any excessive concern on the part of the majority of persons actively engaged in these fields regarding the relationship existing between dogmas and doctrines in their special disciplines and the philosophical world views from which they stem. Professor J. Donald Butler, of the Princeton Theological Seminary, has written a book which apparently is directed primarily at philosophers, educators, and religionists who might be interested in an examination of that relationship. He expresses the hope that the work may cause persons interested in each of these areas of thought to feel a proper respect for the other fields. It should also be of interest to the general reader.

Professor Butler is not concerned merely with formal philosophy. Philosophies, from his point of view, are "systems of inter-related assumptions, consciously or unconsciously embraced, which are so basic and general as to be capable of practice in every area of experience and endeavor." All such systems can, he feels, be described in terms of four general world views: naturalism, idealism, realism, and pragmatism. Each of the four principal sections of the book considers one of these philosophies under five aspects: a historical treatment of the philosophy, a "systematic synopsis" of its principal tenets, its view of education, its view of religion, and its "strengths and weaknesses." The historical and expository treatment is necessarily limited. Nevertheless, the way in which the author has condensed into several small sections the essential features of the thought of a surprisingly large number of men is impressive. The book might, in fact, serve as a reasonably accurate,

if oversimplified, introduction to philosophy for persons without previous training in the field.

Although Professor Butler admittedly is inclined toward some sort of idealism, his presentation of the four philosophies is unusually fair. His treatments of naturalism and pragmatism, in fact, show evidences of his desire to lean over backward to do them justice. He deals with realism in equally scrupulous fashion, but in the historical chapter of his section dealing with that philosophy, he overstresses those types of realism which tend toward naturalism. He criticizes realistic philosophy in general for failing to recognize the importance of the self and human freedom to as great an extent as he believes the idealists have. These criticisms are by no means universally valid. There have been many determinists among the idealists and many by whom personality has been regarded as unreal when compared with an absolutely real universal mind. On the other hand, there have been many realists who insisted vigorously on the recognition of the fact of human freedom and the ultimate reality of the person. Professor Butler admits this on occasion, but the admission is seldom sufficiently explicit. His failure to include any discussion of the Scotch realists and others of their kind causes his picture of realism to be a trifle inadequate. However, his interpretations of the essential nature of the four philosophies are, in the main, quite adequate and remarkably lucid.

The final chapter of the book is entitled "A Confession of Faith: the Outline of a Philosophy." As an outline of a philosophy, it is a somewhat sketchy synthesis of the four world views discussed in the book. As a confession of faith, it is a statement of the author's adherence to some form of traditional Christianity. This credo is introduced somewhat abruptly. Following a discussion of the rational arguments for the existence of God, Professor Butler asserts the need of supplementing such arguments by a revelation from God himself. "Do we have such a Word from God?" he asks. "And my answer to this question is that we do have such a Word. In its most evident and contemporary objective form, this Word is the Bible. In its most vital and essential form, it is Jesus Christ. In the form of its living projection into the society of man, it is the Church." It is to be regretted that the author has not given any account of the way in which his philosophical views and his Christian faith have become integrated. The two are by no means inconsistent in his thought. However, he has simply tagged on the discussion of his religious outlook without properly preparing the reader for it. It is eloquent enough, but it has no obvious relation to an otherwise well-planned book.

ROBERT M. HELM

The Attack upon the American Secular School, by V. T. Thayer, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. x, 257, $3.

From published reports in newspapers, magazines, and books, the American public's attention has been directed recently to crippling attacks upon public schools in such scattered places as Port Washington, N. Y., Englewood, N. J., Milwaukee, Wis., and Pasadena, Cal. The charges here have been related to discipline, poor grounding in the three R's, Americanism, and use of subversive textbooks—attacks made deliberately and as a part of a well-organized plot against tax-supported public schools. In this book, however, the author directs attention to another phase of the controversy, the religious aspect. Two lines of attack are high lighted: one, the charge that the secular school is godless and therefore encourages crime and delinquency; the other, the growing insistence on the part of church-school leaders that they be given tax support for nonpublic schools.

Vivian Trow Thayer, educator, editor, and author, is well qualified to discuss

this subject. He first reviews the evolution of the secular school from Puritan days, showing how the early New England schools had a strong religious intent. In the Middle Colonies, the mixed religious groups developed the nonsectarian religious school, and with further diversity of religious convictions, religious instruction was dropped. The coming of the tax-supported public school in the mid-nineteenth century clinched the idea of the separation of church and state in education, which condition continued until the second decade of the twentieth century. With legislation mandating daily reading of the Bible in some States, followed by laws authorizing released time for religious training, there has been a mounting insistence upon including religious instruction in the public schools. Increasingly, too, the use of tax funds for transportation, health services, and textbooks have followed the growing demand for full support of parochial schools. In twelve States public and private schools merge in some manner or other—using the same buildings, same religious teachers, and in other ways.

The author appears to disagree with the plan to include religious, nonsectarian material in the curriculum, as recommended in the report of the Committee on Religion and Education of the American Council on Education. The report is here described as "an inquiry into the function of the public schools, in their own right and on their own initiative, in assisting youth to have an intelligent understanding of the historical and contemporary rôle of religion in human affairs." He also challenges Fleming, Fosdick, and Weigle in their advocacy of the inclusion of history, biography, art, drama, music, and literary elements with religious significance in the school curriculum. His position here is questionable, for school leaders themselves no longer insist upon a public-school curriculum devoid of spiritual content. While dogma and denominationalism are taboo, an understanding of the basic tenets of various religions is welcomed.

Several chapters are devoted to a scholarly discussion of the question of tax support for nonpublic schools, showing the many lines of attack to secure funds. Thus far these elements have unfortunately succeeded in blocking federal aid to education, designed primarily to assist the underprivileged areas of the country—thwarted because of minority insistence that money be provided in the same act for religious schools. Already, by court action and otherwise, in various States, public money is given to church schools for transportation of pupils, for health services, and for the payment of salaries of religious teachers. Textbooks are purchased. The proposal here made is broad, sane, and historically correct, namely: that auxiliary services such as health, transportation, etc., be provided at public expense, but administered by a public agency, applicable to all children alike; that textbooks should not be provided for nonpublic schools, nor should general aid be supplied for private or denominational school purposes.

In the latter part of the volume, Thayer proposes plans for "erasing religious illiteracy," on the ground that public education is a "co-operative effort of adults to bring to young people what home and community fail to supply." This reviewer feels disappointed that the author has so few positive proposals on this important point. Instead, he uses much space disagreeing with those who advocate teaching religious material, such as Weigle, Fosdick, and T. V. Smith. He supports the naturalist position as against the supernaturalist, believing "that moral character and health of personality flourish best when children are raised in an atmosphere that breeds inner confidence, an acceptance of self, and a sense of security and identity with others." He would prefer to stress moral and ethical values—values being defined as "ways of thinking, feeling, and acting that men strive to make their own in their relationships with each other"—based principally on the concept of democracy

and including ways of living together in a democracy, developing a healthy personality, need of self-respect, good home and school relationships, and mutual respect for personality of others.

This book is one of an eminent list included in the Beacon Studies in Freedom and Power. The logic is sound, the approach scholarly, the critical areas convincing and well documented.

FRANK R. MOREY

Die literarische Einheit des Johannesevangeliums, by Eugen Ruckstuhl, Freiburg in der Schweiz, Paulusverlag, 1951, pp. xvii, 289, n. p.

In the introduction to this treatise, published under the auspices of the Dominican faculty in Freiburg, the author tells us that it had been his intention to establish the authenticity of the words of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. Upon undertaking this task, however, he discovered that a necessary preliminary was a thorough study of the style and literary character of the gospel. He has therefore devoted the present treatise to a review of previous studies along this line, particularly those of Rudolf Bultmann, Eduard Schweizer, and Joachim Jeremias.

In the first, and major, section of his treatise Ruckstuhl takes up the theory of Bultmann, advanced in the *Meyer-Kommentar* (1941) and in earlier articles, that a "revelation discourse" and a "miracle-source" can be distinguished, underneath the hand of the evangelist and the redactor. With considerable cogency he attacks the stylistic marks with which Bultmann supports his theory; but his argument is less convincing to this reviewer when he attempts to draw the opposite conclusion, that the gospel is an indivisible unity. The issue seems to lie in this, that to Ruckstuhl any mention of sources smells of scissors and paste, and he is reluctant to admit that the evangelist could be at any point influenced by existing traditions, Christian or extraneous. Thus, he maintains the complete unity of the prologue and rejects the idea that the older figure of "wisdom" could have shaped its expression.

So again in the case of the appendix, chap. 21, the author attacks in detail each of Bultmann's signs of diversity, and seeks to demonstrate that, even if it be a postscript, it differs from the rest of the evangelist's work in no detail of content, theme, method, or style. From the prologue to the attestation at the close, all must be the work of the evangelist. It is obvious that this is the conclusion which he has all along been determined to reach!

Turning from negative to positive in his second section, Ruckstuhl makes a detailed study of the list of marks of Johannine style compiled by Ed. Schweizer (*Ego Eimi,* Göttingen, 1939, pp. 82-112). After sifting these carefully, on a basis both of their uniqueness and their independence of special turns of thought, he adds several others from studies by Joachim Jeremias and P. H. Menoud, with a few of his own, to form a graduated list of Johannine characteristics. This part of the work is carried through cautiously and ably, and results in perhaps as sound a list of Johannine characteristics as could be reached; though anyone who has attempted a similar task will recognize how erratic such data can be.

His next step is, by linking together the passages in which two of these characteristics are joined, to show that they pervade the entire gospel and reveal its complete unity. In particular, they mark the appendix just as they do the rest; but they are noticeably wanting in the *pericope adulteræ,* John 7:53–8:11. Thus Ruckstuhl believes he has positive evidence against Bultmann's partition theory. And, he concludes, the unity of the gospel, in plan, spirit, and style, excludes any theory of written sources or of redaction, except for 7:53–8:11 and perhaps a few glosses; though use of oral traditions or Synoptic reminiscences is possible in a few cases (pp. 218 f.).

In the third section of his work, Ruckstuhl applies his literary tests to the sacramental periscope, John 6:51[b]-58, and in particular to the essay in which Joachim Jeremias (in *Theologische Blätter,* 1941, pp. 33-46) argues that it comes from the redactor who speaks in John 21:24 and 19:35. Ruckstuhl finds no true characteristics of the redactor in this section, but many of the Johannine characteristics from his own list; and to this evidence he adds a valuable list of other Johannine traits which also are found in the section, and then offers explanation of its unique elements from its sacramental theme. The proof is convincing, as far as literary evidence goes.

Just here lies the chief weakness of the treatise. It is too literal, too mechanical. The author shows pretty conclusively how difficult it is to establish the diversity of the gospel's sources from evidences of style, and how thoroughly the whole has been wrought into a unity by the hand of the evangelist. Yet it seems to this reviewer that he is not fully aware of the more subtle influences of tradition and belief that must have guided the hand of any evangelist, even an apostle.

The treatise does afford a valuable and painstaking study of Johannine style, with lists of Johannine characteristics and traits, and suggestions of method, which must be most useful to other investigators. But he does not return to his starting point and apply his tests to the discourses of Jesus. Would these tests, indeed, support the authenticity of the sayings?

ALFRED M. PERRY

Types of Religious Experience: Christian and Non-Christian, by Joachim Wach, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1951, pp. xvi, 275, $3.50.

While this volume deals with such apparently widely diversified subjects as universals in religion, the idea of man in the Near Eastern religions, spiritual teachings in Islam, the study of Mahayana Buddhism, Caspar Schwenckfeld, the rôle of religion in the social philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville, Rudolf Otto and the Idea of the Holy, the author yet contends that a systematic interest has guided him throughout. It will undoubtedly be more difficult for the reader to discern that central interest than it is for the author to state that he expresses it in the book. The book will impress many as being the collected essays of a historian of religions, written at various times and for various purposes. Perhaps the wise reader will peruse each chapter as a unit, drawing from it the pertinent analysis and insights it contains, rather than trying to force this diversified material into a unified, systematic pattern. Such became the conclusion of the present reviewer long before he had come to the end of the volume.

Especially illuminating chapters are those dealing with Mahayana Buddhism, Caspar Schwenckfeld, Rudolf Otto, and one, not yet mentioned, which is concerned with the distinctions between "Church, Denomination and Sect." The student of the history and philosophy of religion will find in these chapters discriminating, balanced, and penetrating treatments of the subjects considered.

The main concern of Professor Wach is with religious experience, which he defines as "a response to what is experienced as ultimate reality." He goes on to emphasize that this response must be a total response of the total being, which produces the most intense experience of which a human being is capable, and leads to a commitment which causes him to act. In the sense that such religious experience is a universal phenomenon, found in Islam, Buddhism, primitive religion, and Christianity alike, as well as in all other religious expressions, all of the matters dealt with in this volume have a common concern. The impression left in the mind of the reader is that there is a most wide diversity in religious experience which makes it rather difficult to come to exact terms in delineating it and isolating it from the encumbering

phenomena of religion. Perhaps the difficulty of doing this explains the difficulty which the present reviewer has had in isolating clearly the thread of unity which is supposed to run through these varied essays. Each reader should be aware of this difficulty as he begins the reading of the book.

One great value of a volume of this type should not be overlooked. In a day when not only the nations, but also the religions of mankind, are thrown more closely together, there is need for greater understanding in many areas of life. The area of religion is no exception to this demand. Professor Wach has performed a real service in suggesting that there is some possibility of a synthesis of religion on the basis of this common and universal element of religious experience which undergirds each of them. Here is a valuable clue which awaits further exploration by the student of the historic religions.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Religious Foundations of Leveller Democracy, by D. B. Robertson, New York, King's Crown Press, 1951, pp. viii, 175, $2.75.

The seventeenth century in England, especially its two middle decades, has been a rich mine of ore for the prospector in search of political and religious facts in the growth of Anglo-Saxon democracy. Many veins have led from the main deposit, some ending speedily in worthless shale, others still yielding pay dirt of value to the patient seeker. But it is crude ore needing a great deal of refining, and some prospectors have not had the necessary perseverance of submitting to the hard scientific process of assaying the pure metal in the dross. Dr. Robertson, however, in this Ph.D. dissertation presented to Columbia University in 1948, has been most exacting in his survey and appraisal.

These were the birth years of England's constitutional order, to change the figure, and the Levellers, as a party, were but one of many which were certain they had the solution and the remedy for all of England's ills. And John Lilburne, the leader, was but one of many voices speaking loudly and confidently of the necessary prescriptions. It is rightly stated that "Levellerism" was not a religious movement but was a political idealism rooted in religious faith and principles. The term *Leveller* was given in derision by its enemies to the group as those opposed to all authority and law—a "smear" practice by no means unknown throughout history even unto the present day. But Lilburne replied that their desire was simply "that all alike may be levelled to, and bound by Law." He insisted that their agitation was for nothing other than the fulfillment of the *Agreement of the People* on the principles of which the civil wars had been fought and which, he asserted, Cromwell and Ireton had repudiated.

Dr. Robertson is correct in saying that a distinction must also be made between the Diggers and the Levellers, though the former were known at times as the True Levellers. Briefly it may be stated that the Diggers sought the levelling of property, or as it may be termed today, "the nationalization of property." This again was an accusation brought against the Levellers by their opponents but which the Leveller leaders consistently denied.

All this economic and political philosophy was, however, inspired and sustained by religion, as Dr. Robertson states. Even the civil wars were fought in a sort of religious frenzy. Prayer meetings were held on the field of battle; officers of the army wept tears of repentance for having failed to be mightier warriors for the Almighty, and Cromwell led his hosts to the slaughter of Scotch and Irish with the shouting of the Psalms. Little wonder the common people believed the mighty were being laid low and the poor exalted.

So this stout Puritanism, which had struggled against Anglicanism to become the national religion, had to give way to a more personal or individual religion in accord with the developing democracy. This was the demand of Lilburne and his followers, the process dimly recognized by them it is true, but unrecognized, or at least its possibility refused, by Cromwell and his supporters. Lilburne was passionately concerned for the people, Cromwell for England.

This is an insight that explains the diverging political and religious life of the time. All—that is the antiroyalist party—were Puritans. But some were right, some centre, some but a little left of centre, and some far left. To give names, they were Presbyterians, Independents, Baptists, Quakers, Levellers, Diggers, and finally, beyond the bounds of English respect for law and custom, Ranters and Fifth Monarchy Men. And at times the partition wall between was paper thin indeed.

It is here, I think, I find a failure on Dr. Robertson's part to follow through his vein of historical ore. He speaks of this democratic movement as being one inspired and supported by personal experience in religion as discovered in the Scriptures so recently made available to the people. There is, of course, a truth in that. But what this otherwise observing and careful student of the extremely complicated society of the period has seemingly failed to take into consideration is the historic fact of the Merchant Adventurers, the trade corporations with charters duly granted by councils of state. Members of those corporations were free men with certain definite rights recognized by government. Religion did not obtain these corporation rights, but those rights once enjoyed supplied the argument for rights in religion. The freedom of the corporation was transferred to freedom of the church, which, it was contended, was a corporation. Freedom in trade preceded freedom in religion and gave solid ground for its official guarantee. Freedom enjoyed in trade must be enjoyed in religion.

It is worthy of note that the Separatists, Baptists, Quakers, the individualists in religion, first of all enjoyed their rights as traders and merchant tailors. It is also worthy of note that Dr. Robertson himself calls attention to the fact more than once "that the Leveller party was made up largely of the class of small traders."

R. E. E. HARKNESS

From Homer to Menander: Forces in Greek Poetic Fiction, by L. A. Post, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1951, pp. 333, $3.75.

This book contains the Sather Classical Lectures delivered at the University of California in the spring of 1948. It will add new lustre to an already distinguished series. The author treats the Homeric poems, the tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, and the comedies of Menander, as examples of a form of art whose wealth of resources for portraying human character and destiny and whose influence upon conduct and culture have seldom been as effectively conceived as here. Fiction is, of all the arts, "the most capable of presenting to the imagination a representative model of human fate. It alone may hope to include in the imitation of life all the forces that move men from within or act upon them from without." Thus fiction is a powerful force in history; and when it is great, as Greek poetic fiction certainly is, it "fills men with wonder, introduces them to strange new aspects of life or new attitudes toward life, and so endows them with new interests and insights."

Such is the philosophy of fiction that underlies Post's treatment and gives it a singular unity of purpose and richness of content. This approach is, as the author himself says, Aristotelian in spirit—not merely because he believes, as did Aristotle, that fiction is more philosophical than history, but because he endeavors, like Aristotle,

to understand the nature, or essence, of this form of art, and to examine and appraise the details of structure and technique in the light of the end to be attained. Professor Post is in fact more philosophical than Aristotle, since he is not guilty of the omissions and confusions found in the *Poetics*. In a final chapter (not included in the lectures as delivered), he undertakes a reëxamination of Aristotle's theory of poetic fiction. Aristotle's faults are all too evident: his lack of interest in psychological analysis; his treatment of works of fiction as objective specimens rather than as channels of power from the author through the actors to the spectators; his undue concern with technique; his superficial conception of "reversals," which overlooks such significant reversals as repentance or discovery of self; and his curiously inadequate account of the emotions aroused by tragedy and of the purgation that tragedy effects in the spectator. Post modestly remarks that we stand on Aristotle's shoulders. But it is clear that Aristotle's shoulders are not nearly so broad, nor his stature so high, as generations of critics have been disposed to believe.

The total impact of the authors considered here is highly moral, in the broad sense of that term. These writers, at least in the greatest period, took upon themselves the responsibility of leading their people. They had a sure feeling for the values of life and for the eternal consequences of decisions. They were concerned with social welfare as they conceived it and with the excellence of individuals. Homer's rôle as the educator of the Greeks (and through them of all western men) stands out superbly in Post's analysis. The *Odyssey,* "the pattern of success," provides a model of normal morality. The *Iliad* teaches glory, the "divine love of comrades," and through it all—especially in the sublime and incomparable closing book—pity and the sense of common humanity that unites victor and vanquished. In Aeschylus we are conscious of a struggle between cosmic forces of good and evil; we sense a missionary fervor for civilization, for Hellenism, and for Athenian democracy —values that must be achieved in and by individuals, who suffer much but learn through their suffering. Sophocles in the *Ajax* and the *Antigone* gives us tragedies of personal devotion to an ideal, set in an Aeschylean frame of political morality. (The latter of these plays is an example of a kind of tragedy of which Aristotle conveys no conception in his criticism.) The *Trachiniæ* and the *Oedipus Tyrannus* are tragedies of frustration by circumstance, in which the only moral seems to be that human life is uncertain. But in Sophocles' last three plays—*Philoctetes, Electra,* and *Oedipus at Colonus*—character is the key to destiny; and in the last of these, political and religious idealism are fused in a solemn and moving pageantry. Euripides is less easy to characterize. Some of his tragedies are in the older vein, inspired by the political idealism of Aeschylus and Sophocles. In some, notably the *Trojan Women,* tragedy takes on a tone of universal pity that undermines any faith or satisfaction in success. Some illustrate the comic possibilities of burlesque tragedy; and still others contain merely diversified scenes of little profundity that offer opportunities to versatile actors. Thus we become vividly aware of that decline of tragedy to the level of entertainment which led Plato to denounce the drama and blame the theatre for the general democratic failure to discriminate between good and popular in art and life. "From now on we may expect Athenians to write philosophy when they wish to improve their fellow citizens." Finally, Menander raises comedy to the level of a serious treatment of the manners and morals of customary life. Unfortunately we must judge of Menander from the fragments of three imperfectly preserved plays, and from the high praise bestowed on him by the ancient critics, who considered him worthy of being set beside Homer as an educator. Post's evaluation of these plays and of Menander's work as a whole is one of the considerable contributions of this book.

To follow Post through his analysis of these works is a rich reflective experience. His thorough knowledge of the philological and historical background, his gift for apt and pungent expression, his wide acquaintance with the fiction of other cultures, and his psychological and philosophical insight, make this not only a scholarly but also a profound and fascinating work. One regrets that he has left out Aristophanes. The old comedy, he evidently thinks, is fantasy rather than fiction, and hence not a serious treatment of life. Yet Aristophanes certainly considered himself to be a teacher and critic, not merely an entertainer; and the dividing line between the fantasy of the *Birds,* for example, and some of the "never-never lands" of Euripides' creation seems difficult to draw. Furthermore the inclusion of Menander, who built upon the old comedy as well as upon the tragedy of his predecessors, makes more pointed and questionable the omission of Aristophanes. Perhaps some day Professor Post will give us a study of Aristophanes. In any case, what he has given us here is a notable contribution not merely to the appreciation of these masterpieces of Greek poetic fiction, but also to an understanding of human destiny, which is their common theme.

GLENN R. MORROW

Socrates, by A. E. Taylor, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 192, $2.50.

This little volume was published originally in both Great Britain and the United States some twenty years ago. Its reappearance at the present time would seem to have been intended by the publisher to commemorate the anniversary of the death of Socrates twenty-three and a half centuries ago. The aim of the author has been to recapture insofar as possible the real Socrates, a task which has challenged the ingenuity of many hundreds in the intervening years.

As everybody knows, Socrates left no writings. The primary sources for our knowledge of the man and his work are found mainly in the testimony of three men, each in some degree his contemporary: the comic poet Aristophanes, who in 423 B.C. produced in the *Clouds* a manifest caricature of Socrates; Xenophon, whose admiration for the philosopher led him to devote an entire work to his memory; and Plato, in most of whose dialogues his master is assigned the leading rôle. This material has always been available. Unfortunately, as was inevitable, those who have used it have failed to reach conclusions acceptable to all. Some have been inclined to stress the testimony of Xenophon, who, in the words of Professor Taylor, depicts Socrates as "an excellent, but rather prosy, preacher of a good, common-sense morality, with a marked dislike of unpractical speculations and 'useless' science"; others, relying heavily on Plato, credit him with having been not only a skillful dialectician but also a high-minded thinker, convinced of a divine calling and imparting to the familiar word *psychē* a new and highly important meaning; few would give much credence to the picture drawn by Aristophanes.

Taylor has discovered no new evidence. Rather he brings to the solution of the problem an analysis based on somewhat different reasoning. He would discount rather heavily the testimony of Xenophon, calling attention to the lack of evidence for close intimacy between him and Socrates. He remarks also that Xenophon was only twenty-four when he saw Socrates for the last time, and furthermore that his writings dealing with Socrates seem to have been composed at intervals during his exile from Athens, at a time when he had little opportunity to consult those who had really known the great man. As for the *Clouds,* Taylor maintains that Socrates must have been already a well-known figure in Athens and that, with all due allowance for the element of exaggeration so characteristic of Old Comedy, there must have been at least a modicum of fact in the poet's lines. The striking and funda-

mental difference between the Socrates of Aristophanes and that of both Xenophon and Plato he would account for on the basis of chronology: at the time of the play Socrates was only forty-five and Xenophon and Plato "little more than babies." Socrates might well have changed his views and interests during the next ten or fifteen years, as indeed we are led to believe from the account in the *Phædo.*

The normal limits of a review afford insufficient room for the presentation of the many arguments and observations on which Taylor bases his reconstruction of the historic Socrates. In all fairness to him one should follow him step by step. For our present purpose perhaps the following items will prove suggestive at least.

"Plato's *Apology* must have been circulated within a very few years of the trial, and must have been read by many of the actual judges as well as by many who had been among the audience." Therefore it must be an essentially authentic report. Again, though Plato admits that he was not present at the death of Socrates, he and others of the Socratic circle immediately thereafter were for some time at Megara in the company of Euclides, who in the *Phædo* is mentioned as having been present. Therefore the *Phædo* should be reasonably true to fact. More noteworthy still, "unless the *Phædo* is a deliberate mystification, it follows at once that its central doctrine, the so-called 'Theory of Ideas,' which is represented as adopted by Socrates in his youth and familiar to all his auditors, really was a Socratic tenet, and is no discovery of Plato's." These and other observations and deductions of like nature lead Taylor to believe in the essential sincerity and reliability of Plato as a witness.

In succeeding chapters he discusses 1. the early life of Socrates, 2. his later life, 3. his thought. Though little is known of the parents of Socrates, they both seem to have been of good family. That Sophroniscus was a worker in stone rests on doubtful evidence. Socrates himself did not follow any craft. "Down to his forty-sixth year he cannot have belonged to the poorest class of Athenian citizens, as he was still serving in 424 as a 'hoplite.'" "Both the older interest in mathematical and physical science and the new interest in the humanistic study of law and morals were fully represented in the Athens of Pericles. . . . It seems quite certain that Socrates in early life acquired a full knowledge of the science of the age and a full mastery of its humanistic culture." The intellectual situation described in the autobiographical portion of the *Phædo* is "historically exactly that which existed at Athens in the youth of Socrates." By Plato's time the theories there referred to had become obsolete. All this lends some color to the otherwise surprising portrayal of Socrates in the *Clouds.* He was "from an early time in his life generally well known as an outstanding figure in intellectual circles far outside Athens." The well-known question which Chærophon addressed to the Delphic oracle was not without justification, and the evidence points to a date prior to the Peloponnesian War, when Socrates was not yet forty.

This much, however incomplete the presentation, may serve to suggest the spirit in which Taylor pursues his quest and something of his method. If he is but following in the steps of Burnet, to whom he now and then refers for support, he appears to have progressed even further than the latter and to have reached even bolder conclusions. There is, of course, no question as to either's familiarity with the "literature" on the subject or with the historical background of the time. Taylor's book is well worth reading.

H. LAMAR CROSBY

Athens and the Greek Miracle, by C. P. Rodocanachi, Boston, Beacon, ©1948 [1951], pp. ix, 194, $2.50.

The book under review was first published in 1948 in London. It is not, as the title might suggest, a war book telling of the heroism of the Greeks during the

German invasion and occupation or of the subsequent successful struggle against heavy odds to quell the forces of communism. The author, with understandable Greek pride, chooses rather to philosophize about the cause or causes of "the prodigious crystallization, within a bare hundred years and in a small country, of every perfection in art, in thought, and in social organization," characteristic of fifth-century Athens. Thereby he hopes to provide a means for the correction of the evils that beset the world of today.

However, the book does not confine itself strictly to ancient days. After considering such topics as the Greek language, Greek love, the Acropolis of Athens, Attic tragedy, Dionysus, and the like, it concludes with a section (Part III) devoted to certain features of modern Athens and Attica. Here Mr. Rodocanachi is on more familiar ground. What he has to say will revive happy memories for those already acquainted with Athens and should awaken the interest of those who have yet to make its acquaintance. Yet even here one may note blemishes still more prevalent in the earlier parts of the book. One would question the validity of the statement (p. 138): "The dedication of an altar to the Unknown God is the supreme and most fruitful achievement of Greek romanticism." The account of St. Paul and his preaching in Athens (p. 139) seems highly fanciful. What evidence is there for attributing to Paul an accent "almost unintelligible . . . tangled sentences . . . feeble syllogisms . . . jumbled verbosities?" Was he really "squalid-looking and outlandish"? Is it not an exaggeration to state (p. 141) that the Christian religion is "entirely Greek"? Is the Greek pediment a "schematic representation of a mountain" (p. 142)? Should one describe the Greek temple as a "cube" (*ibid.*)? Perhaps that word may be due to inadequate acquaintance with English, signs of which are occasionally visible elsewhere. For example, what is a "redundant banker" (p. 145)? Of questionable propriety are the words (p. 149): "the gloomy sermons that drip from the pulpit and drown every joy in a chill, cheerless drizzle of vicarage eloquence." One is surprised to read (p. 161): that Socrates owed his success in argument to his "dæmon." On the same page, as indeed repeatedly throughout the book, the name of Demosthenes' famous antagonist appears as Aeschinus. Similar inaccuracies in spelling are to be found, for example, on pp. 162 f., where the Russian general is accorded a redundant final *e,* and the sausage-seller of the *Knights* appears first as Agorakrite and then as Agorakrites. One may be pardoned for distrusting the account of Socrates (pp. 163 f.), where, for example, it is said that he was "interviewed by men of every class and profession. . . ." It is more in accord with the record that it was Socrates who did the interviewing.

But it would be a thankless task to list all the points to which exception might be taken. Those that have been mentioned may serve as samples. The author at the outset disarms the critic by explaining (p. ix) that he "does not propose to tread paths pursued by wiser and more knowledgeable students of Greek life and art. . . ." Though in occasional footnotes he does cite ancient writers or modern scholars, it is manifest that the book as a whole is the product of the author's own reflexions. Much may be forgiven him because of his devotion to a subject that has attracted and perplexed many another, but the unsuspecting reader, before yielding himself to the enthusiastic ardor of Rodocanachi, should be warned not to take everything on faith. Too often fancy substitutes for fact.

H. LAMAR CROSBY

Near Eastern Culture and Society: A Symposium on the Meeting of East and West, edited by T. Cuyler Young, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951, pp. x, 250, $4.

This book has assembled the principal papers that were read and discussed at a three-day conference on Near Eastern culture and society as part of the Princeton

bicentennial celebration in March 1947. The results must be judged, therefore, in the light of the inescapable limitations which such meetings entail. The initial popular presentation cannot readily be transformed into a lasting original contribution. The volume before us fulfills nevertheless at least two important needs: it calls attention to certain cultural achievements and it brings into focus a number of socio-political problems. It is thus a tribute to the individual authors, the editorship of Professor Young, and the customary competence of the Princeton University Press.

The book consists of two main parts. Part I deals with the progress and prospect in Islamic studies under five headings: Art and archæology (R. Ettinghausen); Arabic literature (G. E. von Grunebaum); Persian literature (A. J. Arberry); science (G. Sarton); and religion (E. E. Calverley). Part II takes up the current problems of Near Eastern peoples under two aspects: 1. Interaction of Islamic and Western thought in (a) Turkey (A. Adnan-Adivar); (b) Iran (T. C. Young); and (c) the Arab world (H. A. Kurani). 2. The national and international relations of (a) Turkey (L. V. Thomas); (b) Iran (T. C. Young); and (c) Arab states (C. K. Zurayk). The hard-working editor has supplied an Introduction on Near East perspective, the past and the present, while the concluding perspective in terms of the present and the future has been entrusted to H. A. R. Gibb.

Yet in spite of this dual emphasis on perspective, the present volume would seem to be short on that quality in one very important sense. I refer to over-all perspective in dealing with the Near East as a whole. In terms of its cultural and societal development in particular the Near East must be viewed as a historical unit, no matter how many chronological and geographical subdivisions one may be obliged to distinguish within it. Such an approach is vital not only to local history but also to the history of mankind. For in the Near East man's recorded progress can be traced in an unbroken sequence from its very beginnings, and the Near Eastern component in the civilization of the modern West cannot be overestimated.

It is thus clear that the modern Near East can be neither understood nor explained without constant reference to the multiple roots in the past. The book before us promises to concern itself with "Near Eastern Culture and Society." For the most part, however, it addresses itself in effect to the last century and a half. Yet neither this brief period, nor the entire Islamic period for that matter, is an adequate index of the Near East. It is obvious, of course, that even the brief span that is actually considered calls for heroic condensation within the covers of a single volume. One should be aware, however, of the continuous nature of the great experience which we know as the Near East. The book fails to reflect that awareness, except for a few introductory paragraphs. The title proves to be a serious misnomer; more than that, it is a glaring instance of faulty perspective.

E. A. SPEISER

Arrest and Movement, by H. A. Groenewegen-Frankfort, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1951, pp. xxiv, 222, pls. xciv, $7.50.

This book will pose a problem for the cataloguer. Is it philosophy, art, or ancient history? Under a provocative, but noncommittal, title, taken from a line of poetry by T. S. Eliot, this work is a well-integrated study of a clearly defined body of material. The representational art of the ancient Near East is presented in a generous number of excellent photographs and concise descriptions. But the masterpieces of ancient art are not merely described; they are placed within the historical framework of the culture in which they were produced and interpreted in the light of the social and religious thought of the time. The author goes a further step to discuss the meaning of certain aspects of the representational art. Thus the three fields of art, history,

and philosophy, are brought together in an exciting and stimulating approach to material which has generally been presented in mere catalogue.

The point of departure of the essay, at first sight, would seem to be peripheral: the eccentricities of spatial rendering in Near Eastern works of art. But in her analysis of the use of spatial devices by artists, the author believes that she has found that these devices frequently furnish a key to an understanding of very significant social and religious concepts. For example, the author sees the acts of Egyptian kings from Narmer onward portrayed in such a fashion as to deprive them of specific character and as to treat them as repetitive or typical acts. This characteristic of the art of the early periods is viewed as an expression of the dogma of divine kingship known from the literary sources.

In considerable detail Mrs. Frankfort analyzes both the private tomb scenes and those of the funerary temples in the Old Kingdom and concludes that these two types of representation differ in their basic logic and implicit meaning. In the private tombs there are portrayed certain typical aspects of life for the benefit of the deceased, who is a kind of passive "watcher" of life; in the royal scenes there is an attempt to express a "timeless perfection of a divine king revealed in his acts." Yet, while the motive for the portrayals differs, the means used is a mode of spatial rendering which tends to minimize dramatic scenes. In the funerary art of the Middle Kingdom there is seen an attempt to break away from the static canons of Old Kingdom art and present concrete details for the purpose of emphasizing the dramatic and monumental rather than the typical character of the events. In the New Kingdom the changes in concepts with regard to kingship were paralleled by radical changes in the efforts of artists to present scenes in which the king appeared. The interest in scenes from daily life diminishes; where they persist they are used as illustration of the function of certain officials. In the Amarna revolution the older concepts were all but completely upset, as artists strove to portray the secular and the concrete with a realism which had not before been approached in Egyptian art. Ground lines and registers were the technical devices by which this shift was realized. The full flower of Amarna art is to be seen in the rise of new schemes and methods in the pictoral representations of the following centuries. The scenes from the reign of Seti I on the outside of the north wall of the great hall at Karnak are in effect the result of the Amarna revolution in art. In these dramatic battle scenes Mrs. Frankfort sees a unique development in Egyptian art, in that the conflict between symbol and actuality had been solved. Amarna art had failed with its predominant emphasis on actuality and its neglect to incorporate the timeless element which made for a "symbolically pregnant situation." But under Seti I the paradox of monumentality—the artistic blending of the actual with the symbolically timeless—was achieved for the only time in the long history of Egyptian art. In the direction of the trend toward realism and away from the royalistic symbolism the zenith is reached in the battle scenes of Ramses II at Abu Simbel, and that remains, according to Mrs. Frankfort, "the most time-bound" of all the royal temple reliefs in Egypt. On the other hand the reliefs of Ramses III on the Medinet Habu temple represent the full swing of Egyptian art; here the emphasis is firmly on the symbolical statement of the king's victory and his royal, absolute character. The following ten centuries of Egyptian art are disposed of in one short paragraph as "barren of new ventures in either painting or relief, in tomb or temple."

Mesopotamian and Cretan arts are presented and discussed along similar lines. The student of art, the historian, and the philosopher will be grateful to Mrs. Frankfort for breaking new ground in the presentation of her thesis in such an interesting and stimulating manner.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham, by Gabriel N. Buescher, Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 1950, pp. xxvii, 173, $2.25.

This work is a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Sacred Theology. The concepts and vocabulary here met carry one back to the thought world of mediæval scholasticism: *transubstantiation, transaccidentation, terminus formalis, terminus per accidens, terminus totalis, internal nexus, external nexus, substance, accidents,* and such. For many a non-Romanist this would be a fresh track to run on.

The treatise recognizes that Ockham was not only excommunicated by Pope John XXII because of his "later political writings," but the same pope referred to Ockham's eucharistic writings as "pestiferous teaching." Lutterell, the contemporary of Ockham and ex-chancellor of Oxford, drew up a list of fifty-six suspected articles in Ockham's teachings. A papal commission at Avignon censured some of his eucharistic positions. And many a later Romanist has distrusted Ockham.

The outcome of the study here reported is to defend Ockham's orthodoxy as to the Eucharist. "Our study of Ockham's teaching on the Eucharist has convinced us that he is neither the sceptic nor the heretic he is sometimes made out to be" (p. 156). "The doctrine of the Venerable Inceptor is in accord with the *de fide* pronouncements of Trent" (p. 156). "Ockham's notion of transubstantiation dovetails very satisfactorily with the defined dogma of Trent" (p. 153). Ockham is judged as sincere when he asserts "his intention of holding only what the Roman Church teaches concerning the Eucharist" (p. 1). Like the Roman Church, he holds that "the whole and integral Christ, true God and true man, is really contained under the whole host and under each part thereof" (p. 141). The accidents that inhered in the substance of bread and wine remain after the miracle of transubstantiation has removed the bread and wine; but then these accidents are "absolute" (p. 142), and do not inhere in any substantial subject (p. 142). "We have neither sensitive nor direct intellectual cognition of Christ as He exists on the altar," (p. 142). It is only the accidents, now inhering in no substance, which can be seen, touched, or moved.

The author points out that Aquinas and Ockham differed as to what happens to the substance of bread and wine when transubstantiation takes place. The former held "to an intrinsic *conversion* of the total substance of bread into the body of Christ," to "an intrinsic nexus between the cessation of the substance of bread and the presence of Christ" (p. 29). Ockham affirmed "the *annihilation* of the substance of bread and the *succession* of the substance of Christ's body," which then "coexists with the remaining accidents," but not the substance, of the bread (p. 46). But Roman dogma has never officially decided between these two views.

It is Buescher's judgment that Ockham has been suspected because his intention has been misunderstood. He did indeed set forth his view as to how transubstantiation is to be conceived. But, beside that, he was interested to consider other ways in which the power of God would have been able to act. He discusses various possible modes in which God could have effected Christ's presence in the Eucharist: It would have been possible for the body of Christ to coexist with the substance of the bread; and this view would have prevented fewer "inconvenientia" to reason. Or the body of Christ might have "assumed the substance of the bread" (p. 23). Or the substance of the bread might have been reduced to "prime matter" without form or accidents (p. 26). Or the substance of the bread might have been removed to another place, and hence no longer be on the altar where the accidents remain (p. 24). Or the substance of the bread might be converted into the body of Christ

(p. 29). Or the substance of the bread might be annihilated, and its place taken by the body of Christ (p. 28). It has already been pointed out that Ockham holds the last of this series of views.

Readers may be interested to see Ockham's doctrine defended, knowing that he "is often set up by Catholic and Protestant historians alike as the forerunner of many of the heterodox notions which blossomed forth in the so-called Reformation" (p. 150). They may also be interested to see what divergent views of transubstantiation can claim orthodoxy.

CARL C. RASMUSSEN

Perspectives on a Troubled Decade: Science, Philosophy, and Religion 1939-1949, edited by Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, New York, Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion [Harper], 1950, pp. xvii, 901, $5.50.

The papers presented in this volume were prepared for the tenth meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life which was held at Columbia University in September, 1949. The ninety-five contributors include some of the ablest scholars of our time. The editors hope that the range of material will furnish the reader with a good cross section of American thought today. Writers have been chosen principally from the fields of philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, education, history, political science, and theology.

Most of the chapters are impressive for their realism, seriousness of purpose, and the manner in which the best scientific information of our time is handled and interpreted. A certain amount of conflict is accepted as normal in human life by those writing on this subject. Where there is freedom to think and act, conflict is inevitable. This fact does not mean that extreme forms of conflict, such as war, must be accepted as inevitable for all time. But, at present no formula or set of formulas have been discovered to solve mankind's oldest and most acute problem.

At least one of the religious writers deplores the trend towards humanism. Thus Rabbi Bokser estimates that, "Modern man, like the man of antiquity, has only two alternatives in his interpretation of life. He can regard the life about him as self-sufficient, which makes him a naturalist, a secularist, or a humanist; or he can see the world about him as but the glimmer of transcendent realities in which his life, in all its contexts, natural and human, fulfils itself: this is the root of any philosophy of theism. And a theist will not hesitate to ascribe divine status to any human experience which manifests those qualities that reach their fullest development in the transcendent Divine Order."

The perils of a secular culture are painted in sombre colors: "What is wrong with a secular culture? For those who have seen with the eyes of the spirit, a secular culture falsifies the world, for it ignores the highest level of significance in the drama of existence. . . . The secularization of culture has lowered human morale and wrought havoc with morality. A secular morality is anthropocentric in the grossest sense. By eliminating God as the center of existence, it leaves man alone to dominate the scene, with his empirical plans and purposes as the sole arbiter of life."

Obviously, a humanist would not agree with this interpretation of the cosmic scene. Which is to say that in the volume there is manifested the struggle in our own time (indeed it is perennial), on the part of thoughtful men, to face the realities of a changing world, to work out an adjustment to these realities, and at the same time to find a solution, both philosophical and practical, to the pressing problems of the contemporary world.

The discussions in the book with respect to the clarification of the essential meaning and function of values in a society will be of especial interest to the philosophically and religiously motivated individual. But perhaps no one has summed it up more clearly than Arthur E. Murphy, professor of philosophy at Cornell University: "The constructive forces in our civilization that work for sanity and friendliness and understanding are not defeated yet, but they have been to some extent demoralized. To carry on their work in a difficult time will take stamina and skill and specialized knowledge. . . . It is only what we thus see *with our ideals* that can open minds and hearts to opportunities of understanding beyond the limits of our present failure, and guide us in the effort to make the most of them. If we are today to justify the moral claims of our professed ideals *as* ideals and not as slogans merely, it is in this use that they must prove their worth. For this is their final and sufficient justification. And while we now see more clearly than we did four years ago what such an enterprise can cost, we have also had an opportunity to learn how much, beyond all bargaining and illusion, it is worth."

RAY H. ABRAMS

Adventuring into the Church, by Lewis Albert Convis, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. xv, 186, $2.50.

The pharmacopœia describes a given drug, listing its properties and indicating the uses to which it may hopefully be put. A case history faithfully records results obtained through employing a medicine. Ordinarily a book review follows the lines of the pharmacopœia: this one is a case history with the reviewer as subject.

So many months ago that memory of the event pricks my conscience, the editor of Crozer Quarterly sent me for review a copy of *Adventuring into the Church.* To look through the book and write a brief judgment of its worth would have required an hour or two. But one never knows beforehand what a book may accomplish. *Adventuring into the Church,* a small volume about the place of the pastor as educator, precipitated a crisis in my ministry. Mr. Convis, the author, maintains that adequate preparation for church membership cannot be given in a six weeks' pastor's class in which children receive a brief introduction to the elements of Christian belief and the meaning of the sacraments. That criticism was not new to me. I had often made it myself. Thirty-five years in the ministry had taught me, to my chagrin, that children received into membership after such brief indoctrination know little about the Bible and less about the church. Taken into the church, they are not assimilated. Their loyalties are no more engaged than are those of their parents. This I knew, but I had never corrected my deficient methods.

Mr. Convis' very explicit book showed me that through a year-around Saturday class something might be done to improve an unhappy situation. Moreover, it "brought me under conviction," condemned my want of enterprise, chastised what I am bound to recognize as my negligence. I am a repentant, converted sinner against youth.

During the summer vacation I drew up a plan for a Saturday school of religion. The scheme outlined by Mr. Convis was not followed closely, since our particular needs called for another plan. Through the fall weeks our committee on religious education was indoctrinated on the basis of *Adventuring into the Church* and fully converted to the necessity of conducting a Saturday school to supplement the Sunday school. The parish was then advised by letter and the weekly church calendar of what we proposed to do and was in its turn convinced. The children are now being enrolled. Work will begin in classes on February 23.

The curriculum has three objectives. First, to teach the children the elements

of Christian faith and the meaning of church membership. This will be the pastor's responsibility. Second, to tell the great stories which involve biblical persons and events that boys and girls may acquire a knowledge of scripture which, sad to admit, the ordinary Sunday school does not impart. Third, to give the pupils opportunity to learn the hymns and better gospel songs that they may be prepared to take part in services of public worship where other than "The Old Rugged Cross" and "In the Garden" are sung.

A valuable but unexpected by-product of this new emphasis on education for churchmanship is a request from parents that provision be made whereby they too can receive the instruction which their children are being given. This appeal will be honored by a class for parents which will start in Lent and be continued indefinitely. Adults with no children are also asking to be taken in.

A growing number of churches provide for a work of education under the guidance of trained and skilled supervisors; the greater number, for a time at least, must depend on what the pastor can do. Therefore, *Adventuring into the Church* is a book to be shunned by the minister who feels that he cannot assume responsibility for a school. A troubled conscience will afflict him who reads and tries to convince himself that preaching, parish calling, and attending committee meetings leave him no time to be a weekday educator.

It would be well could this case history be continued until such time as might permit the writer to tell of the patient's convalescence. Meanwhile it is a real tribute to Mr. Convis' book that at least one reader is applying the therapy which it prescribes.

ROBERT M. GREY

Fénelon's Dialogues on Eloquence, translated by Wilbur Samuel Howell, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951, pp. 160, $3.

There are many great sermons being delivered today from the American pulpit. But all too often the religious message is a lifeless, perfunctory performance or a florid showpiece that leaves the audience cold. The question naturally arises, Can a poor preacher become a good one as a result of the study of the technique of sermon composition and delivery? The answer, I believe, should be in the affirmative, provided, of course, that the given "poor preacher" be possessed of some native talent, intelligence, sincerity, and a capacity for hard work. Then, and then only, will such a work as Fénelon's *Dialogues* prove of indisputable assistance.

It is of interest to note that in the course of a people's history changes in thought, customs, political and religious climate, affect the form and quality of pulpit oratory: in one age it flourishes, reaches a high point of perfection; in another, the tide ebbs to sterile mediocrity. It was in protest against one of these low periods, the first half of the seventeenth century in France, that Fénelon reacted both by example and by precept: by example with his own simple, earnest yet artistic sermons; by precept with the *Dialogues* in which he not only analyzed the task of the preacher but viewed it in its broader relationship to discourse in general.

When Fénelon wrote this work he was not yet far along the way of his great career. Although probably not more than twenty-eight when he wrote it (about 1679), Fénelon was as keenly aware of the need for a reformulation of the principles of religious eloquence as was his contemporary, La Bruyère. The latter complained that "Christian discourse has become an exhibition (*un spectacle*)", and after pointing out such faults as exaggerated mannerisms of inflexion and facial expression, monotony of gesture, he adds that "on n'écoute plus sérieusement la parole sainte." Yet there was desperate need for the "holy word" to be heeded. With the decline of

Louis' authoritarian rule, the church likewise was losing its grip. Heresy and atheism were on the increase. Force as a means of conversion was losing its popularity. Men had to be won by words rather than subdued by the sword. No longer was the old type of oratory, which, like other forms of expression, had suffered from the complicated mechanics of Scholasticism and the tawdry refinements of *préciosité,* adequate to meet the need of convincing minds and moving hearts. Fénelon's answer to the need—and a most sensible, capable answer it has proved to be—was the *Dialogues sur l'éloquence.*

Professor Wilbur Samuel Howell, professor of public speaking at Princeton University and a profound student of the history of rhetoric and logic, has rendered a real service to the English reader by publishing this distinguished translation with its accompanying annotations. The translation is preceded by an admirable introduction in which Professor Howell closely analyzes Fénelon's objective, examines his sources, and evaluates the historical importance of his theories of composition and criticism in relation to rhetoricians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The reader of this book, whether he be a student of rhetoric, literary criticism, and æsthetics, or a young preacher desirous of improving his technique in the pulpit, will find a wealth of sound advice, pertinent to our present-day needs, on how to preach and how not to preach. Without ennumerating the faults which Fénelon noted as he listened to his contemporaries of the clergy, suffice it to say that most of them are with us currently today. For example, one could hardly give us better advice than the following:

> Do not do what bad speakers do in striving always to declaim and never to talk to their listeners. On the contrary, each one of your listeners must suppose that you are speaking particularly to him. There you have what produces natural, familiar, and suggestive tones.

Or again:

> Actually I have noticed on enough occasions that what certain otherwise talented speakers lack most is depth of knowledge. Their minds seem empty. You see that they have been put to no end of trouble to find the wherewithal to piece out their speeches. It even seems that they are not speaking because they are overflowing with truths, but that they are seeking for truths because they are overflowing with a desire to speak.

In English style and accuracy of translation, as well as in scholarliness of annotation, the present translation is so superior to its three predecessors as to leave little doubt that it will become the standard English edition of a work that was the earliest expression of what has come to be the dominant modern attitude toward the art of communication.

WILLIAM J. GAINES

Questions People Ask, by Robert J. McCracken, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 188, $2.50.

Life-situation sermons are quite the vogue just now; for which we may thank God and take courage. Man's disorder must be confronted with God's design. There is biblical warrant for relevant preaching in the message of Amos at Bethel and Paul before the Areopagus. Moreover, Jesus dealt with the immediate needs of such individuals as Peter, the woman at the well, Zacchæus, and Nicodemus. The saving power of the gospel must be related to the basic needs of modern men. Let us have more so-called life-situation preaching.

But let it be better! Many such messages fail miserably when put to the test of true preaching set by Phillips Brooks, "truth through personality." Too often the truths are half-baked, and clumsily served by an ill-equipped and self-sufficient pulpiteer who seeks to ape his betters just to be in style. The sermons of Dr. McCracken have value, not only for the needy laity; they constitute a life-situation

sermon for life-situation preachers. In this Religious Book Club selection for December last, the twenty-one basic questions people ask are handled in such a manner that both truth and personality are happily wedded. The truths which provide the answers are essentially biblical; the approach and method of presentation, psychological. The personality behind the sermons reveals an unusually rich intellectual and spiritual equipment, commonly associated with one born and educated in Scotland, the land of great expository preachers. Coupled with this doctrinal and biblical background of Scotland is the fresh psychological approach characteristic of American preaching. In reading these sermons one understands the secret of their power when one recalls that Dr. McCracken came to his great pulpit at Riverside Church, New York, from a professorship in theology and philosophy at McMaster in Canada. Thus he is prepared, not only to succeed Harry Emerson Fosdick, but also to make his own place in American life and thought. It is suggestive that the first book of sermons by Dr. McCracken consists of life-situation messages.

Consider the sweep of the twenty-one questions. A rough arrangement indicates that about half of the questions deal with such common emotional problems as fear, insecurity, depression, and the like, while half a dozen relate directly to God and Jesus, as, for example, "Does God Guide Us?" and "Why Did Jesus Die?" Two deal with the vitality and rôle of the church, and several bear upon the sociological aspect of living together in a human society. Every life-situation preacher, or, for that matter, every preacher who would herald a saving gospel, might well remember that for Dr. McCracken the psychological sermon is "preaching in only one of its aspects"; yet such preaching, affirms Dr. McCracken, is the type of which there is particular need today. In these sermons the reader will observe that the author is not only a skilled diagnostician when he isolates and clarifies some fundamental human need or problem, but that Dr. McCracken rigorously and persuasively sets forth the Christian answer. He is not merely a psychiatrist dealing with an organism, but a spiritual counselor guiding a child of God. For example, in the sermon, "Why Not Do What Comes Naturally?" (the topic being taken from a song hit of the day), Dr. McCracken explores and explodes the philosophy of naturalism, calling it "a terribly selfish philosophy" and concludes, "Not self-indulgence but self-discipline is the Christian rule."

The reviewer made this book assigned reading for his class in homiletics, whose members were studying the various types of preaching. There was universal agreement among these critical young theologues that in Dr. McCracken's volume was life-situation preaching at its best. One student wrote, "Not only is this an excellent book to help Christians grow in knowledge and strength, but it is also a basis of genuine faith for multitudes who have not yet found God." Blessed is such a church as Riverside, set in the heart of a city of the multitudes, to have as minister one well qualified to speak the timely word of the timeless gospel, to give security, peace, and significance to fleeting human lives who so greatly need God.

VAUGHAN DABNEY

Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie, by Emanuel Hirsch, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann, *Lieferungen* 12-14, 1951, pp. 240, DM 5 each *Lieferung.*

These three paper-covered sections of this five-volume work include most of volume three, carrying the story from the middle of the eighteenth century to about 1835 and the rise of positivism. The author continue his fruitful method of relating theological developments to their general cultural backgrounds.

It was a fateful period for religious thought. The Deistic rationalism in England

gave rise to a free-thinking criticism of church and even of religion, and paved the way for important movements on the Continent. The works of Hartley, Hume, and Priestley moved from rationalism to skepticism and on to positivism, tending more and more to regard Christian history as a branch of general history and its validity as subject to the tests of human scientific intelligence. Not only was miracle denied but metaphysical causality also, while ethical values which had been regarded as firmly grounded in the metaphysical order were interpreted now as convenient formulations of socially useful principles. Adam Smith applied the procedure to psychological ethics and to economics. Meanwhile France, where religious skeptics faced not a tolerant Protestant population but an intransigeant Roman church, saw the emergence of a stronger anticlericalism combined with a vigorous republicanism. The kindlier tolerance of Voltaire was overborne by the violent attacks on religious orthodoxy leveled by his fellow Encyclopædists Diderot, de la Mettrie, Holbach, d'Alembert, and Helvetius who did so much to set the tone of the French Revolution.

Rousseau, clearly a favorite subject with the author who devotes no less than fifty-four pages to his influence on subsequent religious thought, undermined the biblical arguments for government with his theory of the *contrat social,* and the biblical doctrine of original sin and guilt with his teaching of the natural goodness of man.

Then came the French Revolution. Church and monarchy were swept aside in the name of the people. The spiritual life of Europe was shaken to its foundations. As the first violence of the revolution died and freedom of worship was granted, the struggle between church and state became a relentless battle. Napoleon's uneasy concordat with the pope in 1801 set in motion a train of negotiations and conflicts which involved not only the French churches but the German as well. Thus Protestantism as well as Catholicism became embroiled in the struggle between church and state, clericalism and liberalism, which was to last till the middle of the nineteenth century.

But the pendulum swung back to reaction in the Restoration. Karl von Haller's work on *The Restoration of Political Science* advocated despotism to a degree that would have shocked even the Middle Ages, and grounded it in the grace of God! DeMaistre's *Du Pape* argued that peace and justice in society demand strong papal authority, and he thus prepared the way for the later declaration of the infallibility of the pope as well as for the ultramontanists.

Liberal thought began to turn to agnosticism, positivism, and socialism. Jeremy Taylor's *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789) furnished the bridge from earlier positivism with the doctrine of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number." Its nineteenth-century expression comes in John Stuart Mill; but Comte had already taken Saint-Simon's ideas and built them into an impressive "science of sociology," in which the theological and metaphysical stages of human inquiry have been superseded as part of the evolution of mankind. The way was open for the socialist movement, under the leadership of such men as Fourier, Blanc, Cabet, Robert Owen, later to develop into Marxist communism. But the whole of this story is not told in the material at hand for review, and indeed lies beyond the purview of the work as a whole.

It is to be hoped that Hirsch's work will soon be translated into English. It is the sort of cultural interpretation of the history of Protestant theology which is badly needed to keep this discipline abreast of the best work in the field of the general history of ideas.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Church Lobbying in the Nation's Capital, by Luke Eugene Ebersole, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. x, 195, $2.75.

Political action by the Anti-Saloon League, agitation by prophets of the social gospel, activism in the church through its expanding organization, and alarm at successes achieved by the Catholic church through political methods were chief causes for the establishment in the National Capital of pressure groups by Protestant denominations. Mr. Ebersole has performed a commendable service by describing the type of organization and the procedure of each church lobby which operates in Washington, including the Roman Catholic. His appraisals seem fair and reasonable. In comparison with the well-trained and highly efficient Catholic system, the Protestant groups appear at a disadvantage, though the effectiveness of action by both the National Council of Churches and Protestants and Other Americans United give promise of early improvement. It is clear that political pressure by many of the small, separate groups, each with its own discipline and program, is quite unprofitable. In fact much of the effort seems wasted. A noteworthy exception is the Friends Committee on National Legislation.

By skillful selection of cases and accurate delineation, Mr. Ebersole has shown how the church lobbies operate. It is quite apparent that in the matter of exerting political pressure the Catholic church holds an advantage over Protestant churches through the very nature of doctrines held by the different groups. For instance, a Baptist lobby is embarrassed by stanch adherence of the denomination, at least by profession, to the doctrine of separation of church and state. That is clearly portrayed by the author in his citation of testimony by William Lipphard before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. Instead of admitting the incongruity of his position, Dr. Lipphard tried, without success, to rationalize his point of view. He finally admitted the contradiction.

Another disadvantage suffered by Protestant groups in comparison with the Catholic lobby is their inability to speak with authority and to impose that authority upon political leaders in the Federal government. In fact, Protestant lobbyists cannot count upon support from the members of their denominations either in Congress or in executive positions. When the issue is clearly drawn, the Catholic church has no compunction about imposing the will of the hierarchy upon laymen in public office. This loyalty, coupled with the experience and skill of its lobbyists, gives the Catholic church great strength in Washington.

Protestant lobbies usually have different objectives from those of the Roman Catholic lobby. In almost every instance Protestants exert political pressure for the purpose of securing legislation or executive action to remove social inequalities and to improve public welfare. On the other hand, the Catholic lobby uses much effort to obtain political advantage and government support for the Roman church. For that reason the Protestant lobbies spend much time and skill in the extremely important but negative business of checking the ambitions of the Catholic group and thwarting their thrusts for political dominance and control.

Mr. Ebersole resolves the business of lobbying to a contest between Protestants and Catholics. His conclusion does not offer much promise for a large majority of the Protestant lobbies. Though "the place of the new Protestant denominational lobbies is less firmly established," it seems clear that Protestants will exercise more and more influence upon the Federal government through the lobbies of church councils and similar coöperative bodies.

REUBEN E. ALLEY

God and the Nations, edited by Paul Newton Poling, New York, Doubleday, 1950, pp. 128, $2.

Here is a Christian concern for peace based upon penetrating objectivity. Unlike so many peace-loving tracts which find their way to the bookmarts to plead for a romantic view of the world's need, this volume presents the Christian ideal with a factual understanding of the forces which make the business of peacemaking so desperately difficult. The combined result of the five articles which make up this little volume is to unmask the superficiality of those facile peace programs that call upon God to give us a warless world, which, because of our shallow thinking and unqualified selfishness, we are unable to receive.

"There is nothing in history to justify a belief that peace is possible between states strong enough and near enough to injure each other," observes Professor Harry R. Rudin of Yale University, in the first paper entitled "The Problem of Security." Though fully committed to the Christian ethic, Dr. Rudin shows us by means of historical illustration, that the goals of the kingdom of God are, by the very nature of man, unobtainable until fundamental economic and political changes have been wrought by men of intelligence and good will in the direction of making peace not only desirable, but possible. Basically Professor Rudin regards insecurity as the cause of world chaos, and forcefully analyzes the reasons for such widespread insecurity. He incisively demonstrates that the wish for peace has not yet fathered a program that can bring peace to birth.

In the second article of the volume Vera Micheles Dean, with similar objectivity, highlights the necessity of a calm and rational approach to the "highly inflamed problems of American-Russian relations." Dealing topically with the political, economic, and armament aspects of the American-Russian problem, Miss Dean leads the reader to observe that if war is to be avoided, "(1) We must rid ourselves of our present, often unreasoning and hysterical, fear of Russia and Communism." "(2) We must distinguish between Russia as a national state and Communism. . . . It is entirely possible that the policies of nationalism and imperialism which we now often regard as an intrinsic feature of Russian Communism would be followed by Moscow under governments other than Stalin dictatorship, as they were followed before 1917 by the Russian tsars." "(3) We should criticize Russia and Communism for all acts which, in our opinion, contravene the standards we are all striving to achieve."

Walter W. VanKirk, in the third article entitled "National Sovereignty and the World Community," points out that despite the widespread wave of nationalism which is sweeping over large areas of the earth, the concept of unlimited sovereignty for a nation-state must be boldly challenged if there is ever to be an international accord of any permanence. With realistic candor Dr. VanKirk appraises the strengths and the weaknesses of the United Nations, and deals at length with current ideas of world federation. Much is here to provoke the concern and basic thinking of Christian leaders, and to lead them to a deeper understanding of why the kingdom of God tarries.

In the fourth paper, by James P. Warburg, entitled "World Recovery and Point Four," we are presented with a scientific diagnosis of the malady ravaging the body economic. War psychosis is seen to be the natural result of world-wide economic imbalance, and the sanest hope for world recovery is indicated to be the full prosecution of the Point Four program without too careful regard to the cost to the American taxpayer. Mr. Warburg's thesis is that a "coöperative, world-wide plan of reconstruction and resource development" can be counted upon to lessen tensions,

strengthen the United Nations, and cut down the sense of insecurity which fulminates fear and speeds the armament race.

Presenting "Nine Theses on War and Peace" in the final chapter of the volume, Professor Pitirim A. Sorokin proposes that if the points he makes were to become the controlling guides of everyone's thought and action the pending catastrophe could be avoided. These "theses" make good group discussion and will be doubtless pursued by progressive Americans in attempting to educate themselves through forum experiences.

Needless to say, the book is necessarily academic rather than dynamic. It shows us what a mess the world is in and quite effectively tells us why. It also points us to the road leading out of the City of Destruction. The incentive to follow that road will have to be supplied by those whose minds and hearts have been stirred to action by the truths which the book sets forth.

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

World Religions and the Hope for Peace, by David Rhys Williams, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xiv, 221, $2.75.

This volume supports the constructive thesis that the great spiritual leaders and major religions have held many common ideas, and that religious liberals would do well to seek and stress these universal values. Dr. Williams appears to be a Rochester Unitarian, well-versed in Christian thought and anxious to share discoveries incident to the reading he has done since his seminary years. The style suggests speaking rather than writing, includes many paragraphs of only one sentence, and seems to indicate that the book grew out of a series of diverse though integrated lectures on such figures as Akhnaton, Zoroaster, the Hebrew prophets, Socrates, Asoka, Jesus, Marcus Aurelius, Mohammed, Baha'u'llah, Mrs. Eddy, and Gandhi. Four concluding chapters sum up the values in all religions and offer a spiritual basis for world order. John Haynes Holmes supplies a short preface indicating that the author has followed Carlyle's theory that universal history lies basically in the lives of great men. He adds that Dr. Williams in presenting his story in simple terms invites popular reading on a wide scale.

In fact Dr. Holmes thereby sums up the chief worth of the book. For although the author's reading has given him excellent atmosphere and outlook, the work is likely to appear elementary to the modern college student who has pursued the usual undergraduate course in comparative religion. Bibliographical references reveal an apparent unfamiliarity with many of the standard works. The sympathetic chapter on Mo Ti, for example, is based almost entirely upon Hu Shih's excellent doctoral dissertation, and calls this almost the only work in English on this subject, thus overlooking Legge's earlier translation of Mo Ti and the subsequent standard volumes by Y. P. Mei and the use of their material in Lin Yu-Tang's *Wisdom of China and India,* a popular compendium which would have implemented Dr. Williams' study. Reliance upon secondary works rather than available sources leads to misinterpretations, as in attributing a familiar post-Confucian statement to that master himself, and in assigning to Lao-tse several passages of Chuang-tzu which deal with immortality. The distinction between the Hinayana and Mahayana forms of Buddhism seems not to be glimpsed, and the Chinese are said to have been "handicapped for centuries by a cumbersome alphabet which has only recently been improved." There are numerous other confusions or oversimplifications in subject matter and chronology, along with various unsubstantiated and unilateral statements such as several in the rosy evaluation of Karl Marx and a peculiar though eloquent comparison of St. Francis with Napoleon and Henry Ford.

Although the book was printed late in 1951, it seems to have been written in 1949 and loses force through several comments which scarcely would have been made after the full communist conquest of China and the outbreak of the Korean war. Such fine and respected persons as the author and publishers might have made a more scholarly contribution had they given concern to revision in regard to both content and time. The work is so commendable in spirit, objective, and scope that one can hope that Dr. Williams will follow it with a substantial study which will hold a lasting place in libraries on comparative religion and word unity.

EARL CRANSTON

Man Is Not Alone, by Abraham Joshua Heschel, New York, Farrar, Straus & Young, 1951, pp. 305, $3.75.

The subtitle of this volume is "A Philosophy of Religion," and two problems, that of God (pp. 1-176) and that of living (pp. 179-296) come under discussion. The second section, which is an exposition of Judaism, is not only the flower, but probably provided the roots for the philosophy, and is an easy approach to the first part of the book. It is excellent in its conclusions. Primary stress is laid not on institutions, or creeds, on the emotional or the rational, but on that piety that is born of a sudden awareness of the ineffable in the soul, experienced in an unpremeditated flash, accompanied by awe and terror. It is not controlled by the needs or desires, tangible, social, or even eschatological, but by that inner devotion which is itself divine and is conscious of a reciprocal covenant with the ineffable (pp. 231, 234, 241, 273-286), and expresses itself in that sacrificial self-giving which is compatible with the presence of God who is united with all life (pp. 266-286).

Turning back to the problem of God (pp. 1-176) in which the philosophy of religion is presented, though informed by the jacket that it defies categorization, we shall attempt to state what seems to be the general line of thought. A major assumption is that ideas such as the sublime, the universal, the one, the ineffable (incommunicable, beyond the power of speech) are *innate,* and thus are not arrived at through experience, but by an immediate awareness, which is self-validating (pp. 7, 57, 58, 63, 81-83, 97, 98, 104-109). Surely this theory, long in vogue received its death warrant from Locke, and its final obsequies from physiological psychology. As an integral part of the theory, man is a citizen of two realms; by means of his mind (reason) he scrutinizes the tangible phenomena, while by virtue of his soul he senses the ineffable and "tastes the sacred joy of the imperishable." These two are separated; the mind dealing with things, while our souls are carried away beyond these, out on the endless shore that lies beyond the logical (pp. 4-9, 17, 19, 63). Yet the author endeavors to bridge this gap between a revamped Platonism and modern psychology. We are assured that this awareness of the ineffable is not esoteric knowledge, but is the climax of thought (p. 19), and that by applying rational methods much can be achieved in our quest of God (p. 56). Further, the sources of religion are found only in the concrete events, acts, and insights of the pious man who is the recipient of the awareness not of man, nor of the cosmos, but of the ineffable (pp. 53-55).

The author's style is epigrammatic, often elusive. His urgent emphasis is on inner, selfless piety; as a whole, the book may find its chief contribution as a guide to reflective devotions. The system of thought qualifies as a type of neoörthodoxy, which is supported by oft-repeated assertions, pleasing to tradition, rather than to psychology. That it will win a modern audience may be questioned. However, with ever more adequate interpretations of the "ineffable," which must follow our in-

creasingly accurate knowledge of the cosmos and of man, the majesty, the mysteries and the vitalities of the beyond and the within are increased, not diminished, and remain a challenge and a strength to Man who is not alone. I. G. MATTHEWS

S. O. S.: The Meaning of Our Crisis, by Pitirim A. Sorokin, Boston, Beacon, ©1951, pp. xi, 177, $2.50.

Professor Sorokin regards this book as the continuation of a task which was begun in several earlier works. With these earlier volumes he is not displeased, for he writes: "The majestic tragedy of historical processes has been unfolding according to the schedule clearly delineated. . . . Not a single important point in these works has been repudiated by history. . . . What is needed now is a comprehensive outline of the main development of the crisis of our age from 1940 up to the present moment."

The first half of the book is satire rather than sociology. It consists of three essays which the jacket blurb places in the company of *Praise of Folly* and *Sartor Resartus,* a judgment which is influenced by the reference in the author's preface to the "great examples" of Erasmus and Carlyle. In depicting the destructive trend in human affairs, Sorokin has "intentionally abandoned dry, scientific description in favor of a dramatic, impressionistic-expressionistic portraiture." He has also, intentionally or unintentionally, abandoned clarity and accuracy at many points.

The satire never quite comes off. It does not hurt; it does not irritate; it does not tickle. This is, I think, because it is too inclusive and too vociferous. It lacks contrast and subtlety. Thus, the effect is bitter rather than sharp.

In the second part of the book, Sorokin develops his law of polarization, and reviews the causes and fluctuations of totalitarianism. The law of polarization states that "a crisis, calamity, or frustration tends to make explicit and open the implicit and hidden contradictions, whether in one's mind and conduct, or in a social group and institution, or in a given culture." Some extraordinary evidence is used to support this "law." In religious groups, for example, polarization shows itself in a split of many denominations and sects into two or more factions. It shows itself, too, in efforts to reintegrate and consolidate religious organizations. However, since denominational splits have been occurring fairly continuously for several centuries, it would appear rather difficult to know just when our crisis started. Furthermore, is there any proof that the World Council of Churches would not have been formed, crisis or no crisis? It may also come as a surprise to Protestants to know that in conformity to the law of polarization most of the "religious and non-religious persons, groups, and denominations have aligned themselves along either Communist or Catholic fronts." The evidence set forth to confirm the thesis that totalitarianism flourishes in times of crisis is more convincing.

One of the most perplexing features of the book, it seems to me, is that the philosophy of inevitability is combined with an accusatory mood. The leaders of men are high, mighty, and bloodthirsty. Crisis is bringing out the worst in man. Crisis is increasing totalitarianism. What is the remedy? Are there elements in the present which provide the basis for reconstruction? The medicine, says Sorokin, is "peace, and lack of emergency." Indeed! Are high, mighty, and bloodthirsty men to be blamed or pitied when they face inevitable forces which must run their course? If they are not to be blamed, then what is the point of satire unless it is to make a comedy of the human tragedy? But Sorokin isn't laughing.

It goes without much saying that whenever Professor Sorokin writes he reveals cogent insights, but it is to be hoped that neology and erudition will not too easily be confused with profundity. The present work demonstrates that its author has

not yet succeeded in separating himself from those whom he calls the "word-weavers of scholarship" or the "scholarly non-mystical mist-makers." LUKE EBERSOLE

Altruistic Love: A Study of American Good Neighbors and Christian Catholic Saints, by Pitirim A. Sorokin, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. vii, 253, $3.

This is one of a series of studies projected by the Harvard Research Center in Altruistic Integration and Creativity, to demonstrate that human survival depends upon the sublimation of individual egotism by the larger power of creative love and altruism, forces which dispel loneliness, morbidity, fear, hate, misery, and destruction. To this end the eminent sociologist, Dr. Sorokin, interprets and compares two studies according to techniques somewhat at variance with those commonly employed by conventional researchers and statisticians.

The first analysis covers more than one thousand citizens of the United States, most of whom were nominated by their admirers as "good neighbors" in response to a radio appeal. To these were added 112 individuals selected as the most altruistic persons known to certain Harvard students and social workers. These "good neighbors" were found to have helped their less privileged fellows to solve problems of boredom, amusement, recreation, health, lodging, education, and the like. Most of those aided were service men. The majority of "good neighbors" were middle-class married women, of rural origin, with many brothers and sisters, above the average in education, Christians, Republicans or nonpartisans, members of many organizations, with hobbies, and with a friendly outlook upon the world at large. Nearly all of them had reached their felicitous state through gradual growth in normal environment rather than from catastrophic experiences. They tended to possess peace of mind and to love their close relatives most of all, but to include nonrelatives in positions of high, though lesser, affection.

These contemporary American "good neighbors" are then placed over against some 3,090 Catholic saints selected from twenty centuries but clustering especially between the third and seventh centuries, largely middle-aged or elderly unmarried males coming from royal, noble, or otherwise privileged families. Admitting the scarcity of exact detail concerning these worthies, many of whom are entwined with legends, it is suggested that their longevity, all the more remarkable in view of the fact that many of them met martyrdom, may be due to their altruistic outlook and action. They tended to come from Britain and Western Europe, including Italy. They usually pursued the road to sainthood under their own impulses or the urging of friends. Professor Sorokin suggests that a decline in the number of saints during the last four centuries is a normal concomitant of this present "sensate" period which constitutes an unrewarding transition according to his familiar cyclical theory of history.

A summary section correlates the "good neighbors" and Catholic saints in a manner which may be more convincing to the author than to those less devoted to his hypothesis, and concludes that society can be saved from strife and catastrophe by more conscious attention to altruism and love production. "An infinitely intensified study of the sublime 'energy of love' should be on the agenda of history." Several case studies of "good neighbors" and an excursus on Russian Orthodox saints constitute an appendix. No bibliography is needed or supplied. EARL CRANSTON

Cartesian Studies, by Albert G. A. Balz, New York, Columbia University Press, 1951, pp. vi, 328, $4.50.

Accounts of the history of philosophy usually give Descartes full credit for being the first thinker to see the problem of the relationship between the mind and the

body in the modern way, and for advancing, in his conception of interactionism, one possible explanation, which has continued to be favored in principle by many philosophers and psychologists of every generation down to the present time. However, limitations of space and time have led nearly all historians writing in English to do no more than merely allude in passing to the Cartesians, *i.e.*, the successors of Descartes, mostly Frenchmen, who after his death further developed his theories in various directions.

Professor Balz has performed a valuable service in contributing extensive accounts of the more important of these Cartesians to the philosophical journals during the past twenty years, and in now combining them in the first book upon the subject to appear in the English language. He devotes separate chapters to de Cordemoy, Clerselier and Rohault, de la Chambre, Sorbière, de la Forge, and Clauberg. He also ascribes Cartesian developments in the direction of the psychophysical parallelism of Spinoza and Leibniz, as well as Cartesian refutations of Spinoza. He concludes with two chapters in which he compares Descartes and his successors with Whitehead, with Thomists contemporary with the Cartesians, and with Thomists contemporary with ourselves. This is a scholarly and therefore a technical book. It is not easy reading; because the Cartesians did not inherit Descartes' own matchless skill in presenting difficult thought with perfect clarity and distinctness.

My reaction to this book as a whole—a reaction of which I hope that Professor Balz would approve—is a prolonged sigh. If the Roman Catholic Church, instead of returning to Thomism and the Middle Ages, and putting the writings of Descartes upon the *Index*, had afforded toleration and sympathy to the Cartesians, who for the most part, like Descartes himself, professed to be loyal sons of the church, how different the subsequent history of Roman Catholic thought might have been! In rejecting the services of the Cartesians, this church seems to have lost her last opportunity to move in the van of modern thought, and instead has chosen to lag slowly behind, as illustrated perhaps most notably by her tardiness in accepting the contributions of Copernicus and Darwin.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

Progress Is Unorthodox, by Fred I. Cairns, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. x, pp. 185, $2.50.

This racy little volume of twelve chapters is a story of controversy in religion, particularly in the history of Christian thought. Its author carries a vivid memory of harsh and unpalatable doctrines taught him in preparation for a Calvinistic ministry. He mentions the unholy tricks of inflated preachers of presbyteries as they pounced on ministerial candidates with ecclesiastical pomposity which exceeded both piety and knowledge. Somewhere he declares himself now to be a nonsupernaturalist. To Max Otto, the humanist, he pays warm tribute as friend in his present ministry, and the former returns an equally warm tribute in the Foreword.

If some readers of the clergy are weary of reading the books of the present-day deluge on sin, grace, and judgment (of neoörthodoxy), this book will blow a fresh and stiff autumnal breeze (and, incidentally, furnish some excellent sermon material). The heretics are held up as the saviors of mankind while the institutionalists and traditionalists are unmasked as obstructionists to the quiet but sure surge of progress.

Some sample sentences will indicate the tenor of the author's thought and style: "Sin, as religion has so long conceived it, is not the major obstacle to the development of life today; rather is it the unforgivable habit of orthodoxy to use every crisis as a cause for 'other world' dependence, and to emphasize at all times hopelessness in

human initiative and ingenuity." On sin: "theologians have always delighted more in examining the idea than in dealing with the fact." "Still it is 'sin' that makes religion vital for the orthodox, not the overcoming of sin—that is an admitted impossibility." Unitarianism "was the hope that man might not outgrow his faith, for it was a determination that faith should grow with man, but always a step ahead. . . ." "That which lives for ten thousand years does not die in a moment; the Inquisition itself was an earlier sign of the approaching death of superstition and fear and dogma; the utterance of the priest in the twentieth century [Fulton J. Sheen] is one more groan of the dying patient. . . ." "It is the record of history implicitly, if not explicitly, that men who have the highest regard for the deity of Jesus have the least regard for their fellow men, and those who regard others with decency and dignity are often inclined to honor humanity still more by including Jesus among the sons of men." "And to the present day wars have been blessed more ardently by the clergy of Christ than by humanists. . . ." "There has never lived one more certain of his ground than John Calvin; even God himself must often have wondered whether He or Calvin was right." "In theological school, some of us memorized the 'five points' [of Calvinism] by associating them with the word TULIP" [total depravity, universal condemnation, limited atonement, irresistible grace and perseverance of the saints]. "One historian relates an interesting fact about such councils as the one at Nicæa: 'Unanimity was generally gained on these points by exscinding the dissentient minority.'" And so on.

VERGILIUS FERM

A Sleep of Prisoners, by Christopher Fry, New York, Oxford University Press, 1951, pp. 49, $2.

The Religious Drama Society invited Christopher Fry to write a play for the Festival of Britain. He talked over the idea with a friend, Michael MacOwan, who suggested that the play should be, not one written to be performed in a church, but one in which the action took place in a church. Near Fry's home in the Cotswolds is the village of Burford, where, in 1649, six Cromwellian soldiers were imprisoned in the church; one of them carved his name on the font. From this came the play *A Sleep of Prisoners.* Its recent production in St. James' Church, New York City, has attracted wide interest and the subsequent tour of the London company is taking the play over a large area of the country.

Christopher Fry's six previous plays had built up a growing respect for this English dramatist that reached its height in *The Lady's Not for Burning.* Here is a writer with a gift for making words sing. There was a poetry of experience about what he wrote that made his plays an adventure in beauty of thought and imagery. A reading of *A Sleep of Prisoners* was, therefore, disappointing when it did not fulfill the anticipation that came from acquaintance with the previous work of Fry. Had this review been completed at that point, it would have emphasized the failure of the dramatist to maintain his previous level of workmanship. But it was remembered that our experience with *The Lady's Not for Burning* was reversed; the play was seen first and then read. So we went to see *A Sleep of Prisoners.* Once more we were reminded that a play is written for acting, not for reading; and an earlier draft of a review was thrown away as an utterly false and inadequate judgment.

As drama in a church, it was one of the most thrilling experiences of theatre we have ever had. It is intense drama and superb poetry. We came out of the church chastened by the beauty of the play and deeply moved by its revelations of greatness and penetrating insight. We repeated quietly to ourselves words we had

just heard: "O God, the fabulous wings unused, Folded in the heart" and "Affairs are now soul size."

By all means see the play if you can. If you cannot, read the book with as much imagination as you are able to command and let its allegory of faith in God speak to our day and to our need. Dramas like this are not written in every age.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, by Ernst Cassirer, translated by Fritz C. A. Koelin and James P. Pettegrove, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951, pp. xiii, 366, $6.

The term, "The Enlightenment," is used loosely to indicate the philosophy and thinkers of the eighteenth century in Germany and in France in particular. Such names as Leibniz, Diderot, Montesquieu, d'Alembert, even up to Rousseau, come readily to mind. They depict divorce from true religion, which seeks truth and philosophical search along the lines of nature, science, society, history, and psychology.

In this volume, by Ernst Cassirer, we have a work of erudition in the highest degree, comprising an enormous amount of philosophical study. Although Leibniz lived most of his life in the seventeenth century, his philosophy is rather that of the Enlightenment, which no longer chooses to consider philosophy as an isolated substance of the intellect; it presents the totality of the intellect in its true function. The author, Ernst Cassirer, gives not so much history of individual thinkers as a history of the ideas of this epoch. It was what Kant calls *sapere aude* (dare to know). The seventeenth century had seen the task of a construction of the philosophical system wherein knowledge seemed attainable only when thought, starting from the highest, succeeded in spreading the light of this certainty over all being and all knowledge. The eighteenth century abandons this kind of deduction and proof. Phenomena are the data of experience, and the Enlightenment constructs its ideal according to the model and pattern of contemporary natural science.

One of the most interesting chapters—there are only seven in addition to the index—is perhaps not the one on religion, although that is excellent, but the one on the "Conquest of the Historical World." Montesquieu provides, however, a religious challenge in saying, "The corruption of every government begins almost always with the corruption of its principles." And law is not simply the sum total of that which has been decreed and enacted; it is "ordering order," not "ordered order."

A better word for Enlightenment is perhaps the original German *"Aufklärung,"* which rather suggests an unfolding and development. We see it in Voltaire, who said that we are not born with the strength to walk, but whoever is born with two feet will some day walk; and similarly freedom is not simply liberty, but to know the rights of man; for to own them is to defend them.

The paragraphs, characteristically German, in expression are somewhat prolix; but the language maintains clarity. This book appeared in the original in German in 1932, and now we have this excellent edition in English. The translators have generously filled the book with the equivalent in German or Latin or French. I do not suppose any reader coming across the expression, "most minute explorer of most minute things" would object to *minutissimarum rerum minutissimus scrutator.*

JOHN LANGDON JONES

Albert Schweitzer: A Vindication, by George Seaver, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 120, $2.

If every man is entitled to a friendly biographer, few can claim so passionate a defender as Seaver is of Schweitzer. At best this is a helpful commentary on

Schweitzer by a man well-qualified for the work, author of a standard biography of his subject. In its poorest light, this book is a brawl between two able men of letters with Dr. Schweitzer the innocent (and amused?) bystander. The present volume was produced in reply to a vigorous criticism of Schweitzer's philosophy by John Middleton Murry, *The Challenge of Schweitzer,* published in July, 1948. During the same summer—presumably for the author, a very hot one—Seaver ripped off this indignant defense of the missionary and presented it for publication in November. The time lag is due, say the publishers, to the congestion in the book printing industry. The author, had he known, might well have used the time for a calmer and less vindictive presentation, as befits the subject.

Seaver begins by paying tribute to Murry as "a distinguished literary critic (probably the best we have) . . . honest, independent . . . original . . . sensitive." But after that polite touching of the gloves the slug fest is on with Seaver out for blood, waxing warmer throughout the eleven rounds. At the end the author is an exasperated and winded contender but Murry seems to have been put in his place for daring the challenge.

For all its heated atmosphere this book is profitable to anyone seeking to sound the depths of Schweitzer's thought. Most of the famous physician's philosophy is high-lighted in the controversy, with Seaver taking his adversary's book chapter by chapter for spirited reply. Murry charges that Schweitzer considers history "meaningless" and accordingly has set forth an unknowable and impersonal Jesus. Seaver objects on both counts. To be sure, Schweitzer does abandon hope of really understanding what happened in the past, but he welcomes the witness of history wherever it can be brought forward to make truth more easily recognized. Nevertheless, "truth," quoting Schweitzer, "requires no other authority than that which it contains within itself . . . truth possesses such power of carrying conviction that it has no need to turn to history for recommendation" (p. 15). Schweitzer distinguishes between natural history and human history. The first is without meaning in the sense that no ethical purpose can be ascribed to it. But human history has its meaning in the goal toward which it points. Its true reading is not retrospective but eschatological.

Jesus is indeed unknowable if one insists on knowledge before allegiance, as Murry would have it, but with Schweitzer the approach is reverse, says the author; the ethic of love is prior to the vision of love. Seaver continues: ". . . . it is only in embarking on the perilous adventure of following [Jesus] unknowingly and into the unknown that we ever come to know him truly" (p. 109).

The reverence-for-life doctrine, says Murry, is impractical in modern society and is but a justification after the fact of Schweitzer's choice of a missionary's career in primitive Africa (p. 36). A gross misunderstanding, our author replies. No one sees clearer than Schweitzer himself that this world is not ethical, is indifferent to ethics. But a well-ordered society can only come into being as a result of the practice of the ethic of reverence for life. Schweitzer would by no means advocate that all men flee to the fringes of civilization as he has done, but he would see the necessity of all men getting under the load of humanity each to do his infinitesimal part, which is the simple interpretation the good doctor would give to his presence in the jungles of Africa. For Schweitzer ethical existence is the highest manifestation of spirituality.

The extremely polemical character of this book is, undoubtedly, not the proper overarch for the lofty philosophy of Schweitzer, but this reviewer found it refreshing

to have something of the old-fashioned vigor of Origen *contra Celsum* brought into play. With it all, one cannot escape the feeling that Murry tackled Schweitzer for the same reason Leigh-Mallory gave for repeatedly challenging Mt. Everest, "Because it is there."

VERNON B. RICHARDSON

Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros, by Ludwig Koehler and Walter Baumgartner, Vol. I, [Leiden, E. J. Brill], Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. xv, 448, $10.

Since the end of the war teachers of Hebrew have found themselves in the difficult position of trying to teach a language for which there was no good lexicon available. The old (1906) lexicon of Brown, Driver, and Briggs has long been out of print, and there was nothing to take its place. Now this embarrassment is being remedied by the publication of the first volume of a new lexicon by Ludwig Koehler of Zürich and Walter Baumgartner of Basel. The Hebrew words are given in alphabetical order and supplied with translations into both German and English. This bilingual feature is unique and will make the lexicon useful to a larger group of students than has hitherto used one lexicon. The meanings of the Hebrew words are given in modern rather than in the archaic language of the German and English Bibles. This policy greatly enhances the value of the book as a tool for study and understanding. When the second volume appears the student of Hebrew will be well equipped for the pursuit of his study of the languages in which the Old Testament was written. He can be grateful to Professors Koehler and Baumgartner, and to E. J. Brill, the distinguished publisher, for making possible this useful tool for study.

For the professional scholar this work is of the utmost importance. Up until the appearance of the first fasciculus of the Koehler-Baumgartner work in 1948, one had to use either Brown-Driver-Briggs (1906) or one of the German editions of Gesenius' lexicon, such as the 16th edition edited by Frants Buhl (1915). While one could find there references to the earlier literature on various words, he had to search through endless commentaries and journals for the later discussions of important points in Hebrew lexicography. In addition to the work now being published by Brill in Leiden there is also the lexicon of Zorell, of the Pontifical Biblical Institute in Rome, which has now appeared as far as *p* in seven fasciculi. Here the meanings of the Hebrew words are given in Latin, and there are frequent references to discussions in recent books and in the standard biblical journals, including such non-Catholic journals as *Expository Times* and the *Princeton Theological Review.* Koehler-Baumgartner will prove extremely useful as a ready reference to some of the more recent literatures as well as to the mature scholarly judgment of these two well-known Swiss scholars. Their work will certainly not replace the older lexicons, but will supplement them and make quickly available a wealth of material which has appeared since the earlier lexicons were prepared. An obvious feature is the incorporation of much of the vocabulary which has come from the Ugaritic tablets found in 1929 and in subsequent campaigns. One can say that the appearance of this great work marks another milestone in biblical studies and the completion of the second volume will be an occasion for rejoicing on the part of all serious students of the Hebrew Bible.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

A Prostestant Dictionary, by Vergilius Ferm, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. ix, 283, $5.

The author of this volume is the head of the department of philosophy in the College of Wooster. He seems to possess a special aptitude for works of this char-

acter. Of the fourteen books accredited to him eight are compendiums of which he was editor, notably, *An Encyclopedia of Religion,* and of another, coeditor. Those who are looking for a handy desk reference book, serving the purpose of a religious glossary, will find here a mine of information in condensed form. The subjects treated are limited, by design, to the Protestant tradition, and hence in the nature of the case cannot be regarded as exhaustive. The topics are arranged in alphabetical order with numerous cross references, which in many instances add to the fund of information.

To collate a Protestant dictionary and confine its contents within prescribed limits, is a herculean task. To determine what should be included and what is to be omitted is a difficult matter. On the whole the author has shown fine discrimination in the selection of his material. Perhaps the balance is not always properly maintained. Some topics which may seem to many to be of vital significance in our Protestant faith receive scant consideration, or do not appear at all, while others of apparently minor importance are accorded much larger space. Certain omissions can scarcely be accounted for. Why the lexicographer, who for many years has given courses in the history of Christian thought, should have omitted any reference whatsoever to that outstanding church historian and apostle of church union in the nineteenth century, Dr. Philip Schaff, is passing strange; and should not the Mercerburg theology sponsored by such religious leaders as Frederick Augustus Rauch, John W. Nevin, Philip Schaff, and others, have been accorded a place alongside of Puritanism which it so bitterly opposed and which is still a dominant note in a large sector of American Protestantism?

Certain minor errors, inadvertently, crept into the text. Michael Schlatter, (p. 234), came to America in 1746, not 1748, and could not have organized a coetus in 1747, had he arrived the year later. Also the Evangelical Congregational Church (p. 92) is not a split from the Evangelical Association, but a remnant of the United Evangelical Church that refused to come into the merger when the Evangelical Association and the United Evangelical Church reunited in 1922 to form the Evangelical Church.

There may be other minor inaccuracies and omissions, but, by and large, the volume will serve a useful purpose, and all of us are indebted to the author for his indefatigable labors in providing us with a dictionary of such proportions pertaining to our Protestant tradition.

CHARLES E. SCHAEFFER

Beyond Mythology, A Challenge to Dogmatism in Religion, by Richard W. Boynton, Garden City, Doubleday, 1951, pp. xiv, 257, $3.

Dr. Boynton, professor of philosophy at the University of Buffalo and translator of Alfred Loisy's *My Duel with the Vatican,* attacks supernaturalism and inveighs particularly against the traditional Christian beliefs which he finds hopelessly antiquated, impossible of acceptance by intelligent persons. He dismisses Catholicism as autocratic, antiquarian, and dogmatic, although he gives it credit for scholarly apologetics. He reserves his chief shafts for Protestants, who are assumed to appeal from the authority of the church to that of the Bible inerrantly inspired from cover to cover, to believe in the creation of the universe in six days, and to advocate a Christological, redemptionist, and eschatological fundamentalism inflexibly comprehending all dogma since the fourth century.

The churches are alleged to be "essentially missionary and propaganda organiza-

tions" which ignore facts, discourage doubts and questions, and refuse to examine their own presuppositions and actions. Man has created God in his own image, although the original Yahweh is asserted to have been a thunderstorm. Christianity has interpreted God in patterns fixed by Hebrews, Alexandrians, and modern standpatters. Using arguments as old as Celsus, Dr. Boynton sees Jesus as Loisy's "Nazorean," a simple follower of John the Baptist and potential leader of an insurrection, transformed into the post-mortem saviour of a mystery drama. Paraphrasing Andrew D. White and Bertrand Russell, he then presents what he terms a higher religion, namely, naturalistic theism, stemming from human experience and scientific research, and centring in processes and values which are preferable to beliefs. These values when felt and shared are objective; they are both secular and spiritual and affect only the present life, which is all there is. To his own positive views the author devotes only a small fraction of the space given to his attacks upon "supernaturalism."

In reproaching theologians for being the product of a carefully conceived and jealously guarded system of indoctrinated education, and for resting in a state of blissful ignorance of critical history and philosophy, the professor seeks to clinch his point by reference to his unhappy sojourn a generation ago in a seminary which he seems to consider to have been as liberal and scholarly as any of its kind. One wonders whether the erstwhile student, for all his tributes to his sincere though muddled teachers, has done full justice to their views or thought processes. For others of us of the same generation found our professors open-minded, critical, scientific, devoted to the search for truth. Their writings remain as evidences of objectivity, receptive to new hypotheses and discoveries. What, too, of the literature of most recent decades, of philosophers like Whitehead and Hocking, of philosophic theologians like Lyman, Brightman, and Rudolph Otto, to say nothing of even the neoörthodox and near-neoörthodox exponents of an ever-maturing system of symbols and values? What of the archæologists and historians of religion? What books has Dr. Boynton been reading?

One might wish that as a philosopher the author would reconsider Plato's allegory of the cave. Might he not find himself among the captives chained to its dark bench, shadowboxing with the images upon its rear wall? He might then reëxamine his position, free himself from his misconceptions of current liberal religion, and move out into the light of day, to discover that those he has unwittingly caricatured have emerged before him.

EARL CRANSTON

BOOK NOTICES

The Christian Understanding of God, by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. ix, 277, $3.75.

Every reader will find this brilliant study stimulating and thought provoking, but probably none will agree with it in every detail. This is the ninth book which the author has written upon theological topics, although he has not yet completed his forty-fourth year. In this volume, which, although part of a series, can be read apart from the rest (p. viii), the author, according to the index, cites Aquinas 28 times; Whitehead 23; Farrar 19; Augustine and Barth 18 each; Brunner 13; Calvin, Kierkegaard, and Tillich 12 each; Hocking and Charles Hartshorne 10 each. These are apparently the authorities, outside the Bible itself, by whom he has been most influenced; and since the Angelic Doctor is the one most often cited, it seems safe to assume that Ferré is in most respects conservative. For instance, he has the orthodox indifference to the difficulties with the problem of evil which have led many in our time to suppose that the power of God must in some sense be limited. He sharply, although courteously, attacks Brightman for holding this heresy, apparently choosing to attack him instead of Whitehead, now deceased, who held a somewhat similar view on this point. Ferré seems guilty of an anthropomorphism when he insists emphatically that "God both *is* and *has* a body" (p. 35, Ferré's italics). He is heretical enough (from the standpoint of St. Thomas) to say that no human beings will be damned eternally, but that all will ultimately be redeemed, after undergoing corrective punishments in purgatory (pp. 228 ff.) This heresy has appealed strongly to this reviewer ever since reading Browning's *Ring and the Book* and Ibsen's *Peer Gynt,* although he is a little troubled at the thought that on this supposition we shall have to welcome brother Adolf Hitler and his colleagues on the occasion of their arrival in heaven, subsequent to their sojourn in purgatory, possibly prolonged. William James, it will be remembered, was at one time disturbed by the thought that heaven will be a place in which the Chinese and Hottentots will be in a majority. Ferré might no doubt say that after being thoroughly reconditioned in Purgatory we shall be free from all such prejudices. This is certainly a stimulating book, and it suggests intriguing prospects and possibilities which probably few of us have considered.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The Gospel of God, by Anders Nygren, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. 104, $2.

In the Church of Sweden, it is customary for a newly consecrated bishop to despatch a pastoral letter to the membership of his diocese. *The Gospel of God* embodies the diocesan communication of Dr. Anders Nygren on his recent appointment as bishop of Lund. The book holds a double interest. In the first place, Bishop Nygren is, with Professor Regen Prenter of Denmark, probably the foremost contemporary theologian of Scandinavian Lutheranism. His notable work, *Agape and Eros,* is one of the half-dozen most widely read and discussed contributions to current theology, to be taken into account in every consideration of the meaning of "love" in the New Testament and in Christian thought. Since 1947, he has been president of the Lutheran World Federation. And he is a valued and conscientious vice-chairman of the Study Committee of the World Council of Churches. His book also has considerable intrinsic interest. As might be expected, in view of its purpose,

it is in the nature of a devotional homily. Here the characteristic outlook and teaching of a type of Protestant churchmanship all too little known in this country are set forth with uncommon grace, reverence, and charm. For behind the writing stands the man. And great as is Bishop Nygren's scholarly influence, to those who have had the privilege of personal association with him he must always be thought of preëminently as a saint even more than as a scholar—humble, generous, devout, the winsome exemplar as well as interpreter of the deepest realities of the "Gospel" which he here seeks to make clear and compelling to those committed to his pastoral care. All of these characteristics speak through his pages with translucent earnestness and sincerity.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

The Right to Heresy: Castellio against Calvin, by Stefan Zweig, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 238, $3.

This book first appeared, both in German and in English, in 1936. At that time more than one specialist in the history of the Reformation pointed out that Zweig had exaggerated Calvin's rôle in the burning of Servetus, and had distorted the record in other respects. Indeed, the volume as a whole is spoiled by the fact that the author tries to develop his case almost entirely in terms of black and white. He is writing (at the time of Hitler's ascendancy) a tract about fanaticism versus humanism in order to show that although oppression and ruthlessness may win a short-range victory, the spirit of freedom cannot ultimately be quenched or destroyed. In order to drive home his thesis, Zweig makes Calvin out to be a pathological protofascist, and he makes Castellio out to be more irenic than he was. The fact remains, however, that the story of Calvin's exercise of autocratic power in Geneva, his part in the murder of Servetus, and his persecution of Castellio is melancholy and enraging enough when all exaggerations have been eliminated. It is also true that Castellio was at least a century ahead of his time in his conception and formulation of the principles of toleration. Finally, the book is absorbingly interesting because of Zweig's great gifts for re-creating historical situations, for sketching character, and for making a drama out of a battle of ideas. If approached as a piece of historical scholarship, *The Right to Heresy* must be regarded as defective because the author is so intemperately partisan, and because he reads the issues of the twentieth century too flatly back into the sixteenth. But if it is approached as a "moral tale" where types are employed to symbolize the endless struggle between tyranny (especially intellectual and religious tyranny) and freedom, then the book contains an eloquent, impassioned message which is by no means out of date.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

The Scandal of Christianity, by Emil Brunner, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1951, pp. 116, $2.

In these lectures Dr. Brunner sums up the main themes of his interpretation of the gospel. As his title indicates, he sees in the central Christian doctrines truths which are diametrically opposed to the doctrines of other religions and of philosophy. For Brunner a rational theology can make nothing of historical revelation, the Trinity, original sin, atonement, and resurrection. From the point of view of the rational idea of God, the Christian faith is false, but also from the point of view of the Christian faith, the rational idea of God is false. Neither can be proved. The decision is the decision of faith. Brunner's central theme is the personal character of the Christian revelation. His thesis that rationalism always dissolves the truth of the gospel is surely to be taken seriously. But while we make allowances for the brevity of this exposition, we have to say that Brunner puts the opposition between Christian faith

and reason in such absolute fashion that he seems to relieve the theologian of all inner tension concerning the relation of the faith to human truth and experience. The extreme character of Brunner's opposition of faith to reason comes out in his statement about the "body of death." He says: "The body of death is the historical, earthly experience *as such,* which in its deepest roots is affected by the separation from God and is for that reason self-contradictory in its whole character" (pp. 119 f.). This seems to allow no place for even a dialectical conversation between theology and the rest of human experience. It may be the brevity of the present book which gives the impression that Brunner has done less than justice to his own position that there is a point of contact between the gospel and sinful man. To insist that the gospel is a truth so completely distinguished from all other human knowledge is surely not to do justice to the fulfillment of all truth which we know in Christ.

DANIEL D. WILLIAMS

A Handbook on the Papacy, by William Shaw Kerr, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. 322, $4.75.

Opposition to the appointment of an ambassador to Vatican City is one thing. Opposition to the claim that the bishop of Rome is the supreme head and infallible teacher of the church universal is another, although not necessarily unrelated, thing. The Anglican bishop in northern Ireland who is the author of this book addresses himself to the second of these questions, and he has produced a polemical manual which is a model of dispassionate but cogent historical argument. Taking his departure from the Vatican decrees of 1870, Bishop Kerr demonstrates that their appeal to history—notably the New Testament, the so-called ecumenical councils, and the Church Fathers—cannot be substantiated. The passages cited or alluded to in the decrees are subjected to detailed scrutiny and are found in most instances to be torn from their context, distorted, allegorized, or falsified. Then, for good measure, other illuminating historical evidences are adduced to show how fallible, morally as well as intellectually, popes have actually been (*e.g.,* Liberius in the fourth century, Honorius in the seventh, Innocent VIII in the fifteenth), and how the papal schism, unresolved claims of counterpopes, the Inquisition, the condemnation of Galileo, and the procedures of the Vatican Council itself make the pretensions of the Roman pontiff incredibly presumptuous, not to say absurd. The reviewer does not share Bishop Kerr's opinion that "we can all endorse" that preëminence which the bishop of Rome took upon himself in the fifth century (p. 169), natural though this was in the historical situation, but he both shares and endorses the temper and substance of the argument.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

The Clue to Christian Education, by Randolph Crump Miller, New York, Scribner, 1950, pp. ix, 211, $2.75.

In a sense this book marks the turning of the tide in religious education toward maturity. Ever since the child became the centre of attention in the educational process as a result of the new psychology a generation ago, techniques and methods have dominated the scene. During this period religious education has followed the lead of general pedagogy. "It is not what you think but how you think that is important." Meantime, content material has occupied a minor spot upstage. Now comes a book which restores the perspective by emphasizing the importance of theology in religious education. The author calls on the church school to present Christ as the object of faith. The main task is to teach the truth about God . . . in such a way that

the learner will accept Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior, will become a member of the Body of Christ, and will live in the Christian way" (p. 37). One can relate the teaching about God to daily experiences. Thus the author discusses how a group of fourteen-year-olds rewrote the Apostles' Creed in their own words as an interpretation. In similar fashion he treats the important beliefs of the Christian faith and how to present them to various age groups. Thus he throws light on the teaching of redemption, man, the church, the Bible, and other great themes. In his chapter on death, he states: "It is the nature of God rather than the physiology of man that determines one's belief in immortality. If God places a value on man, then God will give man life everlasting; but man cannot get it on his own account" (p. 190). If the book has one weakness, it lies in the fact that it attempts to cover the whole range of Christian truth and how to teach it in two hundred pages. Be it said, however, that its purpose is not to be exhaustive but to suggest how one can take the great ideas of Christianity and relate them to the individual at various ages. It should encourage other writers to illuminate the various aspects of Christian truth for use in teaching.

CHARLES A. ANDERSON

The Way of Mysticism: an Anthology, edited by Joseph James, New York, Harper, n. d., pp. 274, $3.

The knowledge which men possess of the mystics and of mystical religion is still fragmentary and frequently distorted despite the strong tide of mysticism which has rolled across the centuries. The editor rightly points out in his introductory remarks that there are records from all ages and from all countries which document the fact of the universality of mysticism. The common feature of all the mystics is that they have sought God in order that, finding him, their lives might be saved from division and brought into effective unity. It is this unified, integrated life which they have found through mystical experience. Hence, as a group, they represent one of the most noble bands of religious people the world has ever known. Speaking of them, Mr. James writes as follows: "It is the simple truth to say that in all history no other characters match theirs for unquenchable happiness, serenity of spirit, or peace of mind." Certainly we should have more knowledge of such remarkable people. The purpose of this anthology is not to argue about mysticism or to weigh its pros and cons, but rather to give the mystics the chance to speak for themselves as to what mystical religion and the mystic's way of life mean to them. The book seeks to do this by showing that mystical religion is a two-way thrust, God turning to man and man turning to God. The mystic discovers that before he sought God, God was seeking him. The search is always a double one as Rufus Jones used to say. The approach of God to man is covered under four captions: "The Unexpected," "The Still Small Voice," "The Hem of His Garment," and "His Exceeding Brightness." Man's approach to God entails the conquest of the self that God may find man. The meeting of man and God takes place in the great stillness of the soul where love's fulfillment is found. Does the book succeed in imparting to the reader a thorough understanding of the mystic's way and philosophy of life? The reviewer cannot give an unqualified "Yes" to that query. The truth is that while many pertinent things are said about their views by the mystics themselves, the volume does not seem to provide a good guide for one who might try to embark upon the mystical pathway himself. Apparently Mr. James felt this was a weakness of the anthological part of the book, for he has appended an epilogue in the American edition, stating that many felt that the Great Britain edition, which ended with the anthology itself, left certain important matters undiscussed. The same impression was made upon me. While the epilogue is

an effort by the author to correct this weakness, it would have been much better if the correction had been made by introducing suitable source material into the body of the anthology. Students of mysticism will want to study this anthology. Perhaps in the light of the criticism of this review and that of other reviewers, a more adequate anthology may one day be produced.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

The Idea and Practice of World Government, by Gerard J. Mangone, New York, Columbia University Press, 1951, pp. xi, 239, $3.75.

Few current topics present more general interest and more complete misunderstanding than that of world government. Americans, particularly, run the scale between those who believe it attainable sometime next week and the D.A.R. who see in it the threat of communism and the disappearance of the United States. It is too much to hope that many of these extremists will read Dr. Mangone's book. Perhaps it is just as well, for the former would be greatly disillusioned and the latter would want the author examined by the House Un-American Activities Committee. The book is divided into four parts: The Theory of World Government; The Progress of World Government; Justice, International Law, and World Community; and, Democracy and World Government. Under these headings the author takes the reader through a complete history of the development of the idea as a final step in the realization of international peace. The numerous difficulties in the way are by no means minimized, but stressed. The author concludes that progress toward world government will come only as a result of desire for "the increasing satisfaction of both the economic and spiritual wants of the individual. . . ." It will be a process of evolution and must follow the spread of world culture and the development of a world community. "World government is but a technique of doing something on a large scale, not a guarantee of a better life for all." It may be necessary to use force in its attainment, as democracy frequently has had to do to survive. The hopeful note is not too apparent but it is perhaps better that we are reminded of the obstacles in the way of a "more perfect union" of the world. An eighteen-page bibliography and an adequate index are most helpful.

R. C. MC DANEL

This Grace Wherein We Stand, by George Johnstone Jeffrey, New York, Scribner, ©1949, pp. 96, $2.

Here is a book on preaching written in the eventide of a long and distinguished ministry by a Scottish Presbyterian. It makes no pretence at originality or at breaking new ground. The subjects treated are the familiar ones—the perennial theme of the preacher, his resources, the preparation and delivery of the sermon, the maintenance of the devotional life, the interrelation between preaching and personality. Dale, Phillips Brooks, Jowett, Gossip—they have all worked over the same topics. What abundantly justifies the publication of this volume is the freshness of the treatment and its relevance to our time, the author's use of experiences accummulated during years devoted to the pulpit and the pastoral office, the positive, practical suggestions which should be helpful not only to candidates for the ministry in theological seminaries but to those who are immersed in parish work and in need of a quickened sense of vocation and of new techniques in preaching. Dr. Jeffrey writes with vigor, warmth, and conviction. He has not allowed himself to be overawed by his predecessors in the Warrack lecture series. He has not hesitated to employ the first personal pronoun. For men who want to know how another man

throughout a lifetime has gone about the business of preparing and preaching sermons, sermons which never failed to command a wide hearing and to exert an uplifting influence, this is a book not to be missed.

R. J. MC CRACKEN

The Book of Jeremiah: Vol. I, by Julius A. Bewer, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 80, 75 cents.

In this, the fifth, issue of Harper's Annotated Bible Series Professor Bewer has enriched the 340-year-old translation of the King James Version by an extremely generous measure of explanatory and corrective footnotes. Although these valuable comments cover but approximately one third of the page, the small type employed for this part of the page makes it possible for more material to be presented than is given in the larger type of the King James Version itself. For the great detail of these valuable notes the reader will be grateful. The footnotes are so clearly and intelligently presented that they will serve even the most elementary student. Yet the same notes will be of great value to the scholar, who will watch them carefully for the opinions they express on certain difficult passages in the text of Jeremiah. It is to be hoped that this excellent series may continue to appear without interruption until the entire Bible has been covered.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Faith and Duty, by N. H. G. Robinson, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. ix, 150, $2.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. God and morality, or the theological problem of sin, is the real subject of what is essentially a monograph embodying the results of research into such writers as Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr, and F. R. Tennant. In Chap. I, "The Trend of Thought," Barth is subjected to critical analysis. In him, our author feels, apologetics is totally submerged in dogmatics, and we are left in darkness. There is no point of contact with anything. In Chap. II, "The Theory of Total Corruption," Dr. Robinson considers Brunner's effort at repairing the Barthian total breach between the orders of creation and redemption and at the same time affirming the total sinfulness of natural morality. This is felt to be unsatisfactory on its face, and the criticism is put forward that Brunner's understanding of morality is too Kantian. Chap. III, "Sin As Total Loss of Virtue," is largely devoted to Reinhold Niebuhr. The latter is said to regard "the truth as lying further from Barth than Brunner was able to go" (p. 65); he "is severely critical of any doctrine of total depravity" (p. 66). Yet, says Robinson, he does not really extricate himself from the fundamental dilemma. For "one does not add the slightest degree of credibility to the theological portrait of sinful man by adding to his total depravity the memory, vague or clear, of his perfection, the totally ineffective knowledge of what he ought to be, the uneasiness of a thoroughly bad conscience" (p. 70). What Niebuhr does, therefore, is to "render the inconceivable doubly incredible." In Chap. IV, "The Ethical Approach," secular ethicists are indicted for failure to face up to the seriousness of evil. Dr. F. R. Tennant's account of evil is then considered, and it is concluded that his evolutionary account is too atomistic. In the concluding chapter, "The Moral Solidarity of the Race," Dr. Robinson attempts to give his own solution of the problem. The problem is to reconcile the universality and totality of sin with man's responsibility both as sinner and as able to respond to God—a vast undertaking, as the author fully recognizes. For his answer, it is perhaps fairest for the reviewer now to retire and for the reader to secure an informative, competent, and sensitive book on one of the agelong issues of theology and ethics.

CHARLES W. LOWRY

The Future of Private Enterprise, by George Goyder, Oxford, Basil Blackwell (New York, Macmillan), 1951, pp. vii, 179, $2.

This volume presents an analysis of the problem which has confronted economists and political scientists since the dawn of the "democratic" era: how to maintain the maximum degree of freedom and liberty within the framework of order and authority. The author claims that a "modified capitalism" will go a long way toward solving this problem. The book was written for the British scene, but it contains many valuable insights for those economies of the world which have capitulated to collectivism. The author contends that a "modified capitalism" will achieve a just equilibrium between freedom and order. It will achieve this since it will recognize the just claims and the common purpose of all the parties concerned in a modern industrial society, *viz.,* the shareholders, workers, the community, and the consumer. The establishment of such a system, however, will necessitate a change in the attitude of both the state and industry. The state must not subject industry to continued interference by hampering it with administrative restrictions. It should seek, however, through proper laws, to foster industry's social responsibility. On the other hand, industry must show that it does not need direct government intervention to act responsibly. It should accept voluntarily its social obligations by effecting changes within its own system. The author feels that the inauguration of these changes in attitude will achieve the desired equilibrium between order and freedom. Mr. Goyder believes that the recognition of these desired changes places the Christian businessman under a twofold responsibility: 1. he should take an active interest in the strife, unrest, and lack of common purpose which mar modern industrial society; 2. he should bring the claims of justice inherent to the Christian ethic to bear on the problems of relations between employer and employee. This orientation should lead to "a responsible society," which will be neither capitalistic nor socialistic, "but an order containing elements of each, bearing on its face, in William Blake's phrase, 'the lineaments of satisfied desire,' for the spiritually hungry millions who earn their daily bread in industry" (p. 124). The reviewer feels that this is a noble goal for modern industrial society. This book will not be met with approval by the British socialists and the bureaucrats. It does, however, represent a sincere attempt to come to grips with the political and economic problems which confront Britain at the present. Furthermore, it should give pause to all those gullible American ministers who support the projects represented in "Christian Economics" (*sic!*) and all those who hide their economic views behind the smoke screen of "spiritual mobilization."

KENNETH L. SMITH

These Sought a Country, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 156, $1.75.

The Tipple Lectures in Drew University, 1950, presented a human-interest account of Protestant missions in the fascinating style of Yale's Sterling professor of missions, Kenneth Scott Latourette. Five personalities in the history of Anglo-Saxon missionary endeavor are set forth by Dr. Latourette as embodying the spirit of evangelical outreach. William Carey, Samuel John Mills, Hudson Taylor, Timothy Richard, and Joseph Hardy Neesima are high-lighted as expanding the Christian cause through their unqualified devotion to Christ and to the humanity for which he accepted the cross. This popular portrayal of the accomplishments of the missionary movement should reach the layman and challenge his interest. This is historical writing that is easy to take because the needs, struggles, and objectives

which created the genesis of the foreign mission movement are dramatically incarnated in these major personalities. Not only has Dr. Latourette made what to most of us were only great names into great personalities, but in his concluding chapter, titled "The Conclusion of the Matter," he shares with us his Christian optimism regarding the power of the gospel to change lives and societies. If anyone is haunted by recurring doubts as to the effectiveness of Jesus' mission to humanity, let him keep this chapter within reaching distance.

MILTON C. WESTPHAL

The Book of Thirty Centuries: An Introduction to Modern Study of the Bible, by Stanley Rypins, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. xvii, 420, $7.

This is a book about the texts, versions, and manuscripts of the Bible—subjects which are not generally considered as the more fascinating aspects of the study of the Bible. Yet, some of the most involved problems of textual criticism are presented with a freshness and clarity which will delight and instruct the so-called average reader. It is obvious that the author likes the feel of manuscripts and has gone to no end of trouble to consult many of them. From the principal manuscripts he has picked apt passages to illustrate the differences and other interesting features. This habit of specific reference makes the texts and versions take on character and even personality, so that the reader feels he is dealing not with parchment but with people. The nine chapters of the book are enriched by copious footnotes—some at the bottom of the page and others in a section at the end—two indexes and eight valuable tables, six of which list the principal Greek uncials and papyri. Scholars, as well as beginners, will find of great value this assemblage of detail which might well be called encyclopædic in range.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Vanderbilt Studies in the Humanities, edited by Richmond C. Beatty, J. Philip Hyatt and Monroe K. Spears, Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1951, pp. vii, 275, $3.50.

This attractive volume, first of a contemplated series, shows the range and qualities of work in the humanities at Vanderbilt. As symposia the various essays vary in quality—many of them are on literature; three especially on religion are worthy of note: Kendrick Grobel's "Shepherd of Hermas, Parable II"; J. Philip Hyatt's "The Deuteronomic edition of Jeremiah," and lastly Samuel Sandmel's "Judaism, Jesus, and Paul: Some Problems of Scholarly Research." The essay by Sandmel should be found most stimulating to those interested in the interaction of Christian and Jewish studies of the New Testament period and its background literatures. He points out the fallacy of some modern students who attempt to find out not what first-century Christianity really was, but rather seek for an ancient authority for a modern program. It is for this reason that New Testament scholars have often failed to find in the New Testament what the specialists in modern theology have asserted was there. In his essay he presents the now widely accepted idea that the close study of the Synoptic gospels "have indicated the impossibility of recovering the historical Jesus." Modern scholarship would assess the gospels as throwing light not on the life and teachings of Jesus, but on the views of Jesus as they had crystallized at different stages throughout the developing church. Again and again he asserts the basic principle: The meaning of a passage must be studied in its own context and in the light of its purpose. This thirty-page essay is worth the price of the volume were it alone. It should be read and pondered.

EDWARD C. STARR

The Gospel According to Luke, by Ernest Fremont Tittle, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 274, $3.75.

Few who heard Dr. Tittle regularly in the First Methodist Church of Evanston, Illinois, will ever escape the magnetic pull of his ministry. Few will fail to feel permanently indebted to him. This is the volume on which Dr. Tittle was working at his death. It is a detailed application of the Gospel of Luke, verse by verse, to the whole range of modern problems, as those problems were sensed by this large-hearted Christian. The reader is not only guided through Luke; he is guided (by way of numerous citations) through Dr. Tittle's extensive and varied library. He is guided also through the author's hall of heroes: Jane Addams, Lord Shaftesbury, Grenfell, Gandhi, D. C. Macintosh, Rauschenbusch, and many others. Nor can the reader escape a visit to those frontiers of social action where Dr. Tittle was so valiant a fighter: racial animosities, economic injustices, international rivalries, ecclesiastical and theological perversities. In these pages are packed the germ and the gist of many of the author's sermons. Readers will find that the author was as incapable of writing a "thin" book as he was incapable of preaching a "thin" sermon.

PAUL S. MINEAR

Effective Preaching, by Thomas V. Liske, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. 293, $3.50.

In one book the author discusses the delivery of the sermon, the voice, and the prepared speaker, in that order. The last section is three fourths of the book and deals with the preparation of the sermon and the ways to explain, convince, and persuade an audience. It may seem that this is a lot of ground to cover, and it is: but the coverage is neither scanty nor superficial. What the author has to say he says clearly and in a way that makes the book itself an excellent example of effective writing. Father Liske, professor of speech and director of dramatics at Quigley Seminary, writes for the priest, and much of what he says is necessarily outside the province of the non-Catholic, especially in the illustrations and injunctions he favors. If one wishes principles of effective preaching, this is an excellent book. If one is a Catholic priest or student for the priesthood, it is a better book.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Wings of Faith, by H. V. Martin, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. 132, $2.75.

This interesting little treatise, which provides a consideration of the nature and meaning of Christian faith in the light of Soren Kierkegaard, takes its title from a contention of the Danish theologian. It is his contention that the man of Christian faith is like a bird which alights on a slender, swaying branch. This frail twig may break at any moment from the weight of the bird, but the little creature perches there undismayed because it knows that should the branch break, it has wings to bear it up. So with the man of Christian faith. He lives undismayed in the midst of the uncertainties of existence because he knows that when all else breaks way beneath him, he has the wings of faith to bear him up. Kierkegaard's conception of faith is a dynamic one. For him faith is no mere state of inner assurance which imparts to the believer an emotion of security present and future. Faith does indeed begin with a profound trust in God made possible through Jesus Christ, but faith swiftly passes beyond that to the commitment of one's all to God in the adventure of life with Christ. It is at this point that the Danish thinker was highly critical of

the established Lutheran church in the Denmark of his day. Too many therein felt that faith was simply a justifying influence rather than also an energy which sent one out into life to "reduplicate" the very life of the Master. Without the fulfillment of faith in life Kierkegaard regarded it as incomplete and unworthy of the existential commitment required by a genuine Christianity. The volume is commended to any who desire to penetrate some of the more profound positions of Kierkegaard and who may want also to deepen their own faith.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Bernardine Realino: Renaissance Man, by Francis Sweeney, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. 173, $2.75.

This reviewer had never heard the name of Bernardine Realino until this book came to his desk. The list of new Roman Catholic saints grows very long. Yet one would not gainsay the value of a life like Realino's, even though the miraculous element will often make the non-Catholic reader stumble. This Jesuit priest died four years before the Pilgrims struck Cape Cod. A roaring crowd stormed the scene of his deathbed, and practically broke up the funeral, in a mad scramble for relics of a most obvious saint. Apparitions of Mary, healing miracles innumerable, and predictions that were fulfilled, to say nothing of his indefatigable loving-kindness to prisoners and slaves and poor folks and all folk, spread his fame during his lifetime. To his deep embarrassment, many called him saint while he was alive. We are puzzled then to understand why it took 331 years (in 1947) to "raise him to the altars of the Church." Realino was a north Italian who graduated in law at Bologna, served well in civil administration, and thirsted, as a true son of the Renaissance, for glory in literature. Religious experience led him to the Jesuits, and the exchange of his own fame for the "greater glory of God" (1564). He gave forty-two years to the city of Lecce in southern Italy. He lived to be eighty-six, to the end remarkably active in good works. His supreme labor was in the confessional, a work he professed was to him a burden and a cross, but obedience kept him at it for almost impossible hours day by day through the long years. Father Sweeney writes very gracefully indeed, and one may guess that his scholarship is thorough and reliable.

JOHN W. BRUSH

Falasha Anthology, translated by Wolf Leslau, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1951, pp. xliii, 222, $4.

The fact that Ethiopia is peripheral for most of us does not make the study of that land less interesting. Indeed the student of our Judæo-Christian heritage has much to gain from Ethiopic sources. For example, it is in Ethiopic that the intertestamental books of Jubilees and Enoch are essentially preserved. Professor Leslau is an outstanding authority on Ethiopia, especially on its dialects. The book before us is on the Falashas, or Jews of Ethiopia. The Falashas are the only community of black Jews in the world. They are also noteworthy as being the only Jews who foster monks and nuns. Furthermore, they possess no Hebrew Scriptures of their own but instead use the Ethiopic version of their Christian neighbors. The anthology consists of a devotional midrash on the sabbath, of homilies, of apocalypses, of legends about Old Testament characters, and of prayers. The long introduction about the Falashas and how they live is interesting in its own right. The abundant notes and indices add to the value and usefulness of the book. What the Falashas can mean to the reader depends on the reader. The interest of an obscure minority like the Falashas can be considerable if we realize the varied historical threads in

their make-up. On p. xxix the author tells us that the Falashas have two calendars: 1. one of twelve months of thirty days each, plus five or six intercalary days, and 2. a religious calendar of twelve months which have alternately thirty and twenty-nine days, with a leap month every fourth year. These calendars are, with slight refinement, the old Egyptian and Babylonian calendars respectively. In other words, though the study of the Falashas is essentially in the Ethiopic field, it carries us from the Tigris to the Nile.

CYRUS H. GORDON

Pastoral Care, edited by J. Richard Spann, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 272, $2.50.

This book is well edited and is as comprehensive as the span of human life, and if one considers its prenatal suggestions, even more so. There are two parts. The first and briefer part deals with the background of pastoral care. One suggestive passage in this part touches upon the relation of the modern approach of pastoral duties to preaching. This helpfully emphasizes the insights which the psychological aids in pastoral work can give to pertinent preaching. The second part deals with the field itself, beginning with children and going on through the stages and ages which constitute what our fathers used to call the pilrimage, a figure that no pastoral literature, however modern, should lose sight of. There are nineteen chapters and a writer for each chapter. As with all such books there is inevitable unevenness and a variety of approach not only to the particular subject, but to the pastoral vocation itself. These differences however are minor. The book does possess a unity in spite of them. It suggests the limitation of the old figure of the shepherd. The pastor, to quote, "is no longer a shepherd, but a rancher," and, one might add, a ranger, considering the variety of matters considered in the book. It is a sort of book clinic, and it is in many parts neopastoral and in no part that one can detect, neoörthodox. Psychology and psychiatry are mentioned more frequently than prayer; personality more frequently than sin and redemption. If the writers are not to be thought of as specialists in their limited fields, they can certainly be thought of as research writers. This is illustrated in the chapter on alcoholics. Because of its research the book is worth commending to the minister who is faced with the problems with which the individual pastors deal in our day. What the pastor will find to help him will not be so much a program but suggestions growing out of a modern approach to the modern problems of his ancient calling.

EVERETT C. HERRICK

These Our Children, by Arthur T. Collis and Vera E. Poole, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 157, $2.

These Our Children presents a picture of the home life and social environment of children in an English industrial slum district. The data has been drawn from the case history records of the social workers of this district. The authors have divided this data into three sections. Each section attempts "to show just what the day-to-day life of these children is. To show how the dice are loaded against them from the very beginning" (p. 115). The first section deals with the home life of the children, especially the bad effects of overcrowding and the sufferings of those who have the feeling of being unwanted. The second section deals with the children's life in the streets, their only playground and the place where they learn to pilfer and fight. Section three deals with the available recreation places, *e.g.,* play centres, clubs, movies, and cafés. The authors conclude that these places occupy most of the

children's time when they are not in school. The important social problems which emerged were: child neglect, juvenile delinquency, and substandard family life. The fourth and final section consists of a number of suggestions which the authors offer as partial solutions to the problems encountered. They contend that most of the evils which now exist could be overcome by "a co-ordinated policy of family welfare." The necessary steps for such a program will include:

> . . . what we have to do is to eradicate the slums and replan our towns so as to give every family the opportunity of living in a good home; to make sure that a genuine comprehensive health service concerning every member of the family is made a reality; to widen and enlarge the scope of our educational system in all its aspects; and to make sure that no one suffers from the terrible effects of poverty which so often in the past accompanied unemployment . . . (p. 116).

This solution seems like a large order, but the authors claim that nothing less will suffice. This is a human book and is movingly written. It will be interesting reading for all who have a concern for children, their happiness and welfare.

KENNETH L. SMITH

Renaissance to Reformation, by Albert Hyma, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. 591, $6.

Dr. Hyma, professor of history at the University of Michigan, calls this work "a critical review of the spiritual and temporal influences on medieval Europe." It is a scholarly and valuable contribution in the field of Reformation studies. The author has an excellent treatment of Erasmus and the whole humanist movement. He errs, I believe, in his claim that the Catholic church was forced to choose between Luther and Erasmus as the Jews had to choose between Jesus and Barabbas. Such an analogy suggests that the church adopted the way of Erasmus but history proves otherwise. If there is one section that is weak, it is the chapter on the Reformation in England and Scotland. The author holds that the desire for reform on the Continent was a popular movement but that in England it came down from the sovereigns. But reform did not really come to that land until the time of Elizabeth and then it moved rapidly because of the populace—not because of any ardent desire on the part of the queen. In places one encounters considerable repetition and, here and there, needless description. But Dr. Hyma has performed a real service in his portrayal of the roots and the fruits of the Reformation.

RAYMOND J. BEAN

Let's Live!, by Claude Richards, New York, Exposition Press, ©1951, pp. 206, $3.

This book is a guide for the founding of what the author calls an International League for Better Living, (ILBL), the league to be dedicated to the uplifting of the moral standards and cultural objectives of all who earnestly desire a better life. It is to be family-centred in its organization, international in character—a sort of adjunct to the United Nations. Basic to its organization and maintenance would be the weekly observance of a "Home Evening" by thousands of families. The author places great stress on the instituting of a "Home Evening" as a means of making family life more value-centred and more productive of the wisdom and unselfishness needed for the reconstruction of society. By far the larger part of the book consists of brief sermonic essays on such subjects as "Home is Where the Heart is," "Time Off," "Hands in Prayer," "Your Spiritual Life," "Spending and Saving," etc. These essays are so arranged that, read successively, they constitute a guide to the observance of "Home Evenings" over a two-year span. They are filled and overflowing with practical advice on the widest variety of subjects. Most of the advice is so

good that to question its worth would be rank heresy! Apart from the proposed "Home Evenings" and the ILBL, the book is lacking in originality. It is completely healthy-minded and optimistic. It is also somewhat prosaic and uninspiring. The particular solution which the author proposes to the problems of the world has the benefit of being simple—many would say more simple than profound. Still, it would be difficult to name a book more solidly packed with sage advice.

HARRY B. SCHOLEFIELD

Walt Whitman—Poet of Science, by Joseph Beaver, New York, King's Crown Press, 1951, pp. xv, 178, $2.75.

The thesis of this well-written and scholarly book is that Whitman was not a vague, imprecise thinker—that his knowledge was not scattered and diffuse—but that his abundant use of science was accurate and penetrating. His obvious purpose was to put in his verse such science as would remain valid in the future. Whitman's theory was that the physical world had been slighted by his more romantic predecessors who had limited themselves to love, God, and religion. He wanted to "preserve the equilibrium of the truth that the material world, and all its laws, are as grand and superb as the spiritual world, and all its laws." The author goes into meticulous detail in his analytical study of Whitman's use of fundamental conceptions of astronomy, geology, evolution, chemistry, engineering, biology, and mathematics. He shows that these departments of knowledge were used not as mere sources of allusions but to form an essential part of the structure of poetry. Whitman himself is quoted as having said that science has "interiorly tinged the chyle of all my verse." The book is recommended to Walt Whitman enthusiasts.

EUGENE AYRES

Preaching from Prophetic Books, by Andrew Watterson Blackwood, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 224, $2.50.

This volume has grown out of lectures delivered in Bethel Theological Seminary, and is directed chiefly to students for the Christian ministry. For such a group it is suggestive; packed full with interpretations of the prophets, ample illustrations from far and near, modern applications and an abundance of popular themes. It is good and helpful; liberal yet soundly orthodox; comforting rather than challenging; teaching rather than preaching. Thus it fulfilled its purpose.

I. G. MATTHEWS

Restless Hearts, by Lucette M. Prichard, New York, Bond Wheelwright, ©1950, pp. 109, $3.

Mrs. Prichard has invited us again into the cordial hospitality of her musings and meditations. The reader will be pleased with the privilege, for there is a rare mixture of realism and reassurance in her sensitive paragraphs. She makes no presumptuous effort to exhaust the store of unlimited human emotion and experience, but she carries you along with her on her wistful and reverent journey to the land of spiritual sufficiency and content. Specific needs of the soul will find a compound of heartening uplift and establishment. The general mood will be challenged to new insight and devotion. This little volume is a true adornment and something of a blessing to the weary and heavy-laden. Which, incidentally, is very close to its chief reason for being.

IVAN MURRAY ROSE

Spinoza Dictionary, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. xiv, 309, $5.

This is an attempt to present Spinoza's definitions, propositions, and explanations in his own words. The dictionary arrangement sometimes results in some strange cross-references: *e.g.,* Amazons *see* Women; Amos *see* Words; Ecclesiastes *see* Desire. In the section on Bible he says, "Scripture is sacred, and its words divine so long as it stirs mankind to devotion to God." If this rather novel arrangement secures new readers for Spinoza, it will achieve its purpose.

EDWARD C. STARR

The Dagger and the Cross, by Cuthbert C. Rutenber, New York, Fellowship Publications, ©1950, pp. 134, $1.

The questions of a citizen's duties and responsibilities to his state is a primary consideration in these days of cold wars, increasing armaments, mounting tension, consideration of universal military training, and the apparent stalemate in Korea. All these factors, and many others, combine to make the question of pacifism something more than an academic question. The author has a style which makes for easy reading. He brings to the consideration of his thesis the results of wide reading, buttressed by what both the Old and the New Testament have to say about the age-long conflict between "the dagger," and "the cross." He does not resolve the issue, but sharply outlines the problem. The author appeals to something down deep within each of us which points up the problem of good and evil within the individual and society. He is helpful as one wrestles with the perfect in an imperfect world, with a philosophy of idealism in a world of terrible realism. The book should be helpful to counselors with youth, and to youth who are faced with the necessity of living in two worlds.

FREDERICK B. IGLER

The Endless Quest, by Merlin Hershberger, New York, Exposition Press, ©1951, pp. 60, $2.

The author, rescued from a misspent life, testifies to his belief in prayer, in the Bible, in God's teachings. Brief chapters deal with these various topics.

E. C. STARR

BOOKS RECEIVED

The following list contains volumes of three sorts. Some were assigned for review immediately upon arrival. Up to the moment of going to press we have not received copy. Others are volumes which for one reason or another did not warrant review in our overcrowded pages and would have been listed in this column. Other volumes, several of which warranted extended review, arrived at the moment that the editor received word of the action to suspend publication or during the short period, subsequent to that date, required to notify publishers of our inability to receive additional books for review. No books have been accepted since November 22, 1951.

Parsonage Doorway, by Anna Laura Gebhard, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. 144, $1.75.

Esther, by Norah Lofts, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. 163, $2.50.

You Will Survive after Death, by Sherwood Eddy, New York, Rinehart, ©1950, pp. xi, 250, $2.

All Things Common, by Claire Huchet Bishop, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. xiii, 274, $3.

The Yoga of the Bhagavat-Gita, by Sri Kreshna Prem, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. xxix, 224, $3.

The Code of Maimonides: Book 9, translated by Herbert Danby, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950, pp. xxi, 236, $3.50.

Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior, edited by Pitirim Sorokin, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. viii, 353, $4.

The Christian in Philosophy, by J. V. Langmead Casserley, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. 266, $2.75.

Systematic Theology, by Paul Tillich, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1951, pp. xi, 300, $5.

Man: Mind or Matter, by Charles Mayer, translated by Harold A. Larrabee, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 168, $2.50.

Explorations in Eastern Palestine, IV: Part I, Text; Part II, Pottery Notes and Plates, by Nelson Glueck, New Haven, American Schools of Oriental Research, 1951, pp. xix, 711 (2 vols. paged consecutively), $6 (per vol.).

This is a very important contribution to scholarly knowledge in a field where the author is the most competent man to attempt it.

Johannes Kepler: Life and Letters, by Carola Baumgardt, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. 209, $3.75.

The Mind at Work and Play, by Sir Frederick Bartlett, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 143, $2.50.

The Way of Man, by Martin Buber, Chicago, Wilcox and Follett, 1951, pp. 46, $1.

The Coming of Age of Christianity, edited by James Marchant, Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1951, pp. xvii, 190, $2.50.

Aspects of Liberalism, by L. Berkhof, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. 163, $2.50.

A brisk currying of liberalism and reavowal of Calvinism.

The Kingdom of God, by L. Berkhof, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. 177, $2.50.

Premillennialism is weighed in the balances and found wanting.

An Introduction to the New Testament, by Richard Heard, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. xii, 268, $3.

A new volume in an old field by an English scholar. It is well worth study.

The Genius of the Gospels, by Merrill C. Tenney, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. 124, $2.

". . . a tentative approach . . . from a distinctly conservative position."

Chariots of Fire, by Clarence Edward Macartney, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, pp. 192, $2.

Eighteen sermons on "Bible characters."

The Condensed Bible, edited by William A. Cocke, New York, Exposition Press, ©1951, pp. xxv, 517, $4.

The condensation is achieved through printing the sections which the editor considers most important.

The Snowden-Douglass Sunday School Lessons, 1952, by Earl L. Douglass, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. xii, 467, $2.50.

Selected Writings of Mahatma Gandhi, edited by Ronald Duncan, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. 253, $3.

Crisis and Hope in American Education, by Robert Ulich, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xiv, 235, $3.75.

The Hawthornes, by Vernon Loggins, New York, Columbia University Press, 1951, pp. 365, $5.

The Code of Maimonides: Book 12, translated by Isaac Klein, New York, Yale University Press, 1950, pp. xv, 335, $5.

The Religions of Mankind, by Edmund Davison Soper, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1951, rev. ed., pp. 253, $3.50.

A revised third edition of a very useful volume which appeared in 1921.

The Master, by Max Brod, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. 426, $4.75.

One Great Prison, by Helmut M. Fehling, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xvi, 175, $2.75.

A convincing refutation of Russia's claims that all her POW's have been released.

The Wit and Wisdom of Bertrand Russell, edited by Lester E. Denonn, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. viii, 136, $2.

The Wit and Wisdom of Gandhi, edited by Homer A. Jack, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. xii, 234, $2.50.

Freedom Is the Right to Choose, by Archibald MacLeish, Boston, Beacon, 1951, pp. ix, 186, $2.50.

An inquiry as to America's future. Being *against* communism and totalitarianism is not enough. There must be a relentless search *for* positive values.

Culture and Faith, by Richard Kroner, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1951, pp. xvi, 278, $5.

A complete revision of a volume which appeared in 1928 under the title *Die Selbstverwirklichung des Geistes: Grundriss der Kulturphilosophie.*

Faith Must Be Lived, by Harry Milton Taylor, New York, Harper, ©1951, pp. 188, $2.50.

"No religion is real unless it is psychological . . . and no psychology . . . is adequate unless it is adequately religious."

Autobiography of a Yogi, by Paramhansa Yogananda, New York, Philosophical Library, 1951, 3rd ed., pp. xv, 501, $3.50.

Jesus and the Hidden Bible, by Joseph Hayyim Krimsky, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. xi, 81, $2.75.

There seems little reason for having written this book, absolutely none for publishing it.

The Practice of Evangelism, by Bryan Green, New York, Scribner, 1951, pp. xi, 258, $3.

A volume by the English preacher who recently had thoroughly ordained bishops on the platform while he put refined pep into evangelism.

Prayers for Students, edited by John W. Doberstein, Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, ©1951, pp. 117, 75 cents.

Originally published in 1947 while the editor was chaplain of Muhlenberg College.

The Ecumenical Movement, by Leonard Hodgson, Sewanee (Tenn.), University of the South, 1951, pp. 50, 50 cents.

Three lectures by an eminent English theologian.

Logic for Living, by Henry Horace Williams, edited by Jane Ross Hammer, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. xix, 281, $3.75.

"Based on stenographic notes of actual classroom discussions in 1921-22."

The Wisdom of the Talmud, by Ben Zion Bokser, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. xx, 180, $3.75.

The title might have been: "Some of the Wisdom of the Talmud"—for the book is very small despite the price.

Mid-Century Appraisal of Civilization, by W. D. P. Warren, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1951, pp. xii, 80, $3.75.

Apparently the author wanted to write it; equally apparently the publisher has little interest in trying to sell it—nor is this surprising.

Christentum und Positivismus: die Grundlagen der Rechts- und Staatsauffassung Friedrich Julius Stahls, von Otto Volz, Tübingen, Mohr, 1951, pp. ix, 143, DM 15.

A reëvaluation of Stahl, and an important contribution to the history of the philosophy of law.

The Witness of Luke to Christ, by Ned B. Stonehouse, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. 184, $3.

". . . the basic concern has been the exegesis of the sacred text. . . . There is also present a subordinate apologetic interest."

The Secret of Pulpit Power, by Simon Blocker, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1951, pp. 209, $3.

The "secret" lies in "thematic preaching." This latter is grounded in the Scriptures and has for its purpose the proclamation of God's self-revelation.

Ex America, by Garet Garrett, Caldwell (Ida.), 1951, Caxton Printers, 1951, pp. 42, 75 cents.

Mr. Garrett has long been one of the most influential critics of the American Welfare State.

Glaube und Geschichte in der theologischen Exegese Ernst Lohmeyers, von Erik Esking, Uppsala, Almquist & Wiksells, 1951, pp. 267, 15 sch. kr.

A useful contribution to the history of New Testament interpretation.